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2. FACTS AND HOLDINGS BELOW: Petrs are public school 
teachers in Jackson, Michigan. The district-wide faculty is 
85% white and so is the teachers union membership. The 
~
collective bargaining contract stated that one of its goals 
was to have "at least the same percentage of minority racial 
representation on each individual staff as is represented by 
the student population of the Jackson Public Schools." 
~
Pursuant to this policy the master contract between the school 
and the union contained the following clause: 
"Article XII: In the event that it becomes 
necessary to reduce the number of teachers 
through layoff from employment by the Board, 
the teachers with the most seniority in the 
district shall be retained, except at no time 
will there be a greater percentage of minority ~ 
personnel laid off than the current percentage 
of minority personnel employed at the time of 
the layoff. In no event will the number given 
notice of possible layoff be greater than the 
number of positions to be eliminated. Each 
teacher so affected will be called back in 
reverse order for positions for which he is 
certified, maintaining the above minority 
balance."(emphasis added) 
The Board followed this provision during a recent layoff, 
and white teachers were laid off even though they had more 
seniority than black teachers who remained at work. Petr~ 
filed a ~1983 suit in the E.D. Mich. (Joiner). Although petrs 
sought relief on a number of theories including Title VII, the 
claim pertinent here is petrs' Sl983 claim alleging violations 
~
of the Equal Protection Clause. 
The OJ upheld the layoff provision. He dispensed with 
petrs' claim that affirmative action plans could not be 
adopted without a judicial finding of job discrimination. 
.. 
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United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 u.s. 193 (1979). Here the 
facts showed that in 1953 there were no black teachers in the 
Jackson School District. By 1961 they made up 1.8% of the 
faculty. The faculty was 3.9% black in 1969 even though at 
the same time the student population was 15.2% black. At the 
time the collective bargaining agreement was signed the 
faculty was 8.5% black and the student population was 15.9% 
~
black. At no time did the DC compare the percentage of 
faculty with the percentage of black certified teachers 




The DC held that Weber and Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n 
v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (CA6 1979), cert. denied, 452 u.s. 938 
I ( 
I\ 
(1981) required a court to find internal racial disparities to 
justify the affirmative action plan. Here the DC found no 
evidence of past overt discrimination, but stated that in 
looking for discrimination to justify the affirmative action 
plan, "it is appropriate to compare the percentage of minority~ I -.. e 
teachers to the percentage of minority students in the student 
body, rather than with the percentage of minorities in the -
relevant teaching market." Pet Sa. Although Weber inquired 
into the percentage of minorites in the relevant labor market, 
the DC held that it should look at the disparity between 
students and teachers, "because teaching is more than just a 
job, [t]eachers are role models for their students." The DC 
in entional discrimination, but the disparity between 
teachers and students met the CA6's •substantial 
\ 
misrepresentation" standard required by Young, supra • 
- 4 -
The DC stated that n[t]he test is one of reasonableness, ___.... ~
Young, supra, at 694, 696. 
whether the affirmative action plan is 'substantially related' 
to the objective of remedying past discrimination and 
correcting 'substantial' . and 'chronic' underrepresentation. 
Id. at 696.• The facts of this case met that test. 
The CA affirmed, quoting at length from the DC's opinion, 
~
J)-c_ 
including the passages above. The CA added that Firefighters ~~ 
Local Union No. 1784 v~, 104 s. Ct. 2576 (1984) did not
require a reconsideration of the DC's holding. Stotts did not 
---~.....:> 
involve a voluntary plan entered into by the employer and the 
workers • representative. The majority in Stotts reserved this / ~ J? 
very issue from its holding. Id. at 2590. 
In his concurring opinion Judge Wellford stated that nr 
would affirm the decision that this voluntary affirmative 
action layoff system, subject to collective bargaining 
safeguards, was sufficient to meet the challenge presented by 
plaintiffs.n He argued, however, that underrepresentation of 
minority teachers cannot be measured by looking to the 
percentage of minority students enrolled in school. He 
advocated finding a disparity by looking to statistics in the 
labor market rather than the student body. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs: This is the very issue left open 
by this Court in previous cases: "[t]he line of demarcation 
between permissible and impermissible affirmative action 
plans.• Weber, 443 u.s. at 208; Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 
2590. The CA6 erred in a number of respects. First, there 
.. 
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were no admissions or findings of past discrimination by the 
school board. The only statistical disparity in the record is 
the difference between the respective ratios of minorities in 
the student body and minorities in the faculty. This is 
insufficient to support ~ plan that forces people on layoff 
because of their skin color. 
Second, the CA6 applied the wrong standard. 
"Reasonableness" or "substantial relationship" is not the 
test. The test, stated time and again by this Court, is ......_____ ..___ 
strict scrutiny. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 104 s. ct. 1879, 1882 
egents v. Bakke, 438 u.s. at 289-291 (opinion of 
Powell, J.). The CA6's standard falls way short of that 
.,.. ---
required. 
Third, there is a split in the CA's. In Janowiak v. City 
of South Bend, 750 F.2d 557 (1984), the CA7 per Judge Pell ___. 
reversed a DC order which had approved a voluntarily-adopted 
hiring practice which gave preference on the basis of race. 
The City had preferred as justification for the practice a 
statistical disparity between minorities employed and 
minorities available. This justification was held 
insufficient. In the instant case, the resps have not shown 
~disparate impact between minorities employed and 
minorities available. 
Finally, the decision below conflicts with the 
requirement that racial preference must be remedial in nature. 
0 
In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 u.s. 448, 487 (1980) the Court 
held that a racial preference program "cannot pass muster 
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unless ••• it provides a reasonable assurance that application 
of racial or ethnic criteria will be limited to accomplishing 
••• remedial objectives." Moreover, Jes;;;~ ~ell,~\ 
concurring in Fullilove, noted that "this Court has 
approved race-conscious remedies absent judicial, 
administrative, or legislative findings of constitutional 
statutory violations." Id. at 4971 accord, Bushey v. New York 
State Civil Service Comm'n, 53 USLW at 3478 (Rehnquist, J., 
joined by two others, dissenting from cert. denial). In 
contrast, the CA6 dispensed with this requirement. The CA6 
requires no finding that racial preferences are limited to 
providing relief to victims of past discrimination. Instead, 
the racial preferences here have the same effect as the one 
struck down in William v. New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1569 
(CAS 1984) (Higginbotham, concurring) in which the "quota made 
no effort to correlate prior victim status to future 
advantage1 to be black ipso facto would be to benefit under 
this plan." 
Resps: The DC noted that minority teachers were 
substantially and chronically underrepresented in the 
district. The language negotiated by the union and the board 
is a reasonable plan to ensure that minority gains are not 
wiped out through layoffs. The facts of Weber make it clear 
that no judicial finding of past discrimination is needed. 
Resps do not discuss the CA7 Janowiak case, but argue 
that~totts does not prohibit this result as it involved Title 
~ VII and did not discuss voluntary plans. The holding below 
-------~ 
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does not contradict Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. 
Finally, although the case is not moot, very little is at 
stake. At the time this suit was filed only one white teacher 
~
was on layoff that would have been avoided had the layoffs 
followed a strict senior~ty basis. 
4. DISCUSSION: Weber is the closest case on the facts 
~
because it involved a collective bargaining agreement. Weber 
did not involve state action however, and this petn is ., 
predicated solely on the Fourteenth Amendmnt. The 
( 
r~iscrimination present in Weber was more egregious than that 
{\ 
present here;' indeed it is not clear that actual 
discrimination ever existed in this case. See 443 u.s. at 209 
(affirmative action plan under Title VII must rest upon a 
finding of "conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally 
segregated job categories"). 
It appears clear at the outset that the CA6 applied the 
wrong standard in assessing this program. In Fullilove the -------......, 
Chief for himself and Justices White and Powell stated that -
"[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must 
to make sur 
that it does not conflict with constitutional guarantees." 448 
u.s. at 491. Justice Rehnquist joined a dissent by Justice 
Stewart which urged that •any official actions that treats a 
person differently on account of his race ••• is inherently 
suspect and presumptively invalid." Id. at 523. I suggest 
that until this Court holds otherwise the minimal level of 
~
~ scrutiny should be that stated by the Chief Justice. But see 
'-· '-~~:---.....-----...... 
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also Fullilove, 448 u.s. at 517 (Marshall, J., concurring in 
judgment) (benign racial classification must be substantially 
related to correcting effects of discrimin tion). 
This case is similar to Bushey v. New York State Civil 
Service Comm'n, cert. denied 53 USLW 3477 (1/8/85). Both this 
case and Bushey involve a voluntary affirmative action program 
v' . . by a state. In Bushey the petrs brought only T1tle VII cla1ms 
in their cert. petn while here the petrs bring only an Equal 
Protection Clause claim. This petn is a possible grant for 
many of the reasons stated by Justice Rehnquist's dissent from 
------------
denial in Bushey (joined by the Chief Justice and Justice 
White). As the Bushey opinion noted, the issue was left open 
in Weber and Stotts and states do not possess enforcement 
~ power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. [One difference 
between this case and Bushey is that here the bargaining 
agent, composed of 85% white employees, agreed to the plan.] 
(( 
This c~~~f the clear and obvious past 
discrimination found in Weber and Fullilove. Even if one can 
--~ 
say that the DC and CA6 found a disparate impact, the 
disparity was a strange comparison between black faculty size 
and black student population. No attempt was made to 
determine whether the percentage of minority faculty mirrore 
the percentage of available minority teachers in the job 
market. 
There is a split between this case and the CA7's 
Janowiak. Janowiak held that more was required to uphold a 
~ City's race-conscious hiring program than a statistical 
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disparity between hired minority workers and available 
minority workers. 750 F.2d at 562 -563. Statistical data, to 
the CA7, is only the "first step in assessing whether an 
emp~~s properly to institute an affirmative action 
plan." See also Bakke, ~38 u.s. at 369 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) •1 According to the CA7 an affirmative action 
program must be based upon a finding of past discrimination. 
750 F.2d at 564, citing Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503, 508 
(CAS 1981), cert. denied, 454 u.s. 1124 (1981). Because 
additional evidence of discrimination was needed to support 
the race-conscious hiring program in Janowiak, the CA7 
reversed the DC's summary judgment order which had approved 
the hiring program. Janowiak is expecially at odds with this 
~ petn because the CA6 may not have even found a proper 
disparate impact, and there is no finding that the disparate 
impact was caused by discrimination. Both the CA7 in 
Janowiak and the CA6 below base their conflicting holdings on 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Finally, this case is not moot. The b~s of ~~ ~ 
at least one teacher are still in issue, and the layoff ~ 
provision is still in effect. See Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2583. 
1Justice Brennan for the four dissenters stated that: 
. . 
"[A] state government may adopt race-conscious programs 
if the purpose of such programs is to remove the 
disparate racial impact its actions might otherwise 
have and if there is reason to believe that the 
disparate impact is itself the product of past 
discrimination, whether its own or that of society at 
large.• (emphasis added) • 
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I recommend grant. One response. Op. in Pet. 3/25/85 Jung 
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Quotas on Teams 
F IVE YEARS AGO, the dispute in the Perry County, Miss., school syst~m was about bas-ketball. The local high school had an enroll-
ment that was half black and ha1f white; there were 
.tWo basketball coaches, one of each race. In spite of 
this neat and equal arrangement, though, it seemed 
the best basketball players were black and the white 
boys spent most of the time on the bench. The 
school board ordered the coaches to let more white 
boys play, but the federal government, finding that 
such forced integration of the team would constitute 
discrimination against the good black players, cut off 
aD the county's federal education money. 
A couple of years later, a court-appointed deseg-
regation administrator in Cleveland, Ohio, went 
farther. He decided that the school basketball 
teams had to be at least 20 percent white while the 
baseball teams had to be at least 50 percent black. 
:A judge with common sense threw out the plan, but 
the idea that school teams requiring a skill of some 
·kind must be racially balanced is still around. The 
) 
'latest example is in Los Angeles, where the local 
school district has just decreed that high school 
teams in academic competitions must reflect the 
racial and sexual composition of the student bodies 
at schools. . 
All these quotas for competitive school teams are 
.' 
sadly misguided. Some students obviously will be . 
better basketball players and aome will excel at 
mathematics. The trick is to develop each child's 
personal capacities to the fullest. It is nonsense to 
put someone on a basketball team because she is 
short, fat and white or to choose a boy for the "It's 
Academic" team because he represents the tall, Al-
banian group in the English lit class. Even more 
ludicrous than these policies is the contradictory 
one in Los Angeles that tolerates racially unbali 
anced sports teams but not academic teams be-
cause "athletic competition is primarily a question 
of physical skill, which is somewhat more inherent 
than intellectual skill." 
· H~ is a r_y1e that's senSJble and fair: every stu-
dent is eligible to compete for a place on every 
team. Students of all races should be encouraged to 
do so by practices that make plain that no racial or 
sexual discrimination will work against them. But 
p~e t should o to those who have t e 
eatest ability-w e er 1t's in s e lam-
dunking or Ianfflige and 'terature-and who are 
WillUig to put in e Bme and effort to perfect those 
skills. That's the way Redskins are chosen, and ~ 1 
cancer researchers and opera singers. To teach 
children that life offers different standards is to do 
them a terrible disservice. 
~~ 
iDirSex and Race Goals in Hiring;. ~ah-a--
Interview With Morris Abram 
Vice Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 
Q Mr. Abram, why do you believe we should abolish the use 
of mJrfs to increase employment of minorities and women? 
A oppose quotas because they create an ethnic spoi ls 
SY.s tcm for certain groups to grab more power lor tfi'eir 
members-at the expense of individuals outside the group. 
That's contrary to our civil-rights laws that guarantee equal 
protection of civi l rights for all Americans, not just for 
blacks, women and other minorities. The Civil Rights Act of 
( 
1964 specifically forbids any mandatory requirement that 
~ employers grant preferential treatment on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex or national origin. 
Q Why not compensate for decades of past discrimination? 
A Any individual who proves that he or she has been sub-
ject to discrimination is entitled to compensation under our 
civil-rights laws. But the fact that one black or a hundred 
blacks have been discriminated against in the past doesn't 
mean that Joe White Man, who didn't discriminate, can be 
replaced or prevented from getting a job so that Joe Black 
Man, who may never have suffered any discriminatiO!], can -\ I be appointed. I don't kn~,Jial basis f01~grouplbcing 
C entitled to COmQensation regardless orwhether or not indi-
- viduals in that group have 
YES- suffered any discrimination. 
Q Wouldn 't ending quotas 
turn back the clock to the days 
when disadvantaged groups 
were shut out of many jobs? 
"Thev create an ethnic 
spoils svstem lor 
groups to grab more 
power" 
A No. It's against the law 
to shut anybody out on the 
basis of race, creed and gen-
der. I support the vigorous 
enforcement of the law. This 
is different from the ques-
tion of group need. I'm 
deeply aware of the fact that 
there are many blacks and 
other minority groups who 
are disadvantaged. A grow-
ing number are experienc-
ing an employment and 
educational crisis. The rise in 
female-headed households is 
a special problem. But quo-
tas are not going to help people who are not trained to 
work. Quotas are not going to help people who are illiter-
ate. Quotas are not going to help people who have not the 
motivation to work. 
Q Do you conclude that the 1984 Supreme Court decision on 
layoffs and seniority bans employment quotas? 
A Yes. In that case involving layoffs of Memphis fire-
fighters, the Court ruled that you cannot interfere wit~ 
seniority system to protect minorities from being laid off. 
But the Court didn't stop there. ll said that this principle 
applies to hiring people and promotions. 
Q Why should quota systems that seemingly have been ef-
fective for years suddenly be dismantled? 
A Because quota systems are wrong and divisive. We had 
white supremacy for years, and cities in the South where I 
was raised said that it worked and that the community was 
happy. But it was wrong. Just as discrimination done in the 
name of white supremacy was wrong, discrimination done 
in the name of racial or sexual preference is wrong. 0 
50 
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Interview With Mayor William Hud'nut 
Republican of Indianapolis ~~ , J 
~ ... ~~ 
Q Mr. Hudnut, why do you think quotas are an appropriate 
remedy in job-discrimination cases? 
A I prefer to usc the word "goals" or "guidelines." It 
means you're shooting for standards in employment which 
reflect roughly the percentage of minorities and women 
in the general labor pool. A lot of progress has been made 
with affirmative-action goals. 
Without them, we would re-
gress into a situation where 
overt or covert discrimina-
tion against blacks, Hispanics 
and women would prevent 
them from taking their right-
ful place in the mainstream 
of community activity. 
Q Hasn't the Supreme Court 
outlawed the use of numerical 
goals in employment? 
A The decision last year in-
volving Memphis firefighters 
is susceptible to different in-
terpretations. In our opinion, 
it was a narrow case which ap-
plied to laying off whites to 
hire blacks, and the Court 
protected seniority systems 
when it comes to layoffs. I'm 
not sure it is proper to ap-
NO-
Without them. "we'll 
never get close to 
equal treatment lor 
minorities" 
ply that decision broadly to all affirmative-action plans. 
In Indianapolis, we made a commitment in 1976 that 25 
percent of recruitment classes for police and fire depart-
ments be composed of minorities. This goal was subsequently 
confirmed by the Justice Department. Things have worked 
well , and the white majority has accepted the fact that we're 
making a special effort for minoriti es and women. I think it's 
a great mistake for the Justice Department to ask us to dis-
mantle the program. 
Q But didn't sponsors of the Civil Rights Act oppose the idea 
of numerical quotas? 
A Well, the sponsors of the Civil Rights Act may have op-
posed quotas at the time, but subsequent history has shown 
that without goals we'll never get close to the dream of equal 
treatment for minorities, because that doesn't happen when 
nature takes its course. What happens is that the overwhelm-
ing majority of job opportunities goes to white males because 
they are the majority. Those same sponsors of civil-rights laws 
also said that the government has a special role to play as an 
advocate for the disadvantaged . I think it's morally obliga-
tory that we make an extra effort for disadvantaged groups. 
Q Are minorities or women who would otherwise be unquali-
fied to hold certain jobs being hired under quotas? 
A I don't think so. Let's say you have 25 qualified people 
for a recruit clas~ of 20 in the police department. Among the 
20 selected are five minorities or women to help achieve af-
firmative-action goals. The point is they are all qualified. 
Q Aren't quotas just another form of discrimination that harms 
whites or males who are innocent of any wrongdoing? 
A I'm not sure that's true. It's a very tough, complex legal 
issue. But I don't think that the white male is being discrimi-
nated against when he's getting 80 percent of the jobs in po-
lice and fire departments-as he is now in most cities even 
with affirmative-action goals. 0 
o Copyright @ 1985, U.S.News & World Report, Inc. 
Banle Heats Up 
over sex,.Race 
Biasindobs 
Hiring goals are widening 
the rift between the White 
House and coalitions of 
civil-rights groups. 
Spurred by recent federal efforts to 
roll back affirmative-action plans in 50 
cities, civil-rights groups and their al-
lies are gearing up for a counterattack. 
At a two-day conference in Washing-
ton, D.C., representatives of 91 groups, 
including the AFL-CIO, the National 
Committee Against D{scrilnm.:Lticm 
Housing and the N 
for Women, formed a task force to 
tle the Reagan administration over the 
rights of women and minorities in em-
ployment, housing and education. 
As part of that effort, the National 
Association for the Advancement of Col-
ored People has sued the Justice Depart-
Assistant Atty. Gen. William Brad-
ford Reynolds contends that the ad-
ministration is following "colorblind 
and sex-neutral principles" and has 
compiled an "unprecedented record of 
civil-rights enforcement." 
Moreover, as the administration sees 
it, leaders of many civil-rights groups 
no longer represent the bulk of wom-
en, blacks and other minorities. 
ment in an attempt to bar the ms- more, Los P-''1".'"._"'"" In a strategy to woo 
tration from dismantling hiring g~ve 
based on sex and race. The NAAC · on 
ul"'~""~~I'-J'"""~' President Reagan 
~~~~~~~U:ntdiltiOJrral civil-rights lead-
plans suits to block administr 10n ef-
forts to discard affirmative-action pro-
grams in Indianapolis and Los Angeles. 
The Mexican American Legal De-
fense and Educational Fund, too, is 
considering suits against the Justice 
Department to protect quotas 
women and minorities in San 
San Francisco and Los Angeles. 
opened his doors to a fledgling 
btfl'M~an group called the Council for 
a Black Agenda that stresses 
center o the rift etween civil- self-help en al solutions in-
ts groups an~.J.d.min_i§!ra!i_9n is iF stead of massive ent aid to im-
question: s ~rove the economic of blacks. 
protect classes of people who allegedly A GOP coup. This scored its 
apply to all indiv a as, the opular black chief executive 
race, creed, sex or national origin? o Wayne ounty, Mich., and potential "It used to be that the J 
partment used its prestige 
resources for the 
and poor who needed he 
says Richard Fajardo of 
Mexican-American Legal 
suffer discriminatio o the laws bi es~ccess on May 8 when William 
andidate for governor, 
Seeking support of middle-class blacks, President Reagan switched his allegiance to the 
welcomes Michigan politician William Lucas to the GOP. Republican Party. Lucas said 
fense and Educational 
"Now, the resources of Jus-
tice Department being 
used against them employ-
ment, education housing." 
The problem civil-rights 
groups escalated when the 
Justice Department asked a 
court to overturn quotas in In-
dianapolis over the city's ob-
jection-the first time the fed-
eral government has taken a 
city to court to dissolve an af-
firmative-action plan. 
The government argues that 
numerical goals amount to 
preferential treatment forcer-
tain groups at the expense of 
individuals outside the group-
in most cases, white males. 
U.S.NEW S & W ORLD REPORT 
,, 
blacks have been "taken for 
&ranted" by Democrats. 
GOP strategist Lee Atwater 
predicts Lucas will be the first 
of "many switches of substan-
tial black leaders who under-
stand that it is time to change." 
Yet as the rift widens be-
tween the administration and 
civil-rights groups, a number 
of leading Republicans remain 
wary of the federal govern-
ment's hard-line approach. 
"You've got to talk to blacks, 
and you can't just talk to the 
ones who voted for you," says 
Representative Jack Kemp (R-
N.Y.). "You cannot be con-
scious of the problems facing 
blacks in America today with-
out talking to the people who 
represent them." 0 
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h Aff, J?~t Ai/.1.~/sl).,... b T e 1 mat1ve ct1on e ate 
A draft executive order would rescind rules that require major 
government contractors to set numerical goals for hiring minorities and 
women. We print here some opinions on the issue. 
The Draft Proposal 
From a draft executive order on nondiscrimination requirements 
for government contractors: 
Each government contractor and subcontractor shall engage in 
affirmative recruitment and employment-related training programs 
designed to ensure that minorities and women receive full consider· 
ation for hiring and promotion. Such affirmative programs shall be 
developed pursuant to regulations promulgated by the secretary of 
labor', and shall describe the actions to be taken, including time 
frames for taking such actions, to accomplish the objective of ex-
panding the number of qualified minorities and women who receive 
full consideration for hiring and promotion. 
Nothing in this executive order shall be interpreted to require or 
to provide a legal basis for a government contractor or subcontrac-
tor to utilize any numerical quota, goal or ratio, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against, or grant any preference to, any individual or 
group on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
with respect to any aspect of employment, including but not limited 
to recruitment, hiring, promotion, upgrading, demotion, transfer, 
layafi, termination, rates of pay or other forms of compensation, 
and selection for training, including apprenticeship. Nor shall any 
government contractor or subcontractor be determined to have vio-
lated this order due to a failure to adopt or attain any statistical 
measures. Further, nothing in this order shall be interpreted to re· 
quire or provide a legal basis for any government contractor or sub-
contractor to exclude or in any respect limit the participation of any 
individual in any recruitment or training program on the basis of 
race , color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
A Civil Rights Lawyer 
From a statement by Richard Seymour 
of the Lawyers ' Committee for Civil Rights 
Under Law: 
The Supreme Court 
From the Supreme Court decision in 
Teamsters v. United States (1977): 
... [O]ur cases make it unmistak· 
ably clear that "[s]tatistical analyses 
have served and will continue to serve 
an important role" in cases in which 
the existence of discrimination is a dis· 
puted issue .... We have repeatedly 
approved the use of statistical proof, 
where it reached proportions com-
parable to those in this case, to estab-
lish a prima fa cie case of racial dis-
crimination in jury selection cases . ... 
Statistics are equally competent in 
proving employment discrimination. 
Labor Secretary Brock 
From an address by Labor Secretary 
William E. Brock before the NAACP 
convPntion in Dallas June 24: 
I think this country is going to have 
some form of affirmative action for a 
considerable period of time into the fu. 
ture. There is a distinction which you}' 
can make between absolute numbers 
and quotas and so-caJ.led goals ap-
proaches. 
But we as a country have lived for 
200 years with a major part of our 
population in remarkable disadvantage. 
And it takes some time to recover from 
that. Maybe we [the generation of white 
Americans] were not here then. Bu~ · 
that does not change the obligation we 
have as citizens to respond to that situa-
tion. 
Under the present executive order, the 
government can look at the same kinds of 
evidence a court would examine to deter· 
mine if a contractor is in violation of the 
law. The draft [order] would bar the gov-
ernment from looking at any statistical 
proof, no matter how compelling, and no 
matter how great the weight a court 
would give to such proof. . . . The draft 
would leave nothing but the facade of the 
present enforcement program, and would 
gut everything of value in the program. 
The National Associ~tion of Manufacturers 
If the draft order is signed, it would be 
the most extreme action the administra· 
tion has yet taken in the civil rights area. 
It would effectively limit the executive 
order to rare cases in which direct proof 
of intentional discrimination is available. 
The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission and the justice Department, 
combined, file only a couple of hundred 
fair employment lawsuits a year (out of al· 
most 10,000 new cases filed under the 
fair employment laws by private citizens. 
each year), and the Labor Department's 
monitoring of thousands of government 
contractors each year under the present 
executive order has been the govern· 
ment's main weapon in combating job dis· 
crimination. Dismantling it will be a great 
comfort to bigots everywhere. 
From congressional testimony 
on July 10 on behalf of the Na-
tional Association of Manufactur· 
ers by William S. McEwen, direc-
tor of equal opportunity affairs for 
Monsanto Company: 
As the debate on affirmative ac· 
tion has emerged in recent years, 
much attention has focused on 
goals and.ti!n~s Ym!!5 quo.ta,s. 
~not believe that nu· 
merical goals for minority inclusion 
in the workforce, by themselves, 
constitute quotas. Business, partic· 
ularly big business, sets goals and 
timetables for every aspect of its 
operations-profits, capital invest· 
ment, productivity increases and 
promotional potential for individu· 
als. Setting goals and timetables 
for minority and female participa-
tion is a way of measuring progress 
L----------------- yt ~1\ 
and focusing on potential discrimi-
nation. 
· Industry recognizes, however 'l 
that goals and timetables can be-
come masks for rigid quotas. We 
oppose any regulations that turn 
positive programs for measuring 
progress into unwielding rules On 
the number of minorities and 
women who must encompass the 
workplace. Yet, vQhm~s set 
by corporations lOrworkforce par· 
ticipation should not be viewed as 
eroding equal opportunity objec· 
tive.s. These goals are merely a 
recognition that ~eju­
dices remain in our soctety. A:ssur· 
ing eqWlr oppo uruty, at least for 
the next few years to come, means 
we must be ever vigilant in facing 





..... _ ' . 7l~t rf./1&, I. 'S ' ~ 
Gzant 8tep Backward .11~ 
THE REAGAN administration has under study what could be its most regressive step on civil rights in five years in office. Circulating within 
the justice Department and the White House is a pro-
posed revision of the executive order on which is 
based the government's least known but possibly 
most important civil rights enforcement program. 
This is the ~tive a£_tion program quietly om py 
tM_~~ent for federal contractors. It 
covers l>erhapsarourth~ork force, 
and extends to ahnost every major company and in-
dustry. T!l dQ...business with the government a._com-
h ·v · s. A large com-
pany must show there is a reasonable relationship be-
tween the racial and other characteristics of its work 
force and the makeup of the work force at large from 
which it draws. 
Opponents within the administration, said to in-
clude the attorney general, Edwin Meese, and the 
assistant attorney general for civil rights, William 
Bradford Reynolds, would eviscerate the order by 
stripping out the racial and other statistics now 
used as reference points. An excerpt from their · 
proposed rewording is on the op-ed page today. So 
are some very different views of the matter; one is 
the view of the Supreme Court. 
Those arguing for the more detached approach 
say it is the only correct one for the government to 
take: the governme ust be colorblind. We sym-
pathize with that. We a ee as well that affiunative 
action can ~nd et1mes has been taken too r, 
to the w!nt. of stri&t r~jal an<i...Qtber: QI.!Q!jls. But 
the proposed position goes too far as well, in the 
opposite direction. It places ideology above reality; 
it pretends as if there is no past. 
This proposal, which would effectively destroy the 
government's ability to stop discrimination in taxpay-
er-financed jobs, was not sought by industry. "We've 
gotten used to it, frankly," a spokeswoman for the 
National Association of Manufacturers said of the 
present rule. From the other side of the table, the ex-
ecutive council of the AFL-CIO has said a weakening 
of the rule would be "a giant step backward in the 
fight against employment discrmination." 
Twenty years of affirmative action by the gov-
ernment, unions and private employers have 
brought about dramatic improvement in the lot of 
minorities and women in the work force. T~ 
er~quirem._ents hav ver involve uo s-
that IS a str w an-and ey ave en accepted 
in every segment of the economy, even by those 
most resistant at the start. The objective has been 
a level of fair employment that will make all goals 
and timetables unnecessary. But that day has not 
yet come. The proposed new order would gratui-
tously disturb a program that, for now, is doing 
more to unify society than divide it. The program 
should be left alone. 
lfp/ss 09/17/85 CLERKS SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: My Clerks DATE: Sept. 16, 1985 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Affirmative Action 
We have granted the Cleveland affirmative action 
case, and probably will grant another one (I do not recall 
the name) at the September 30 Conference. The issue is 
another one of national importance that we will consider 
during the 1985 Term. 
As I dictate this, I do not recall whether one of 
you has been assigned the Cleveland case. If one read 
everything that has been written on the subject, it could 
well take the entire Term. There must be a score or more 
of lower court decisions, as well as law review articles. 
The most relevant decisions of this Court - as I recall 
their names - are Bakke, Fullilove, Weber and Stotts. I 
believe the lower courts have been reading Stotts as 
~ 
limited to situations where a quota plan was applied~ a 
collective bargaining agreement, although there is 
language in Stotts a good deal broader than this. 
In general, a distinction has been drawn between 
affirmative action programs and quotas or mathematical 
"goals". In many situations the distinction is far from 
clear. Most of what I have read (and it has been 
haphazard reading) - even including a recent editorial in 
the Post - suggests that non-mandatory goals adopted by 
management to achieve a more representative work force 
consisting of women and minorities are valid. In view of 
what I wrote in Bakke, and said 
program could have my support 
arbitrary quotas, particularly 
in Fullilove, such a 
unless it camouflaged 
those that displaced 
persons innocent of any discrimination. I would find it 
difficult to say that the Equal Protection Clause does not 
- as its plain language states - invalidate a quota plan 
in the absence of proof of discrimination against those 
employed to displace innocent persons. 
A difficult area is the extent to which 
discrimination by an employer generally affects the type 
of plan adopted. The easiest case is where there has been 
a pattern of not hiring qualified women and minorities who 
have sought employment. Those discriminated against have 
a strong case. A more d iff icul t case arises where no 
particular individual can be identified as having been 
discriminated against, and yet it may be deduced from the 
population mix and the composition of the work force that 
there was a discriminatory intent with respect to women or 
minorities. 
I suggest that it may be desirable for two clerks 
to work together on this problem. Consideration should be 
given to obtaining assistance from the library. We could 
request it to identify the best law review and other 
periodical discussion of the issues that are likely to be 
decisive in these cases. 
elaborate hearings before 
I believe there also have been 
congressional 
the library can be quite helpful in 





Perhaps the four of you could set aside a hour to 
discuss this question, and define more sharply than this 
memo what needs to be examined carefully an~ , exactly how 
the library may be able to help. 
As I have not thought carefully about 
difficult problem, and have read nothing recently, 






September 23, 1985 
WYGANT DOCOUT-POW 
84-1340 WYGANT, etal v. JACKSON BOARD OF EDUCATION, etal. 
MEMO TO MIKE 
I note that this is your case, and assume that you 
are doing a bench memo. It may well be one of three or 
four of the most important cases of this Term. In this 
memo to you I will share some general thoughts that may 
possibly sharpen the focus of your more thorough study. 
The collective bargaining agreement between respondent 
School Board and its teachers union (in effect since 1972) 
provides that white teachers may be laid off even though 
certain minority teachers with less seniority are 
retained. There had been no history of discrimination. 
Minorities are defined to include "employees who are 
Black, American Indians, Orientals, or of Spanish 
decendency." The agreement further provides: 
"The goal of [the School Board policy] 
shall be to have at least the same perce~tage of 
minority racial representat i on on each 
individual [teaching] staff as is represented by Ci ... 'J/ .. { 
the {i~ po~tion of the Jackson Public '~ 
Schoo s." 
The petitioners are white teachers who initially were laid 
off under this CBA provision. The briefs state that all 
L.. 
of the petitioners have been reemployed except one, but 
that the case is not moot because back pay is - or maybe -
involved, and the program (called "affirmative action 
~ogram") remains in effect. I understand that injunctive 
relief is sought. 
At the outset, Mike, I make this comment: There are 
four categories of minorities. Apparently these four 
would be added together, when the total number of teachers 
correspond to the total number of Blacks, Indians, 
Orientals or persons of Spanish decent in the student 
population, the "goals" would be realized. I would think 
there would be considerable argument as who are Orientals 
and particularly who are persons of Spanish decendency. 
Dan Ortiz's father was a first generation American, his 
father being from Spa in. Moreover, as we saw from the 
)_,vV' ~ statistics in the Bakke case, Orientals (and there is no 
ljl f?"t' 'f>t; ref ini tion as to who is an Oriental) often are brighter 
A ~r than a majority of Whites with whom they may compete. But 
trl ~ 
~~ I do not think this senseless provision in the CBA merits 
~) ::e ca::anas a i ;a~:n:::~entTehde t::u::r:r::::::l w~::u::in::d:: 
l ~ programs designed to benefit Blacks at the expense of 




we do not write on a clean slate, although I do not 
~lieve a majority of the Court in any of our cases - or 
perhaps even adding up votes in different cases - has 
~reed on the proper standard of analysis in this type of 
case. Nor have we had before us an affirmative action 
program or quota program exactly like this. As I 
mentioned in my general memorandum, apparently the most 
relevant cases (apart from many cases that state general 
~inciples of equal protection law) are Bakke, Weber, 
Fullilove, and Stotts. The parties, and the numerous 
amici, differ as to which of these cases is closest or 
most relevant. As I read the SG's amicus brief, he thinks 
that Bakke and Fullilove are the most relevant. It is 
true that Weber did not involve state action. It was a 
Title VII case in which there had been a long record of 
racial discrimination, and the company and its union 
~reed on an affirmative action program. 
The DC and the Court of Appeals in this case 
distinguished Stotts primarily on the ground that there 
had been a court order enforcing a discrimatory layoff ---
plan, whereas here there was a voluntary agreement between 
,...- _____..,_..;:_ 
the School Board and the labor union. The petitioners 
assert a denial of equal protection by state action, and I 
.. 
..... 
think it clear that a school board and a union could not 
agree to deprive employees of constitutional rights. 
~ 
The courts below applied a standard of 
~easonableness", Pet. P. lOA, relying primarily on Court 
of Appeals decisions. Although no finding of 
discrimination was made, the DC found that there was 
"substantial" and "chronic under representation" of 
minorities on the school faculties, and therefore - it 
reasoned that "the Fourteenth Amendment would permit" the 
voluntary adoption of "an affirmative action plan to 
protect minority teachers from the effects of layoffs." 
'!he CA largely adopted the DC' s opinion. Although this 
was called an affirmative action plan, it was quite 
comparable to the quota system in Bakke because white 
teachers were laid off without regard to seniority or 
comparative ability simply because they were white. 
Identifying the proper standard is critical in this 
type of case. I am inclined to agree with the SG and 
petitioners that the "reasonableness" standard adopted by 
the DC and CA6 is inappropriate where there is racial 
discrimination. Yet, I am not at all sure that five of us 
have ever agreed on the phraseology of an applicable 
standard. As stated in Bakke, and reiterated in my 
5. 
concurring opinion in Fullilove, I think that where 
discrimination is based solely on race the traditonal 
"strict scrutiny" standard should be applicable. We have 
not always used precisely these words. I joined the Chief 
Justice's opinion in Fullilove despite some 
dissatisfaction with the Chief's failure specifically to 
identify the standard he was applying. The closest he 
came to doing this was as follows: 
"Any preference based on racial or ethnic 
criteria must necessarily receive a most 
searchin~xamtn~tion to make sure that it dOes 
not conflict with constitutional guarantees." 
448 u.s. 448 at 491. 
Only Justice White and I joined the Chief's opinion. 
~stices Stewart and Rehnquist dissented in Fullilove, in 
which Justice Stewart quoted from Justice Harlan's dissent 
in Plessy as follows: 
"Our Constitution is color blind, and 
neither knows nor tolerates classes among 
citizens.... The law regards man as man, and 
takes no account of his surroundings or his 
color •.• ". Justice Stewart then stated that the 
"equ=a.;;.l__.P.;;.;r;;..o~te.;:..g.U,on stan~ard of the Constitution 
I 
has one clear and central meaning - it 
absolutely prohibits invidious discrimination by 
governme~t. Tnaf sta ndara mus t be met by e very 
state under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Any official action 
that treats a person differently on account of 
his race or ethnic origin is inherently suspect 
and presumptively invalid." 
.. 
Vo 
Although I did not join Justice Stewart's opinion in 
FUllilove for the reasons stated in my concurring opinion, 
I view his standard as substantially similar to "strict 
s::::rutiny". I simply 
by the Congress and 
agreed in Ful~that the findings 
the general ap 1cation of a federal 
statute demonstrated a compelling governmental interest 
that met the test. 
In view of what Justices Brennan, Marshall and 
Blackmun have said in Bakke and other cases (but CF. 
Mirshall's opinion in Fullilove), it is likely that at 
least these three Justices will vote to affirm CA6 in this 
case. I would guess that the Chief Justice, Rehnquist and 
O'Connor will be inclined to share my tentative view that 
at least a high level of scrutiny (sometimes referred to 
as "heightened scrutiny") must be applied, and that the 
oourts below gr ieviously erred in the applying simply a 
reasonableness test. Justice White joined the Chief 
Justice in Fullilove, but he was with the Brennan group in 
Bakke. Justice Stevens, with the Chief Justice, and 
Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, avoided any clear 
identification of a standard in their Bakke opinion. They 
did not reach the constitutional question. Thus, the 
outcome of this case is likely to depend on the votes of 
7. 
either Justice White or Justice Stevens. In your review 
of the cases, Mike, you might bear this in mind. 
I would have some doubt as to whether the plan before 
us (actually it is closer to a quota system than the 
normal affirmative action type plan) even meets a 
reasonableness test. No attention was given in the 
implementation of the plan to the number of qualified 
Black teachers available as compared to the number of 
qualified White teachers available in the community. The 
plan's objective was to equate the number of minority 
teachers with the number of minority pupils, justifying 
this in part on a "role model" theory. But there is no -
evidence in the record to support the role model theory, 
and one can argue that intelligent minority students would 
prefer to have the ablest teachers without regard to race 
or color. In this case, the discrimination was with 
respect to seniority - not other qualifications. 
It probably will be clear, from the foregoi~ 
rambling comments, that I am inclined to reverse CA6. It 
is critically important to consider carefully what 
Justices White and Stevens have either written or joined 
in the past. I would like to be able to anticipate their 
.. . 
Uo 
arguments. I could live with the Chief's rather off-hand 
articulation in Fullilove of a standard, though I probably 
~uld explain - as I did in that case - why I considered 
this a heightened level of scrutiny applicable to any 
racial discrimination. 
I would not join an opinion that forecloses approval 
of the type of affirmative action plan that is so typical 
in both public and private employment. This is a plan 
pursuant to which general goals - not fixed quotas - are 
... 
stated, and minorities and women - if qualified - may be 
given priority in filling vacancies or new positions. The 
purpose is to increase the number of women and minority 
employees. There are a good many variations of such 
plans, but the type I would approve involves no layoff of 
Whites simply because they are White. 
My views are tentative, and I will welcome your more 
carefully considered analysis and recommendations. 
I add that I have not read any of the numerous amici 
briefs. You may find one or two on each side of this case 
helpful and worth reading carefully. 
LFP, JR • 
1b: Justice Powell 
From: Mike 
~= 83-1340 Wygant et al. v. Jackson Board of Education 
Set to be argued: Wed. Nov. 6th 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
This memo is in response to questions raised during yo~ 
conversation with Justice Stevens. 
(1) Justice Stevens stated that the layoff provision of tre 
collective bargaining agreement was a form of "tenure" granted to 
minority teachers. That term does not appear in reference to 
minority teachers in any relevant provision of the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement. Although I am now a little "gun-shy" about 
~essing at Justice Stevens' reasoning, the "tenure" theory is 
probably his characterization of the argument made by resps in 
fueir brief at p.l9 that without layoff protection for new 
minority hires, no progress could be made toward increasing the 
percentage of minority faculty, because they would be hired one 
year only to be laid off the next spring. That contention is 
hlghly disputed by petrs, see Petrs' Reply Brief at 7-10. 
The main reference to "layoffs" is found in the 
Cbllective Bargaining Agreement at Article XII. That provision 
states that layoff shall be according to seniority, "except that 
at no time will there be a greater percentage of minority 
.' 
,~ ._ ( 
personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority 
personnel employed at the time of the layoff." The effect of 
kticle XII is to place a cap on the number of minority teachers 
that can be laid off. If 10% of the faculty are minorities 
~fore the layoff, then only 10% of those laid off can be 
minorities. Article IX also notes that recall from layoffs 
·~hall be accomplished maintaining the minority ratio of teachers 
which existed prior to the layoff." See J.A. at 13, 27. 
~) Justice Stevens maintained that although "minority" was 
defined broadly, this case actually only involves blacks. At 
J.A. 108 a chart displays the number of minority hires according 
to race. Because the American Indians, Asians and those of 
~anish descent were among the last hired, presumably they were 
protected by the layoff provision. 
(3) There are four cases that involve one or more of these same 
parties. I will list them chronologically. 
A. Jackson Education Ass'n v. Jackson Board of 
.Etlucation, No. 4-72340 (ED Mich Dec. 15, 1976) (mem op found at 
J .A. 30) In the spring of 1974, when the Board saw that adhering 
to the layoff provision would result in firing tenured teachers 
if favor of retaining minority teachers still on probation, it 
declined to follow the layoff provision. Black teachers sued. 
The Fed DC (ED Mich) held that the minority plaintiffs had not 
---. ~ -
I I ,....--.. .... "'r 
established any purposeful discrimination as required by 
washington v. Davis, 426 us 229 (1976) sufficient to vest the 
court with jurisdiction over its equal protection claim, and that 
it lacked jurisdiction over their Title VII claims for failure to 
tc 
file a claim first with the EEOC. Having determined that it 
lacked jurisdiction over the federal claims, the court declined 
to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state contract claims. 
a Jackson Education Ass'n v. Jackson Board of 
ffiucation, No. 77-0011484 cz (Jackson County Circuit Court, 
August 31, 1979) (J.A. 40). Plaintiffs in case A, supra, took 
their state contract claims to state court. That court stated 
~at it "has not been established that the board had 
discriminated against minorities in its hiring practices. The 
minority representation on the faculty was the result of s~tal --
racj_g1_ .. 9.i~.~>~-~.~!Jon." J.A. at 43. Plaintiffs prevailed on 
~eir argument that the layoff provision was not in conflict with 
Michigan's Teacher Tenure Act. 
c. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 546 F.Supp. 
1195 (ED Mich 1982) (App. to Cert. Pet. at 20a). This is the DC 
opinion below in this case. It is fully described in the bench 
memo. The DC made no discrimination, reasoning 
that no such finding was necessary. 
D. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 746 F.2d 1152 
(CA6 1984) (App. to Cert. Pet. at 2a). The Ca decision below. 
It adopted the reasoning of the DC, and made no finding of prior 
discrimination. 
~
i · Asian Am~ricans, in rece~t years 
r the f~est .. rowin_g segment of the 
population; n?w .l~nerally out)>er- . 
form otl)er mJAOnties and whites in 
the cl~room ·and the workplace 
a~d a~ "~fteQ perceived as a model 
l
mmonty, eccording to a study re-
eased yeste~. . . . 
The ~opulation Reference Bu-
r~u, US1Qg ~sua · Bur~au data, 
said that in general Asian Ameri-
cans ~am mO're 'llloney than white 
~~nchi~~ ~ are more likely to 
Jru~ ,... school and college than 
theJC white counterparts. . 
I . 
aranta is ~ •• " transform .the 
U.S. im#an1 population there-
port aafd. From 1980 to i9a.., 48 
pera:nt of aU legal immig~ants 
came from Asia, compared with . 
~bout 12 perce~ in the 1960s. Dur-
10~ the 1980s, a· third of legal im-
migrants have come from M . , _ . exico 
oru.atin AmerJCa while only 12 per-
. cent have come from Europe. This 
re~e~nts .a sharp reversal from 
earJH:r ImmJgr~tion patterns. 
Th~ . only category of Asian 
Amencans who perform below 
thes~ s~andards are the latest wave 
of VJe~namese immigrants, the so-
called :OOat people," who arrived in 
t~e Umted'States in the last decade 
With less. ed~cation than previous 
waves of Immigrants. 
Asran Amencans have a remark-
able rec?rd in education, the au-
thors say. Except for Vietnlmese 
a~udents, 1980 high school' compJe- . 
bon rates for Asian-American males. 
be~ween the ages of 25 and'29 out-
str!pped the 87 percent rate for 
whites and the 7 4 percent rate 
. among blacks. 
The_ recent wave of Asian immi-
,, 
Amo~g Japanese Americans, the 
completion rate was 96 percent· 
a~o~g Chinese, 90 percent; among 
FJbpmos, 89 percent; among Ko-
See ASIAN AMERICANS, Al9, Col. 3 
DIE w ASUINGTON PosT . 
TOTAL ASIAN-AMERICAN POPULAliO!..INCREASE 
APRIL l, 1980-SEpt. 30, t-..1. . · ~ ·'"t .. 
·a.lan Americana ,...,.....t 2.1 ~nt of the · 
toul u.s. popu~.uc,n., a3t,447,ooo. • . 












SOURCE: Population Research Bureau. 
THt: WASHINGTON POST 
~ Asian Americans Shown 
' 1 
:Outperforming Others 
ASIAN AMERICANS, From AI 
· reans and Asian Indians, 94 per-
cent. The rate for Vietnamese 
· Americans was 76 percent. 
The figures for female Asian 
, AmeriCans in the same age group 
1 were goOd, but not as high as 
among males. ·, . 
The 1980 cens\18 found that 35 
percent of Asian Ainericans age 25 
ana oJcSer bad arac:tuated 'fr9lD ·col-
leJe-twice the _ prQPOrtion of 
Wbltel$ •. ' . • • .. . 
Chinese Arnen.cans led the Waf in 
college.attendance, with 60 percent 
~~between T; of 20 and 
part due to the fact that Asian 
Americans tend to live in larger 
family groupings and have more 
workers per hoilaehold.' 
The report said that Asian Amer- · 
icans gene~ally have. lower unem-
ployment ra~s and higbet labor 
· force participation rates than 
whites or blacks. . 
·. The nation'-- A*,~ 
now number '5.1- ml1tiOil and are 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell October 30, 1985 
From: Mike 
No. 84-1340 Wygant, et 
~et+ ­
/~ 
al. v. Jackson Board of Education 
Cert to CA6 Argued November 6, 1985 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Does the Equal Protection Clause permit a public 
school district to adopt racial preferences for teacher 
layoffs in the absence of findings by a qualified body of 
prior disc rim ina t ion? c::2--~;PC...-£.::~..,....-...to(....j~t,.c..-~ 
~~0uNrf7:~~ 
Before the 1972-1973 school year, the collective 
bargaining agreement ( "CBA") between the Jackson Board of 
Education and the Teachers Association of Jackson, 
Michigan, called for layoffs on a strict seniority basis 
(Pet. App. 2la) • At about that time, the Jackson School 
f" • ~ • 
2. 
District began to experience racial tension; some fighting 
broke out. As part of the School Roard's voluntary 
efforts to integrate the entire school system, a Citizens 
Committee was formed. Recommendations from this Committee 
and from other sources dealt with faculty as well as 
student integration. The School Board felt that its 
efforts to integrate the faculty to the extent it desired 
were hampered by the lack of job security for new hires 
under a strict seniority system. It sought to implement 
some minority job protection into the CBA. The teachers 
overwhelmingly rejected a straight freeze on minority 
layoffs. Eventually, agreement was reached on a modified ·---------layoff provision that protected new minority hires by 
placing a percentage cap on the number of minority faculty 
"-------~----~-------------
that could be laid off. Specifically, the agreement stated 
--·-- ----- ---........._ 
that "at no time will there be a greater percentage of 
minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of 
minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff" 
(Pet. App. 3a, 23a). The ~ go~ of the CBA was "to 
have at least the same percentage of minority racial 
representation on each individual staff as_i. s repr:.esented 
by ~ t~:...,~~on of the Jackson Public Schools" 
(id. at 13a, 23a, 32a) • The agreement defined minorities 
as those who are Black, Arner ican Indian, Oriental or of ~ 
S~sh descendancy. It was implemented at the start of 




The current version of the agreement is set to expire in 
1988. 
Petitioners are Jackson teachers who were laid off 
in accordance with the layoff provision while minority 
teachers with less seniority were retained. Petrs brought 
suit in ED Mich. claiming that the layoffs violated the 
&jual Protection Clause and Title Vll. 1 On cross motions~ 
for summary judgment the DC dismissed all of petrs claims. ~ 
A. The Opinion in the District Court 
The DC opinion hinges on United Steelworkers of 
America v. Weber, 443 US 193 (1979) and Detroit Police 
Officers' Association v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (CA6 1979), 
cert. denied, 452 US 938 (1981). Weber involved a plan by 
Kaiser Aluminum Co. that granted certain minorities a 
preferential entry into a skilled job training program. 
The Court held that Title VII does not prohibit a private 
'-- -
employer from voluntarily adopting a plan that granted a 
limited preference to minorities in job advancement, even 
-- -- - __ _____......__-- ___________ _ -------------------------
absent a judicial finding of employer discrimination. In 
""'-~ ~, 
the DC' s view, Detroit Police extended the reasoning and 
I\ 
holding of Weber to public employers and to constitutional 
violations. In the DC's view, Detroit Police established 
the threshold proposition that an affirmative action plan 
1 The Title VII claims are not pursued on appeal here. In fact 
the SG offers that petrs were barred from suing under Title VII 
for failure to file administrative claims with EEOC, and thus are 
completely relegated to their constitutional claims. 
I 
4. 
by a public employer may grant preferences based on race, 
even in the absence of any finding of discrimination, 
without violating the Equal Protection Clause. Under the 
DC analysis, there were two issues: (1) whether the 
objective of the plan was constitutional and (2) whether 
the plan was reasonably related to that objective. 
1. The 6?~~ve of the Layoff Provision: The DC 
held that a plan that prefers minorities can satisfy the 
Equal Protection Clause if "there is a sound basis for 
concluding that minority underrepresentation is substantial 
and chronic," Bakke, 438 us at 362 (opinion of Brennan, ~1-
White, Marshall and Blackmun) • While in most employment 
discrimination cases the evidence of underrepresentation is 
based on a comparison of the percentage of m.inor i ties in 
the employer's work force with the percentage of minorities 
in the relevant labor pool, see, ~, EEOC v. United 
Virginia Bank, 615 F.2d 147 (CA4 1980), the DC thought that 
approach was too limiting for the present case. Instead, 
the DC determined that it was "appropriate to compare the 
percentage of minority teachers to the percentage of 
minority~dents in the student body, rather than with the 
percentage of minorities in the relevant labor market." 
Pet. App. 3la-34a. Only such an approach, said the DC, 
.SLL£, 
t2..h.c 
takes account of the fact that teachers are role models.~
Applying that highly unusual standard, the DC thought it 
clear that minority teachers were substantially and 
chronically underrepresented on the Jackson faculty in the 
5. 
years prior to the adoption of the racial preference. The 
DC also reasoned that a finding of specific discrimination 
was not necessary, citing the Brennan, et al. opinion in 
Bakke (stating that .. it is enough that each recipient 
[of a preferential benefit] is within a general class of 
persons likely to have been the victims of discrimination, .. 
438 us at 363). For these reasons, the DC concluded that 
the objective of matching the percentage of minority 
faculty with the percentage of minority students was a 
constitutionally permissible objective. 
2. The Relationship of the Preference to the 
Objective: The DC also reasoned that any plan that granted 
a preference to one race for a permissible objective 
satisfies the Equal Protection Clause if it is reasonably 
related to the accomplishment of that objective. The DC 
listed several factors why it thought the layoff plan 
passed this test of .. reasonableness .. (Pet. App. 28a, 3la), 
including the fact that it was a temporary measure, that it 
was collectively bargained and that it did not 
.. unnecessarily trammel .. the interests of white teachers. 
B. The Decision of the Court of Appeals ( ~ /i-C~~~ 
u.-... . A-_, ·"' ~-- ... --~1 r'_...,. """-" '-""~ ~. .- ...--~ 
The CA6 adopted the reasoning of the DC and quoted 
from it extensively. The only addition it made was an 
attempt to distinguish Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. 
Stotts, 104 S.Ct. 2576 (1984), decided after the DC 
opinion. The CA distinguished Stotts on the basis that 
Stotts involved a court ordered plan while the plan at 
6. 
issue in this case was the product of a voluntary agreement 
between the School Board and the teachers' union. 
II. DISCUSSION 
Both opinions below applied the incorrect legal 
standard and came to wrong legal conclusions from the 
facts. Because the facts of this case make it likely that ~ 
~~ a majority can be formed for reversal, this case takes on 
added importance as a vehicle to formulate an authoritative -- '--""---~ 
majority opinion that clearly sets out the governing legal 
standards in reverse discrimination. By doing so the Court ---may avoid opinions like those below, where the judges were 
literally pulling legal principles out of a grab-bag of 
dissents and concurrences. The Court also could position 
itself articulately to deal with the more complex reverse 
discrimination issues later this term. Because this case 
is important both as an opportunity to establish a general 
---------~-- --
framework for deciding reverse discrimination cases and as 
an opportunity to decide the specific issues in this case, 
I have divided the discussion into two major parts. In the 
first part I describe a general framework of analysis that 
can be used in all reverse discrimination cases. In the 
second part, I apply that framework of analysis to the 
specific issues in this case. While that makes for an 
unusually long, complex memo, I believe it is helpful to 
set out at the start of the term the principles that will 
govern in all f QYL rey erse discrimination cases this year : 
q~ 
A. The Proper Analysis of Reverse Discrimination Cases -
~ 
7. 
The proper analysis of reverse discrimination 
cases is no mystery; it was first set forth in your opinion 
in Bakke. 2 In that opinion, you subjected reverse 
discrimination to traditional equal protection analysis and 
applied strict scrutiny. That result not only was 
sensible, it was compelled by the vast body of cases 
wherein this Court made "race" a suspect category. But 
while your opinion in Bakke recognized that discrimination 
against whites fits within the rubric of race as a suspect 
classification, it did not engage in the theoretical 
illusion that government action that grants a preference to 
minorities is always equivalent to government action that 
favors whites over blacks or other minorities. It 
recognized the possibility that some government action 
favoring certain minorities could pass strict scrutiny. 
Strict scrutiny review under traditional equal ~~ -
protection analysis is now a well-established framework of 
analysis. When racial classifications impinge upon 
2 I will refer to four leading opinions on reverse 
discrimination, Re~ents of t fi e University of California v. Bakke, 
438 US 265 (1978) (Bakke); United Steelworkers of America v. 
Weber, 443 US 193 (1979) v (Weber); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 us 
448 (1980) vfFullilove); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. 
Stotts, 104 S.Ct. 2576 (1984) ~ (Stotts). In deriving a proper 
method of analysis, I will attempt to reflect the views of the 
Justices over time, with the idea that some movement can be 
d~tected. For that reason, I have prepared a short statement of 
each c ase, with the votes of the Justices. It may be helpful to 
refer to that paper from time to time, located in Appendix A •. 
I Appendix B, per your request, is an attempt to predict the votes of the various Justices, with an eye to determining who will be a swing vote. 
. . . 
8. 
individual rights, the individual "is entitled to a 
judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear Lr-~ 
on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest." Bakke, 438 US at 299 (opinion of 
Powell, J.). There are t~o basic lines of i119uiry. The 
f . . . 0 1 k h h h f /-lrst 1nqu1ry oo s to t e purpose t e government as or ..,............ 
.k 
making the classification; under strict scrutiny ,the ~­
~4U.•-r 
purpose must be compelling. In reverse discrimination 
cases, it is possible under this analysis for the 
government to have a compelling purpose for a racial 
classification, but only in those cases where there has 
been an actual ....t} ndi,!1.9_ of_yr i c:_r ,..,9. iscr imination, and the '" ~.J­
government's racial cl~§si f ication serves the puJpose of P~··' 
. ----= ---- ~ 
remedying that discrimination. 3 ~ 
~ ... -c..,... .... " ... «.-
The ability to take race into account in the ~ 
..__ ____ ____.......... - -- --
remedial context is strictly premised on a finding of 
constitutional or statutory viol~ions: 
the distinction between permissible remedial action 
impermissible racial preference rests on the existence of a 
constitutional or statutory violation, the legitimate 
3 In employment discrimination cases, without taking race into 
account it would not be possible "to make [the victims] whole for 
injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment 
discrimination," Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 us 405, 418 
(1975). In the school desegregation cases the Court has 
realistically determined that without taking race into account in 
the remedy, a plan that simply enjoined future discrimination 
without dismantling ·the discriminatory superstructure would 
"render illusory the promise of [Brown I]," North Carolina Board 
of Education v. Swann, 402 US at 45-46. 
9. 
interest in creating a race-conscious remedy is not 
compelling unless an appropriate governmental authority has 
found that such a violation has occurred." Fullilove, 448 
us at 498 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Thus, 
one of the key issues in any reverse discrimination case ~s ~ 
whether there has been a proper finding of prior~ 
&..c.-
discrimination. Without such a finding, the government's ~ -interest is not compelling. .e:.-) sd2 
~4~ 
There are two requirements for a proper finding of ot/ 
-~ 
prior discrimination. First, the government body that~-
attempts to impose a race-conscious remedy must have the 
authority to act in response to identified discrimination. 
Second, the government body must make findings that ~-
~.s 
demonstrate the existence of illegal discrimination by the ~ 
persons or entity against whom the remedy runs. Fullilove, -~-
448 us at 498 (Powell, J., concurring). 
There is another re-atly a4-o 
~ --------------------------------------
consideration not 
foreshadowed in rior cases that is essential to 
establishing a compelling government purpose. The entire 
justification for race-based government classifications is 
that they are an attempt to remedy prior discrimination. 
What the earlier cases do not discuss is that at some point 
the entity that has discriminated in the past will have ~ . 
accomplished its goal of remedying its prior 
discrimination. 
is achieving the 
The important principle is that the B 
I 
rough equivalency, not forever ma in taining -





the entity accomplished this goal, then, absent a finding a ~ 
.,C .-<.I .. -
further discrimination, its power to engage in race-~ 
conscious remedial action has come to an end. ~ 
~ If accomplishment of the goal is not focused on, 
~,4~~ 
then~licies that were originally instituted to 
remedy prior discrimination will entrench thems...e.J....ves _long 
after the remedy has been accomplished. Such policies will 
"reinforce habitual ways of thinking in terms of classes 
instead of individuals," Fullilove, 448 us at 547 (Stevens, 
J. dissenting, paraphrasing Powell, J. in Bakke) and "delay 
the time when race wili become a truly irrelevant, or at 
least insignificant, factor," id. at 545. When racial 
classifications are enforced past the date of the 
accomplishment of the remedy, they are no longer justified 
as at tempts to remedy prior d i scr imina tion, and therefore 
the government's purpose is no longer compelling.~ 
The 
~~-
sec'-o_ n_d __ l_i_n_e __ o_ f __ a_n_a_l_y_s ......... is ___ u_n_d_e_r __ s_t_r_ i _c_t __ s_c_r_u_t_i ny is 4., 
whether, given a - compelling purpose, 




the method used to"h..~-
4~ 
"The means 
selected must be narrowly drawn to fulfill the government 
purpose," Fullilove at 498, and only "when effectuating a 
limited and properly tailored remedy to cure the effects of 
prior discrimination" is it possible for the government to 
require innocent persons to "share the burden" of the 
remedy. !d. at 484. There are very few general 
propositions that can be said about this second prong of 
strict scrutiny analysis; it is necessarily case-specific. 
11. 
For example, in Bakke you suggested that the purpose of 
improving the delivery of health-care services to poorer 
communities might be legitimate, but that there was simply 
insufficient proof that preferential admission of 
minorities into medical school was directly related to the 
accomplishment of that purpose. 
in Fullilove also was based on 
Justice Stevens' dissen~p $ 
the "narrowly tailored" 
prong; he felt that the 10% set-aside provision for 
minority business enterprises was not closely related to 
the stated goals of eliminating discrimination in 
government contracting. 
These examples simply demonstrate that the Court 
takes seriously the requirement that the means used by the ~ 
government to accomplish a compelling purpose 
........ ~ 
... ~ be ~-1'[\U g.A<.-
purpose. ~ 
~~-­
able to Because in many cases the government will be 
articulate a compelling interest in the racial 
classification at issue, it is my impression that most 
reverse discrimination cases will turn on whether the 
classification is narrowly tailored. There are at least 
two general principles under "narrowly tailored" analysis 
that help distinguish proper race-conscious classifications 
from improper ones: 
(1) [ airing goals versus layoff ~ . The "narrowly tailored" ______ ...... 
prong provides the logical principle that explains why 
tt \' 
cases involving preferential hiring or advancement m~e 
-
allowed, while cases involving layoffs will seldom if _eyer l.J4Lt - ~ ---------~.:..:::.:........:.:..:.;::.;: _ _;;.;..;;..::.-~------
)1~/.1;~~ 
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pass strict scrutiny. Hiring goals are a much narrower 
means of accomplishing the government's anti-discrimination 
purpose than a program that requires an innocent person to 
--------.., 
be fired. I think that is one of the cardinal principles 
by which a proper affirmative action plan can be 
distinguished from an improper plan, for the reasons 
explained below. 
In Weber the Court justified its position 
affirming a race-based job training program by noting that J 
~ , ~the plan does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of 
0 the white employees," arid that the plan was a job training 
program that did not require any existing employees to lose 
their jobs. That consideration makes sense. The burden on 
innocent whites is much greater when one is deprived of an 
existing job than it is when one is deprived of one 
particular employment opportunity or chance to advance in 
an existing career. For example, petr DeFunis in DeFunis 
v. Odegaard, 94 S.Ct. 1704 (1974) temporarily lost the 
opportunity to attend the University of Washington Law 
School. Yet he had already been accepted at the Oregon, 
Idaho, Gonzaga and Willamette Law Schools. At worst, he 
would have lost only one opportunity among many. That is 
certainly not the case when a minority preference in a 
layoff provision causes someone, usually a junior union 
member with limited opportunities and completely dependent 
on his or her wages, to lose a job. Because the harm to an 
innocent individual race is so much greater when he or she 
13. 
is fired from a present job, with the consequent loss of 
income, dignity and fulfillment, I would at a minimum 
require the state to demonstrate that it would not be 
possible to achieve the same result, even if on a slightly 
slower timetable, by hiring goals alone. The only 
exception to that is the already accepted principle that 
innocent whites can be displaced in order to provide "make-
whole relief" to the actual, individuai victims of 
discrimination, cf. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 us 717 (1974); 
Fullilove, 448 US at 530 n. 12 (Stewart, J., dissenting) 
(no relief should be allowed that operates "against 
innocent people on the basis of the sins of others of their 
own race" except to "make whole the identified victims of 
racial discrimination"). 
(2) Who is benefited by the racial preference? A second 
principle under the "narrowly tailored" prong for 
determining whether a racial classification is proper 
examines who benefits from the racial preference. The 
important principle is that the racial preference, in order 
to be narrowly tailored, must only benefit those groups for 




That is, if there is a finding of prior 
against blacks, then the racial 
is not narrowly tailored if it grants a 
preference to blacks and Asians. Prior cases demonstrate 
that it is common for a racial classification to extend 
benefits to a random selection of this country's 
~. ... 
14. 
minorities, see Bakke, 438 us at 274 (preferential 
admissions for Blacks, Chicanos, Asians and American 
Indians): Fullilove, 448 US at 535, 546 (racial preference 
for Negroes, Spanish speakers, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos 
and Aleuts) When racial classifications seek to benefit 
groups that are not the subject of a finding of prior 
discrimination, such classifications are not narrowly 
tailored enough to pass strict scrutiny, at least to the 
extent that they benefit those groups. See, ~, 
Fullilove, 448 US at 546 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Just 
why a * * * Negro or Spanish-speaking investor should have 
a preferred status in bidding on a construction contract in 
Alaska--or a citizen of Eskimo ancestry should have a 
preference in Miami or Detroit--is difficult to 
understand"). 
The principle that racial classifications can only 
benefit groups that are the object of a finding of prior 
discrimination falls in the middle of Justice Brennan, et 
al. 's position that the government can engage in broad-
based, class-wide relief and the SG' s position that only 
identifiable, individual victims of discrimination can be 
benefited. You ha~ previou~ rejec~stice Br~nan's I 
position as untenable in the light of strict scrutiny: I 
recommend that you also reject the SG's position. For all SG-
its citations, the SG's brief actually boils down to a bald ~-
~~ 
assertion: 'the government's interest in remedying the 




benefits the actual victims of prior discrimination.' I 
see nothing about that proposition that makes it 
intrinsically true. It certainly is not supported by the 
case law. Instead, the Court has consistently looked to 
the results of its remedies: it has examined whether the 
effect of its decisions has resulted in a remedy of the 
past violations. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 US 
39, 41 (1971) (merely maintaining an anti-discriminatory 
system following a history of violations would leave in 
place "the status quo that is the very target" of the anti-
discrimination effort). When there has been an authorized 
finding of prior discrimination, the government's interest 
goes beyond just ensuring reparations to identifiable 
victims--it also has a compelling interest in 
reconstructing things as they would have been had the 
wrong never occurred--a traditional remedial task. 4 That 
-------------------------~ is an 1nterest that is not vindicated by allowing the 
wrongdoer to escape any responsibility simply because the 
victims cannot be found, since many of the effects of their 
wrongdoing are still in place. 
III. APPLICATION OF TRADITIONAL STRICT SCRUTINY ANALYSIS 
TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
done the same thing in securities cases when the 
of fraud or insider trading cannot be found--the 
e stockholde s, some of whom may not be have 
is vastly different, 
equitable remedial powers go 
16. 
In the above analysis setting out a general 
framework for reverse discrimination cases, the following 
points were made: 
(1) Reverse discrimination cases are subject to regular 
equal protection analysis, which requires that any 
classification based on race be narrowly tailored to meet a 
compelling government interest. 
-<-. 
(a) The government 1 s interest in remedying 
prior discrimination, when it is based on an actual finding 
-------------------------------
of prior discrimination, is compelling. 
(b) The government 1 s interest in remedying 
prior discrimination is only compelling up to the point 
that the remedy has been accomplished. Once that remedy 
has been accomplished, the government has no compelling 
interest in maintaining a system of racial preferences that 
discriminate against persons innocent of any 
discrimination. 
(2) In order to survive strict scrutiny, the racial 
classification must be narrowly tailored. 
(a) A classification designed to remedy prior 
discrimination that involves layoffs of innocent whites, as 
opposed to a mere hiring preference, can only be narrowly 
tailored if it benefits the actual, individual victims of ---- ---
prior discrimination in the form of 8 make-whole relief. 8 
(b) The 8 narrowly tailored 8 prong also 
requires that the racial preference only benefit those 
17. 
groups identified as the actual victims of prior 
discrimination. 
When these principles are applied to the facts of 
the present case, I think it is clear that the layoff 
provision at issue cannot pass the test of strict scrutiny. 
In this section, I conclude that only one characterization 
of the School Board's interest in the layoff provision can 
possibly be compelling, and that even assuming a compelling 
purpose, the provision is not narrowly tailored enough to 
pass strict scrutiny. 
A. Is the Asserted State Interest Compelling? 
The briefs differ on the exact interest of the 
School Board in support of the layoff provision. Petrs 
note that Article VII of the CBA sets forth the policy of 
actively seeking -minority personnel. In that same article, 
it is stated that the "goal of such policy shall be to have 
at least the same percentage of minority racial 
representation on each individual staff as is represented 
by the student population of the Jackson Public Schools." 
Later, in the layoff provision (Article XII) it is stated 
that layoff shall be according to seniority, "except that 
at no time will there be a greater percentage of minority 
personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority 
personnel employed at the time of the layoff." From the 
relationship between the two provisions, petrs conclude 
that the goal of the layoff provision is the same as the 
general goal of the CBA, that is, eventual accomplishment 
.. ~- . 
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of a ratio of minority faculty equal to the percentage of 
minority students. 
On the other hand, resp argues that the goal of ~ - --
the layoff provision is different from the general hiring~ 
goal stated in Article VII. The goal of the layoff 
provision is simply to preserve the gains made in 
integrating the faculty, by limiting layoffs of minority 
personnel so that the percentage level prior to layoffs is 
maintained. "The language was designed as to protect 
against a 'Catch-22' situation wherein minority teachers 
would be hired, only to be immediately laid off, thereby 
continuing a pattern of racial exclusion of blacks from the 
previously segregated Jackson Public Schools," Resp. Br. at 
23. Viewed in this light, the layoff provision is part of 
a remedy for the prior practice of discrimination in the 
hiring of teachers. 
~ 
There is evidence to support both of these 
positions. As in Bakke, it is probably safer to assume 
that the classification was motivated by more than one 
purpose. The first purpose (that of matching the 
percentage of minority students) is admittedly based on the 
concept of "role-models" for minority students. As a basis 
for justifying a racial classification, the "role-model 
theory" clearly is not compelling. In terms of the general 
framework of analysis, this purpose is not compelling 
because it is not even intended to be a remedy for past 
discrimination. ---- In addition, this particular theory 
~ 
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rejects the need for a finding of prior discrimination, 
since it focuses on the existing need of minority students 
for same-race role models. While it may or may not be a 
reasonable sociological/pedagogical theory, not every 
colorable teaching theory can pass strict scrutiny. The 
burden is on the state to demonstrate that this interest is 
compelling. In this case, the School Board has not put 
forth any evidence whatsoever that could support a 
determination that this interest is compelling, nor does it 
-------------------------------------readily appear to be compelling on its face. The School 
Board has done nothing to show that it is essential to the 
state • s mission of educating its children that it have a 
certain percentage of minority role models. 
In addition, the means chosen to effectuate the 
role model theory are not narrowly tailored. By its 
haphazard definition of minority, the School Roard has 
introduced an element of absurdity into its role model 
theory, by, for example, providing Asian students with 
Indian role models, and by attempting to provide any same 
race role models at all to the disparate and ill-defined 
sub-groups that fall within the category of persons of 
Spanish descent. 
Resp contends that the layoff provision can also -
be viewed as an attempt to protect minority hiring gains ~ 
~ v..,Jw during times of layoff as for prior ----------- ---------------~ ~~~~ part of a remedy 
~ empl_o_y_m_e_n_t ___ d_i_s_c_r _i _m_i_n_a_t ..... ion against minority teacher 




the state's purpose is compelling is much more difficult. 
Because of unresolved factual dis utes, the Court is not in 
a position to make a determination whether resp's theory of 
the government's interest is compelling. However, I later 
conclude that even assuming arguendo that this purpose is 
compelling, it is not narrowly tailored enough to pass 
strict scrutiny. Therefore, it will not be necessary to 
remand this case for determination of these factual issues. 
Even though the case can be resolved without 
deciding whether resp has articulated a compelling 
government interest, most of the contentions of the parties 
and amici focus on this issue. For that reason, I will 
briefly subject the contentions of the parties to this 
first prong of strict scrutiny analysis. There are 
basically two considerations. 
(1} A racial classification only can constitute a 
compelling government interest if it is based on a proper 
finding of prior discrimination. In Bakke, two 
requirements for proper findings were set out: "First, the 
government body that attempts to impose a race-conscious 
remedy must have the authority to act in response to 
identified discrimination." In this case, the only finding 
of prior discrimination, if any, was made Qy. the School 
Board. If the Regents of a University are incapable of 
making a proper finding, it might seem that the same result 
would apply to a School Board. But I conclude that the 
language in Bakke refers to the Regents attempts to make a 
21. 
finding of general societal discrimination, since it was 
conceded that there was no discrimination at UC-Davis 
Medical School itself. I do not think the language in 
Bakke forbids a School Board from making a finding that it 
itself has discriminated, as opposed to a finding that ---society has discriminated. I therefore conclude that in 
the context of remedying its Q!'!!l discrimination, Jackson 
School Board was competent to make a proper finding of 
...,_ ----------
prior discrimination by the Jackson School District. 
The second requirement for a proper finding is that 
"the government must make findings that demonstrate the 
--------~~~ ------
existence of illegal discrimination," 448 us at 498. Petrs 
argue that no such finding was ever made and that there is 
no evidence to support such a finding. Resp asserts that 
while the pre-Bakke evidence in this case may not speak in 
terms of "findings," it is clear that the School Board came 
to the considered conclusion that there had been a pattern 
and practice of discrimination. While there is some 
evidence to support the School Board's assertion, this 
hotly-disputed factual question was not decided by th C 
--~---~------~ below, since it reasoned that findings were unnecessary· 
Without a DC finding, and with the scanty, disputed 
evidence on appeal, this Court is simply not in a position 
to resolve the question of whether the School Board 
actually made the a finding of prior discrimination in 
faculty hiring . 
.. 
22. 
(2) The second unanswerable question that goes to whether 
there is a compelling interest is whether the School Board 
has already accomplished its purpose of remedying prior 
discrimination. To the extent that it has, then its race-
conscious layoffs are no longer in furtherance of the goal 
of remedying prior discrimination, and therefore the 
government's interest in the racial classification (the 
layoff provision) is not compelling. As stated in the 
framework section, if it can be determined that at some 
point in the past the School Board has accomplished its 
goal, then, absent a finding of further discrimination, its 
power to engage in race-conscious remedial action has come 
to an end. 
when 
The thorny issue in this regard is determining -----the remedy for prior discrimination has been 
accomplished. In employment discrimination cases such as 
. 
this one, the answer can be stated in the abstract fairly 
simply: the remedy is achieved when the percentage of 
minority employees is roughly equivalent to the percentage 
of minorities in the relevant labor pool. Hazelwood School 
District v. United States, 433 us 299 (1977) (establishing 
the relevant labor market as the proper basis of comparison 
~
in employment discrimination cases, without defining that 
term) • But that general proposition raises two specific 
questions in this case: (a) what is the relevant labor 
market? and (b) has the percentage of minorities in the 
,;. . 
23. 
relevant labor market in fact been matched? I will briefly 
consider each in turn. 
(a) What is the relevant labor market? This 
issue was not decided below, and is hotly contested in the 
briefs. Petrs contend that the relevant labor market is lc 
--------~------the percentage of minority graduates awarded teaching ~ 
degrees in Michigan (app. 11. 6%). Resp argues that '---___ _______.., -=-
existing market conditions require the School District to 
hire minority faculty from out-of-state, so that the ~~ 
relevant market is not just Michigan. The issue of the 
relevant labor market is normally raised and decided at 
trial. The Court cannot resolve this factual dispute. 
(b) Has the percentage of minorities in the 
relevant labor market in fact been matched? The answer to 
this question depends on the answer to question (a), supra. 
---------------~--
From 1972 to 1981, 25% -- ....____ Petr certainly makes a strong case 
of the new teachers hired were minorities. The present 
....________~-......-__.._, 
percentage of minority teachers in the Jackson School 
District, according to a Mich. Dep't of Education Report, 
is 16.1%. Those figures are probably in excess of any 
relevant labor market. However, since the Court does not 
have a factual finding on the relevant labor market, it 
cannot determine with surety whether the goal of achieving 
a rough equivalency between the percentage of minority 
faculty and the percentage of minorities in the relevant 
labor market has been accomplished. 
24. 
Are The Means Selected Narrowly Tailored to the 
Accomplishment of the Purpose? 
Section III.A. examined whether any interest 
that the School Board has in its race-conscious layoff plan 
is compelling. In that section I examined two versions of 
the School Board's interest in this racial classification. 
Petrs' version, 
not amount to 
depends for its 
the "role model theory," on its face does 
a compelling interest. Resp's version 
resolution on factual issues that this 
Court is incapable of resolving. 
This section examines whether the burden borne by 
innocent whites because of the layoff provision is narrowly 
tailored to the accomplishment of a compelling purpose. 
Even assuming arguendo the existence of a compelling 
interest, an individual affected by the School Board's 
action "is entitled to a judicial determination that the 
burden he is asked to bear on [the basis of his race] is 
precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental 
interest." Bakke, 438 us at 299. Both prongs must be 
satisfied in order to pass strict scrutiny. The School 
Board has completely failed to demonstrate that the means 
is has selected are narrowly tailored, for at least two 
major reasons. 
First, based on the discussion in the framework 
section, a racial classification is narrowly tailored only 
when it seeks to benefit those persons who fall within 
proper findings by a government body authorized to make 
25. 
such findings that a certain group or groups have been 
discriminated against. In the present case, even assuming 
arguendo that the School Board made proper findings that it 
had engaged in prior discrimination, those findings would 
only establish prior discrimination against Blacks. Yet 
the School Board's definition of minority includes Blacks, 
American Indians, Orientals and persons of Spanish descent. 
There is no evidence to explain why innocent whites should 
lose their jobs in order to benefit persons of Spanish 
descent. The only possible justification for such a 
provision must stem from a desire of the School Board to 
remedy, for example, what it perceives to be general 
societal discrimination against persons of Spanish descent, 
a task of dubious value that the School Aoard is not 
authorized to perform. Because there is no evidence or 
findings to demonstrate that Indians, Orientals, or persons 
of Spanish descent have suffered any harm in Jackson School 
District, there is nothing to justify the loss of 
employment by whites in order to benefit members of those 
groups. Because the layoff provision harms innocent 
persons partially in order to benefit groups never 
identified as victims of discrimination by the government 
body in question, it is not narrowly tailored enough to 
pass strict scrutiny. Second, the layoff 
plan involves firing innocent persons from their existing 
jobs instead of mere hiring preferences. As explained in 
the framework section, such a plan can only be justified 
26. 
under "narrowly tailored" analysis if it grants a remedy to 
individual victims of discrimination, or possibly if it 
would be impossible to accomplish an otherwise legitimate 
hiring goal without some layoff protections. Neither 
exception applies in this case. The very nature of the 
School Board • s arguments is an admission that the layoff 
provision is not an attempt to "make whole" identified 
victims of prior discrimination by the School Board. The 
School Board has not produced any evidence at all that 
demonstrates that it could not have accomplished any 
arguably legitimate (non-role model based) hiring goals 
without the layoff provision. 5 
Based on the above analysis, I conclude that none 
of the means used to accomplish even arguably legitimate 
purposes are narrowly tailored enough to pass strict 
scrutiny. For that reason, under any analysis, and without 
the need to decide disputed factual issues, the layoff 
provision violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
IV. Conclusion 
5 In fact, petr has put forth strong evidence indicating that 
even if the layoff provision had never been instituted, any 
legitimate hiring goal of matching the relevant labor market 
would have been achieved some time ago. See Reply Brief, pp. 7-
10. While the School Board attempts to refute this evidence, the 
point remains that the School Board has not satisfied its own 
burden of establishing the necessit of the la off revision for 
t~complishment of some legitimate goal. 
27. 
The layoff provision in the CBA between Jackson 
School Board and its teachers constitutes state action. It 
---~ 
is a racial classification, and is subject to traditional 
-----... 
strict scrutiny analysis for classifications based on race. 
Strict scrutiny requires that the classification at issue 
be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government 
interest. 
To the extent that the government interest in the 
layoff provision is the "role model theory," that does not 
state a compelling interest. 
To the extent that the government interest in the 
layoff provision is part of a plan to remedy prior 
employment discrimination against minorities in Jackson 
School District, the Court does not have the information it 
needs to decide if that interest is compelling. 
Even assuming arguendo that there is a compelling 
interest, the~ accomplish that interest are 




November 5, 1985 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Mike 
Re: 83-1340 Wygant et al. v. Jackson Board of Education 
Set to be argued: Wed. Nov. 6th 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
There are four cases that involve one or more of 
fuese same parties. I will list them chronologically. 
~. 
A. Jackson Educa t 1on Ass' n v. Jackson Board of 
ffiucation, No. 4-72340 (ED Mich Dec. 15, 1976) (mem op 
found at J.A. 30) In the spring of 1974, when the Board 
saw that adhering to the layoff provision would result in 
~ 
firing tenured teachers ~ favor of retaining minority 
teachers still on probation, it declined to follow the 
ayoff provision. Black teachers sued. The Fed DC (ED 
ich) held that the minority plaintiffs had not 
established any purposeful discrimination as required by 
veshington v. Davis, 426 us 229 (1976) sufficient to vest 
the court with jurisdiction over its equal protection 
claim, and that it lacked jurisdiction over their Title 
VII claims for failure to file a claim first with the 
EEOC. Having determined that it lacked jurisdiction over 
2. 
the federal claims, the court declined to exercise pendent 
~risdiction over the state contract claims. 
t..~· B. Jackson Education Ass 'n v. Jackson Board of 
:J~ .Erlucation, No. 77-0011484 cz (Jackson County Circuit 
~: Court, August 31, ~ (J.A. 40). Plaintiffs in case A, 
1/tl 
rupra, took their state contract claims to state court. 
vJ ~That court stated that it "has not been established that 
~~~~· vj · . the board had discriminated against minorities in its 





faculty was the result of societal racial discrimination." ----
J.A. at 43. Plaintiffs prevailed on their argument that 
the layoff provision was not in conflict with Michigan's 
'leacher Tenure Act. 





~----f pri_:'_~ scrimination, 
~- recessary. 
F.Supp. 1195 (ED Mich 1982) (App. to Cert. Pet. at 20a). 
It is fully This is the DC opinion below in this case. 
eescr ibed in the bench memo. The DC made no finding of 
reasoning that no such finding was 
/.~ D. 
Cit{,-~ v F.2d 1152 (CA6 1984) 
Jackson Board of Education, 746 Wygant v. 
(App. to Cert. Pet. at 2a). The Ca 
decision below. It adopted the reasoning of the DC, and ft'- c)~ 
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84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 
Miscellaneous notes on opinion of CA6 that 
largely adopted the DC's opinion: 
1. The CBA provided that the: 
"Goal of such policy [of preferential treatme~ 
of-rnrnorities] shall be to have at least the 
same percentage of minority racial 
representation on each individual staff as is 
represented by the student population of the 
Jackson public schools." 
In Hazelwood School District v. u.s., 434 u.s. 
299 (308), we rejected a comparison of Hazelwood's 
"teacher work force to its student population", saying 
that this comparison "misconceived the role of statistics 
in employment discrimination cases". We went on to say: 
"That a proper comparison was between the racial 
composition of Hazelwood's teaching staff and 
the racial composition of the qualified public 
~hool teacher population in the relevant labor 
market." 
Despite our decision in Hazelwood, CA6 agreed 
with the District Court that: 
"In the setting of this case, it is appropriate 
to compare the percentage of minority teachers 
student body rather than with 





n prived minority 
models." (underlining 
2. 
2. It is conceded in the opinion that "there has c:L~ 
~ been no ___ p_r_i_o_r~ judicial dete~ina~on that the defendants 
tl L"'"~~ mgag- ed in racial discrimination". P. 6 (a) • In an r _::::.:::_:. .. , - ----- ~ 
&f ~lier case involving these same parties, decided by the 
 Jackson County Circuit Court in 1979, the Court stated 
~?'~:z:-~ I)' 
~:::::SU~that it "has not been established that the board has 
-4, 4.- y----- - I 
discriminated against minorities in its hiring practices. 
inority representation on the faculty was the result 
~ ~ of societal racial discrimination." 
Although there has never been a finding of racial 
~ ~ discrimination by the board (of which I am aware), the DC 
~~~ 
d the Court of Appeals both ~" st 
discrimination" generally and s 
justifying affirmative action 
off of whites. 
3. 
3. In this equal protection case of reverse 
discrimination, the Court of Appeals said that the "test 
is one of reasonableness", and that the question under 
fuis test is "whether the affirmative action plan is 
substantially related to the objectives of remedying past 
discrimination and correcting substantial and chronic 
underrepresentation". 
I know of no other equal protection case 
involving affirmative action goals or quotas that has 
applied such unconventional equal protection analysis. In 
Bakke I said that the Equal Protection Clause requires 
strict scrutiny and the showing of a compelling state 
interest that is served by the classification. This was 
mY reading of the Court's opinion in Fullilove. 
4. The decision in Fullilove. I joined the 
Chief's opinion despite its vagueness in some respects, 
~cause he said: 
"Any preference based on racial or ethnic 
criteria must necessarily receive a most 
~archin x mination to make sure that it does 
not conflict with constitutional guarantees". 
4. 
The Chief's opinion also said that the Court's 
analysis demonstrates that the federal statute "would 
survive judicial review under either of the tests 
~ticulated in the several Bakke opinions". In my 
fullilove opinion, 1 read the Chief's opinion as applying 
an analysis like mine in Bakke, namely the strict strutiny 
applied to racial classification, and that such a 
classification is prohibited "unless it is a necessary 
means of advancing a compelling governmental interest". 
Moreover, 1 stated: 
''!'his Court has never approved race conscious 
remedies absent judicial, administrative, or 
regislative findings of constitutional or 
~atutory violations". Bakke, 438 u.s., at 307. 
~amsters v. u.s., 431 u.s. 324, 367-376, United 
Jewish Organization, 430 U.S. 144, 155-159 
(opinion of Justice White); South Carolina v. 
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Like to Be 
' . 
Told To ·Hire-
By Peter C. 'Robertson 
P RESIDENT REAGA~ is being nrged to weaken enforcement of .affirmative action programs for federal contrac-
tors. The proposition has divided the Cabi-
net, stalling, action. But if Reagan still is 
trying to make .up his mind, here's a mes-
sage from the business community: Go slow. 
Although business has major problems 
with the program, it now supports the basic 
principles of affirmative action as · imple-
mented under Presidents Kennedy, johnson, 
Nixon, Ford and Carter. 
The r~sons corporations are ·not inter· 
ested in seeing those principles weakened 
have more to do with business than with ciVil 
rights. Business - Jed by the National Aa-
aociation of ManufactUl"O{I - aees that ita 
own aeH-interest reqUire& affumative action. 
And if the lUqan adrqinistratioa ~ 
American ~ Jri11 tblnk it for we~· 
ing affirmative action enforcement, then th~ 
administration isn't lis~nina to what bust-
,pessmen 'OUtside the Beltway are uying. . · 
Thet penuneat'a .......X lffinoatM. ~ • 
tioo program ..... 
-with 
written lffitmldwt 
... md ··t..w~~~Mie 
JDellt ,. ......... 
Chal'llfifll Lobor Marlt,t: 
Women and 1llinOridea will be '15 
percent of labor force· growth between 
1~ and 2000. Employm without plana to 
eJiminate barriers to 1JMrui or Pr'OitlotfnB those groups wtU be eut' dlt from a ~ 
part of America'• labor force. · ·: 
C. W~ Parry, dUet ~ecutive officer at 
AI~, recently aent a mem9 to aD~ 
"?tine that Alcoa's "beat prospects for &ur· 
vwal and growth lie in our skillful selection 
of the best individuals" from a "broad-based 
~lent pool that includes women and minon-
tJes." 
2 Mini.miziTI(! Rilk of Reverse Discrimi-nation Suits: . In a retent survey of chief executive 
offtcers by the management consulting firni 
for w~ 1 work, 95 percent indicated that 
they will use numbera aa a management tool 
to measure COl'porate progress whether the 
government requires them or not. However, 
once the government requirements are. 
gone, there would be a risk of so-called "re~ 
verse discrimination" suits aUe~ that em-
plorers have gone too far with affirmative 
\act10n. 
See AFFIRM, D2, CoL 1 
Peter Robertson, a former senior official with -
the Equal Employment Opportunity . 
Commission, is a management consultant 
with Organizalion Resources Counselors, Im. 
I 
I 
t f' 11 ! 1 1r" ! ,::" --~, :·n ~ : .. 1t: 
, I ', · ·..:~ lltlellt ow~ ram .., 
tll.tc ' ... ;t!O•h goab and timetables 
wrll make it less likely that such 
suits will be successful, according to pleading states' rights. However, 
National Association of Mapufaetur· t~ay they pre,fer the .uniformit¥ of a 
ers President Alexander Trow- , smgle f~deral regulation, ~ven if the 
bridge compantea don't• afwaya like all the 
· · details, to havina to meet a multipli· 
3 CompatibiUty with Mar&G(!e· '' eity of state and. local. regjdation11. · tnent: •'·. ' One national t~Qancla! !etVices The use of pis and timeta· · company ~ hae . affirmativ~ 
bles and other numerlcaf me88Ute& lction with 60 local jurift. 
to track the emploYft*t oiiQfnori- it. 
tiel and women I* .... "'* 
bow corporatiolil ... ... im-' . 
portlnt areat. 
.i:s,..=-~·-JI! 
.•• , canwe .If = 
•. '!0 can't meuure, how can 'fie~ cost moi1J imd te.u1t Jn 
~.@l~t . · ; . . · .. .te. effecti~ . , prolflms." T~ow­
~ ; .. wpuam ~E~w~i~at u.J! bridge bas calleq~f,or reforms in ~he. 
~ .~a.a .... al program without amending 
:· tO • in St.' ' and ~ · Jii"Wld.erlying ~ecutive or~er. The 
~ 0. h ..... . ~.~ NA.ttt believe. ~ auch ame~­
pup of tile HAM.·to¥1 Jlolae ~ . · QM!Ilts WOUld b4l .,Ul-tdVised.'' io 
,.Jtepteaentativee ~~~~~ iJl 11Jirt., . because they might trigger 
JUly that ''busirieel ; . . leta jiaJS ~state and l~al action. " 
~ and timetables for every aspect of 
6
. A ..... :.t: ... · 1-nA '.b·le JljJ .d -' 
4 i£8 operations - profit$, capital in· ~II! . ,.,..,x, re ef.lU 
;vestment, productivity increases and · UgJSlahon: . 
:promotional potential for individuals. · Employe!s are concerned 
. ~tting goals and tirom.~ for on.. that Congress.~ght freeze thepre-
'nortty and female parijclpation is 1 sent ~r:ogram mto law and thus ~eny 
way of ~ ~rogresa abd / fJ~xibiltty to a,lter the .r~gulat1ons . . 
focusing on . potential · dilcriinina·., Re~. Augustus F. HaWkins (D-
tion." · . . r Calif.), . chairman of the ~ouse 
Senior corporate officiall clearly · Educat1on and. La~ot ~mmtttee, 
~ f!C()gnize that Jl1anagen must be has pledge~ leg1slat1ve act1on should 
measUred on all of the thinp they th~ executive order be w~ake~ed. :are expected to do. • He WOQ~d probably get blparttsan 
• A survey of more than 200 major support m both houses. Sen. R~bert 
companies found 76 percent saying Dole (R-Kan.) urged the prestd~nt 
. they used "voluntary internal nu- not to weaken the new executive 
merical objectives to assess, (equal order and con~ressmen an~ senat~rs 
employment opportunity) perform- of both parties have . wntte~ ~1m 
-ance." One-fourth of the companies str~~g letters supportmg a s1m!lar 
·. said that incentive ' compensation position. 
-p.),ans for managers include equal 7 E_m:ploye Morale and Produc-~ 
eJ!!PI~tobjectives and that per- - ttmty: 
:: fQ.rmance against those objectives Companies who have made 
~ can affect incentive payments posi- significant progress in hiring minori-
·.tiv.ely or negatively. By 1988 mqre ties and women would have morale 
than half the companies predict they and productiv~t~ problems if their 
-l'lill be basing iricentive pay in part employes believe that the federal 
·on EEO performance. government ia redueing its commit· 
4 
Use of Numbel't (If 0 Defeni,e.: . ment to affirmative action, particu-
... One proposal might elltni· larly if they 'believe that business 
' nate the poSsibility tbat busi· pressure led to such a change. 
nesses could ~ foals and timeta- For example, IBM now has 
~ Illes even voluntarily or point· to pro- 30,000 minority . employes and 
. ~ ~ess in minority and female em- 30,000 women who would not be 
ployment as part of the evidence in there if the company's percentage of 
defending against diicrin1ination minority and female employment 
.. charges, although the Supl"$1le : was the same aa it had been in the 
.Court has emphasized the al)propri~ early '60s. Such a company needs ita 
ateness of such a defenae. Etnploy· ~mployes to think affirmative action 
ers clearly want to use their prO" is being eliminated like it nee~ a 
· -gress as a defenae and ·to~ able·tu, corporate hole in the head. In fact, 
f 1........ .IDM's chief executive officer, John 
avoid urther government u•vaatiga~ Akers, J·ust issued an IBM-style, 16-
tions of their aetivitiee if they have 
• done well, lJI measured by the niitn· page report on ita afftrmative action 
be of minorf•1-A nd fe 1e be program witb statiatica and a de-
rs .._ a rna 8 t y scnption of the CODl"""'Y'S programs velJlploy. 'I ...... 
· At the same time, the pro8J'am to achieve these gains. Similar re-
does not require IDf qQOtas. The ports have been issued ·by otJters: 
... .. 1 nd • ._..... . Schering-Plowm. PhUip Morrla, 
. goa s a ........ Uiblet program· ia 8 EXxon, AT&f, · Westinghoust and 
~~~~le.:~ ~~ t;).~~an~ Chemical Bank to mention just a 
~chairman of Time, Inc. told Con-· lew. . · . · · · 
-gress that at "no timll [Wif hia com· The Alcoa memo noted that Alcoa 
pany) subject to anythirtJ reaemblmg would continue its programs 
• • [and that t"'-•) 't "whatever the ~nt's even· 
quotas ..... , weren pre- tual fV\.<Iitlon.'' . In a aimilar vein, 
sented with rigid, predetermint!d ..-
<~tatis' tt' s for the &.l..,... J ,__ Davidson, ol Time, Inc., told a 
• K c ..... u.. ut. ...... ._. House Judiciary subcommittee thia 
ynd mlnorftiea." He said that the week that "when pre. re&lorts indi-. 
go rnment never tried "to dictate csted th•t the presidendal order on 
a al, inflexible reault." , · aff~ . . . . 
&ide tmd Loctrl Oa , .. . • . 1~¥e. action] might be weak· 
Progro ~ . I ~ or watered down, Tjme, the. 
Hist:'.~n... Jar- ~pa- ' t ,.sued ' a statement [that) ' 'should . 
.,..,.,.., • 8"" ....... this happen, we want to as8ure you 
nies oppoee<~ . federal reMtiQna we will maintain our affihriative ac-
/' 
-.+ I I 'i.' ... -
I " 
L "\._ ; _[ l. •. l. l 
tion program. We have been well 
served by that program, including 
the setting of internal hiring and 
promotion goals for minorities and 
women •• • .' '' · 
~· 
· ~~~- clvil ' rifhta under. 
lit,e RepUblican· Sen. ~Everett · M • 
· Ditlcaen (R·DL) lpOke of "an idea 
· whose 'time had come" and helped 
achieve Kennedy's dream of getting 
the problem out' of the' streets and 
into the CQUrts. ''Employer6 ' ·m~y' 
. ar~ With hOw f.bV'ernment regula· 
,ti~ ant· applie41 b .. · 
rather have these <>NI•Im'<>nt,c> 
·in' a -legal framework 
str~ts. ·· ,' .· 
9 Third Party Pressures: . , If faith in the ability of the Jegal .,ystem to increase em-
ployment opportunities were to 
fade, we may not see marches in the .· 
streets again, but ~· will certaiply 
see increasing pressure on employ-
.ers from. outside the legal system. 
, ~~eady, private civil rights organi· 
zations have. substantially increased 
their demands for afffrmative action 
. plans QJ:' fai( share agreements out~ 
side the context of government re-
quirements. Most employers would 
prefer to deal with the government, 
even when perceived as slightly mis-
guided, than to negotiate 'the details 
of how they do business wit!Ni wide 
variety of competing private groups 
whose standards are not subject 'to 
judicial review. ·1 0 · Management Flexibility 
- The . DeregulatorY 
Issue: 
This is Perhaps the most impor-
tant reason employers favor contin· 
·ued use of voluntary goals and 
timetables and even support appro-
priately crafted mandatory ones. 
NAM president Trowbridge made 
the point when he pointed out that 
retaining. flexible goals and timeta-
bles as a measure of good faith com· 
pliance to ensure progress · would 
"give business the necessary guide- ' 
Jines to ensure compliance with fed-
eral mandatea," and pointed out that 
"absent such guidelines, individual .· 
¢nforcement officers will be left witlt 
decisions as to what comprises com-
pliance with affirmative action." , . : 
The present rules· mandating 
goals and timetables were adopted 
by the Nixon administration, in part 
at the request of business, in es- · 
sence as a deregulatory 'move in th~ 
area of employment diserimihation 
· and affirmative action. • . 
~- Under pre-NIXon programa, tbife 
were major confrontations. with aov· 
ernment investigators concerning 
the adequacy of. specific detalla in 
corporate affirmative action pro- . 
grams. The Nixon pro-busine88, 
deregulatory approach was tQ adopt 
goals and timetables as an objecti~ 
measure of corporate p~ogress nd 
thus elimlnate many o the ar • 
ments about the adequacy of spec ic 
programs. In fact, i" the lead Su-
preme . C~urt dec.ision approving 
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84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 
Dear Sandra: 
The Chief has assigned this case to me to write. 
While this case by no means presents us with the 
q>portunity to resolve all of the intractable "affirmative 
action" issues that will continue to require the guidance 
of the Court, 1 consider it an important opportunity to 
. 
h b . . "' h' begin to establish some muc -needed sta 1l1ty ~ t 1s area 
of the law. My notes show that the Chief, Bill Rehnquist 
and 1 voted simply to reverse; Byron's vote was to "remand 
or reverse"; and you expressed a preference to vacate and 
remand to permit the School Board to make more specific 
findings • 
2. 
My notes also indicate that we share substantial 
~eas of agreement. First, neither of us would accept 
general societal discrimination as a justification for 
rev:rs~ d~~c~imin~ To the extent that the court 
elow relied on societal discrimination to uphold th 
constitutionality of these layoffs, they ought to b 
Second, 1 understood you to say that the Court 
ought to articulate a standard of review for affirmative 
action cases. One of the more important results of this 
case may be to get a majority of the Court to agree on 
such a standard. In Bakke, 1 applied the "strict 
scrutiny" standard that consisten~ has been applied by 
the Court in equal protection cases involving alleged 
~ . . . 




basis for a different standard under the Equal Protection 
Clause when there is reverse discrimination. 1 would 
welcome your views as to a proper articulation of a 
standard. 
a...~/-{) 
Although you indicated ~~ remand to 
~ 
allow the School District another opportunity to establish 
a finding of prior discrimination, 1 think ~t we are in 
agreement on the fundamental principle behind the idea of 
proper findings. The need for findings flows from the 
requirement that these layoffs, or any other state action 
that discriminates on the basis of race alone, be put into 
effect in order to remedy prior discrimination in that 
unit, and not as an attempt to cure the effects of general 
societal discrimination. At some point, then, it is 
necessary that an authorized body answer in the 
) . 
4. 
affirmative the question whether there has been prior 
discrimination. Here, the School Board itself could have 
done so at any of several points in the past, but did not. 
&en in the District Court below, the School Board could 
have established that its actions were intended to remedy 
prior discrimination, but instead supported its plan with 
the "role model" theory and with reference to societal 
discrimination. In my view, the requirement that state 
action that discriminates on the basis of race be remedial 
to prior discrimination necessarily requires at some point 
that prior discrimination be established. I welcome your 
views. 
I should add that I am disturbed by the fact that 
the state action at issue here involved layoffs as opposed 
to mere hiring goals. While my view of strict scrutiny 
5. 
''"~Ol:e"'t f"'~ ties 
allows some burden on nonmino£ities in order to remedy 
prior discrimination, such a burden must be no greater 
than necessary to accomplish the purpose. In my view, in 
most cases firing someone who is not guilty of 
discrimination imposes too great a burden. The actual 
harm that an innocent person is asked to bear can be so 
much greater when they are deprived of existing 
employment, often where the individual involved is heavily 
dependent on wages, than the harm that occurs when someone 
is deprived of an employment or advancement opportunity 
they are not presently dependen~ o • 
1 would prefer simply to reverse outright, as 1 
think the courts below were dead wrong in every respect. 
1 would be content, however, in order to obtain a clear 
majority to reverse and add the language we frequently use 
6. 
to the effect that the case is remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with our opinion. I see no reason 
expressly to give the School Board a second opportunity to 
adopt resolutions that would correct or change its 
position. Indeed, in none of the four cases involving the 
validity of the Board's action, has there been any finding 
that the Board had discriminated. In the 1976 District 
Court litigation the Board expressly denied that there had 
been any past discrimination. Moreover, this case was 
argued and decided by both courts below on the theory that 
the discrimination against white teachers was justified by 
(i) the need for "role models" (as to which there is no 
support in the record), and (ii) "societal 
discrimination". 
7. 
It may be possible, I suppose, to write this case 
so narrowly that we would do no more than reject the 
reasoning of the courts below. This would merely delay 
the "day of reckoning" as we have the more difficult 
affirmative action cases that lie ahead. 
I am, of course, happy to discuss this with you 




To: Justice Powell 
From: Mike 
Re: Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, No. 84-1340 
Date: Nov. 21, 1985 
The language you asked for from Fullilove v. Klutznick, 
448 u.s. 448 (1979) appears on p. 491: 
"Any preference based on racial or ethnic 
criteria must necessarily receive a most searching 
examination to make sure that it doVes not conflict 
with constitutional guarantees." 448 u.s. 448 at 491. 
Earlier in the opinion the C.J. also wrote: 
"We recognize the need for careful judicial 
~aluation to assure that any congressional program 
that employs racial or ethnic criteria to accomplish 
e objective of remedying the effects of past 
discrimination is narrowly tailored to the achievement 
of that goal." 448 u.s. at 480. 
Finally, the opinion expressly states that it does not 
either formulation of the standard of review in Bakke, but 
issue in Fullilove could pass either level 
Jo f~J tA)(No~ ~ 
~ CQ~t~{lb~ 
1J_ol 
1b: Justice Powell 
From: Mike 
Re: Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 
No. 84-1340 Draft Opinion 
Date: November 26, 1985 
Attached is a rough draft of the opi,nion in Wygant. I 
am giving it to you well in advance of the time I would normally 
ask you to look at a draft because I do not want to polish up 
entire arguments that you would just as soon not make. For that 
reason, I do not think it would be productive actually to "edit" 
this draft; rather, I think it would be more helpful simply to 
read it to see if it makes the arguments you had in mind. I 
suggest that you skip pages 1-7, the _____ ---.._,...,. 
begins on page 7, and it attempts to 
fact section.~
describe a level of review 
that will both sweep in Justice White and retain Justice 
Rehnquist. Fortunately, I also think that it is the appropriate 
standard of review in this case. Without saying so in so many 
words, it establishes a "modified strict scrutiny" adapted to 
school desegregation cases. 
~~starting on p. 11, debunks the role 
model theory. It does so in a way that allows the opinion to 
restate your views on societal discrimination. You may want to 
consider whether those views will lose Justice White~~n 
l~iscusses the state interest in diversity. I am of the 
opinion that to come right out and recognize a state interest in 
racial diversity in public schools sufficient to support 
affirmative action would not be prudent. For that reason, 1 
discuss the interest but reserve the question of its validity. 
1f you believe at the end of the discussion that it would be 
better simply to recognize the validity of the interest, rather 
than reserving the question, then 1 can rewrite that section and 
make it much shorter. ~ti~l. 3 discusses the interest in 
remedying prior discrim1nation, in a way that allows the opinion 
to make the point that one eye must be focused on whether the 
legitimate remedial goals have been accomplished. 1f that point 
does not seem important to you, the section can be shortened 
considerably. this section ends by ~t 
answering the question whether the interest is sufficient, 
because of key unanswered factual questions. 
~ecti~ turns to the question whether the means 
chosen to accomplish any of the asserted interests is narrowly 
tailored enough to pass equal protection scrutiny. 1t expressly 
applies the nnarrowly tailoredn language of strict scrutiny, 
because Justice White previously has agreed to that half of 
strict scrutiny analysis. 1t concludes that because the chosen 
means for achieving the asserted purposes involved layoffs, none 
of them can pass this second prong of equal protection analysis. 
You will notice that because of the resolution of the 
nnarrowly tailored" prong of analysis, it is not necessary to the 
decision to say anything at all about whether the asserted state 
interests are sufficiently important. You may choose to say 
nothing about the various interests, and simply state your 
-------------~-:>--
position that layoffs are an unacceptable means to accomplish any 
of the asserted purposes. 
·~ 
Subject: No. ti4-1J4U, wygant: v. ..;acK::;ou noa.L·u u.L .c.u.u.~.,;c:~.~.,...c..uu 
From: L.F.P., Jr. 
I am sending this memo, together with your draft of 
November 26, to you by Federal Express in the event that you 
may want to do some work on it on Saturday. I am not sug-
gesting that I expect you - or any of my clerks - to work 
all of Thanksgiving week-end. 
Your draft reflects skill in "tip-toeing" around the 
delicate issues that makes it so difficult for us to get a 
Court in this case. At least for now, I like your organization 
and approach through Section III(B). I have concerns about 
Section III(C), and its discussion of the state interest in 
remedying prior discrimination. As you suggest, try shortening 
this part considerably, making as few commitments for the 
future as you can. 
Section IV in some respects at least, is the most 
important section as it will decide the case if its analysis 
is accepted by four other Justices. ~ have done considerably 
editing (tentatively in the margin). The distinction made 
between employment "goals" and layoffs is a critical one, and 
I think you made this distinction quite well. I am not sure 
that we have said as clearly as I would like that except where 
identified individuals who are discriminated against are 
involved (Bowman), this Court has never approved the laying off 
of innocent employees as a legitimate means of remedying prior 
discrimination . 
.. it i~· 
' . ,, 
No. 84-1340 2. 
I appreciate that this preliminary draft does not 
have the citations that will be included in the next draft. 
Citations are clearly needed at a number of places. I 
believe it is in Part II that you rely primarily on rather 
old Equal Protection Clause cases. There must be some 
equally good statements in our more recent decisions. 
In sum, Mike, it has been very helpful to have a 
look at your first draft. ~Vhen you have a second draft, 
I suggest that you give a copy of it to your editing clerk 
at the same time you give it to me. It will not be easy for 
me to find very much time early next week. 
L.F.P. 
November 19, 1985 
84-1340 ~~1gant v. Jackson Boar~ of Education 
Dear Sandra: 
The Chief has assigned this case to me to write. 
My notes show that the Chief, Bill Rehnquist and I voted 
simply to reverse; Byron's vote was to "remand or reverse"1 
and you expressed a preference to vacate and remand to per-
mit the School Board to make more specific findinqs. 
I would prefer simply to reverse outright, as I 
think the courts below were dead wrong in every respect. I 
would be content, however, in order. to obtain a clear major-
ity to reverse, tc a~d t~~ language we frequently use to the 
effect that the case is remanded for further proceedinqs 
consistent wi.th our opinion. I see no reason expressly to 
give the School Board a second opportunity to adopt resolu-
tions that would change its position. Indeed, in none of 
the four cases involving the validity of the Board's action, 
has there be~n any ftn~ino that th~ Board had discriminated. 
In the 1976 District Court litigation the Board expresslv 
denied that there had been any past discrimination. More-
over, in this case the Board again had a clear chance to 
establish a finding of prior discrimination. Instead, it 
chose to justify its discrimination against white teachers 
by (1) the need for "role models" (as to which there is no 
support in the record), and (ii) "societal discrimination". 
This case was argued and d~c!ded by both courts below on 
these nebulous justifications. 
My Conference notes make clear that you would not 
accept societal di.scrimination as a justification for re-
verse discrimination. I also understood you to say that the 
Court should articulate a standard of analysis in "affirma-
tive actlon" cases. Moreover, I believe you stated that the 
"means" adopted by the Board--discrimination against inno-
cent teachers--was impermissible under equal protection 
analysis. I agree with everything you said at Conference 
with the sole exception that it may be desirable to give the 




The difficult question is the standard of analysis, 
as I do not believe five Justices have ever agreed. In 
Bakke, Bill Brennan, Thurgood and Harry apparently relied on 
some intermediate level of equal protection analysis ade-
quate to justify reverse discrimination. Byron joined that 
view in Bakke, but it is not clear that he 'ltOuld adhere to 
it in a case like this where--in effect--societal discrimi-
nation is the only justification. Byron did vote to re-
verse. My understanding from what John said at Conference 
is that he would accept the Rreasonableness" standard relied 
on by the Court of Appeals. 
In Bakke, I applied the "strict scrutiny" standard 
that consistently has heen applied by the Court in equal 
protection cases involving alleged discrimination against 
minorities. I see no principled basis for a different 
standard under the Equal Protection Clause \>lhen there is 
reverse discrimination. 
I nevertheless would welcome your views as to a 
proper articulation of a standard, and whether we should try 
for it in this case. It may be possibl~, I suppose, to 
write it so narrowly that we would do no more th~n reject 
the reasoni.ng of the courts below. This would merely delay 
the "day of reckoning" as we have the more difficult affirm-
ative action cases that lie ahead. 










FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Dec. 9, 1985 
84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 
After reviewing your second draft of December 8, 
1 have some second thoughts as to whether we may be trying 
to say too much in a case that best may be disposed of by 
saying less. 1 make the following suggestions somewhat 
tentatively, as 1 think all that you have written has 
merit. But 1 am not even sure that Justice O'Connor, much 
less Justice White, would agree. 
1. Despite your sound idea of implying that 
public schools are in a special category, 1 think we 
should leave this suggestion until we see what is said in 
dissent. 1 therefore would omit from the full paragraph 
beginning on page 9 through the paragraph that ends on 
page 11. This omission will leave the remainder of Part 
11 without requiring substantial change. 
2. we end Part 11 by stating there are "two 
prongs" to affirmative action analysis: The "purpose" 
prong, and the "means" prong. 1 find Part 111 a bit 
confusing because the two prongs are not clearly discussed 
separately. 
Part Ill-A initially addresses the "purpose" 
prong. Perhaps it would be clearer if the first paragraph 
commencing on page 12 stated that the Court of Appeals, 
relying on the reasoning of the District Court, identified 
two state interests thought to satisfy the "purpose" 
prong: (i) the need for role models, and (ii) the 
interest in remedying societal discrimination. In 
addition, respondents argue for the first time here that 
an additional state interest is the need for "a diverse 
faculty". Would it be clearer, Mike, if Part Ill 
addressed separately but consecutively each of these three 
alleged state interests? You have excellent answers for 
each one but my impression is that the draft does not deal 
with each separately and in turn. For example, after 
talking about the role model justification on pages 12-16, 
the first full paragraph on page 16 seems to focus 
primarily on "societal discrimination", but again on page 
17 we go back to the role model theory. 
I am dictating this as I read. As I now reread 
the draft a second time, I see that you are not viewing 
the role model theory as a different or separate state 
.. . 
interest from the perceived need to remedy societal 
discrimination. Although not clearly stated, the idea is 
that because of this discrimination students had been 
deprived of role models. Indeed, you say this in the last 
sentence beginning on page 13. When read in this light, 
perhaps my initial reaction as to the organization of Part 
Ill is not justified. 
3. As I continue to read the draft, you conclude 
the discussion of the "purpose" prong on page 20. The 
last paragraph on that page is an incomplete introduction 
to a discussion of the second prong, namely, that the 
means are not narrowly tailored. I suggest that we 
commence Part IV at this point. The first sentence could 
state in substance that even if there were evidence or 
persuasive argument that a substantial state interest was 
served by the reverse racial classification in this case, 
respondents are not entitled to prevail because the means 
chosen to achieve the asserted state interests are not 
appropriate under constitutional standards. (I would like 
to avoid repetitious use of the word "tailored"). 
After an introductory paragraph, we would move to 
the first full paragraph on page 23. This would eliminate 
at this point what you now have on pages 21 and 22 . 
4. If we leave the paragraph on page 21 in the 
cpinion, we invite at least two Justices to argue for a 
remand. I am inclined to omit the paragraph from the text 
and put something like the following in a foonote: 
"Respondent's belatedly argue that the layoff 
provision was necessary to remedy prior faculty 
employment discrimination in the Jackson School 
District. Before a remedial government purpose 
can attain constitutional significance, a 
factual determination must have been made by the 
appropriate governmental entity that there was 
purposeful discrimination. In this case, 
despite the fact that Article XII has spawned a 
full decade of litigation and at least three 
separate law suits, no such finding ever has 
been made. On the contrary, in Jackson II the 
Board expressly denied the existence of 
employment discrimination. J.A. 33. In these 
circumstances, we can give no credence to this 
belated and unsupported argument." 
5. Also, I suggest that the first full paragraph 
on page 22 be put in a footnote earlier in the opinion at 
,;. .. 
some appropriate place. It seems to me to be misplaced 
near the end of our opinion, and disrupts the flow of our 
analysis. I certainly want to use John Stevens' quote 
from his Fullilove dissent. 
6. I think your discussion of the ~means~ issue, 
pp. 23-29, is excellent. I would end the opinion with the 
single sentence I suggest on page 29. 
for further repetition. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
t ~ .. 
There is no need 
WSJ 
• FRIDAY, DECEMBER 27. 1985 ~~ -71utr /:5' 9~ ~ ___, ~qa-.;, 
Asian-American Political Muscle 
By JoANNE JAcoBS cans traditionally have tended to register when you see the Vietnamese visibility in 
Hard-working and family-oriented, as Democrats, the political balance is the Republican Party." 
Asians have been very successful .in the . shifting. Asian-Americans in California are Democrats emphasize what they see as 
u.s. in a very quiet way. They are called, now evenly split between the two major the problems of Asian-Americans: Japan-
somewhat patronizingly, the "model mi- parties, and 67% say they voted for Ronald bashing that creates hostility against Japa-
nority"-seen in elite colleges and scien· Reagan in 1984, according to a study by nese-Americans; attacks on Vietnamese· 
tific professions, but not heard from. two California Institute of Technology po- American fishermen; shortages of bilin· 
Now, as their numbers are growing, litical-science professors. Co-author Bruce gual teachers; discriminatory college-ad· 
Asian-Americans are beginning to build Cain has some advice for the Republican mission policies; employers who hire but 
and flex their political muscles. And, un- Party : "Go after the Asian community." fail to promote Asian-Americans. 
like other ethnic groups who lean to the In particular, Republicans (and worried Inevitably, they bring up the murder of 
Democrats, the right arm may be as pow- Democrats) see more than 700,000 South· Vincent Chin, a young Chinese-American 
erful as the left. east Asian refugees, most of them fer· beaten to death in Detroit in 1982 by two 
Except in Hawaii, Asian-Americans vently anti-Communist, as the "new CU· unemployed auto workers who thought he 
have not been very important politically, bans." (Cuban voters in Miamr showed was Japanese. The killers received sus-
even in cities with large Asian populations. their growing political clout this year by pended sentences and fines, . outraging 
However, that may be changing: electing the city's first Cuban mayor.) Asian-Americans and others. 
• Last spring Michael Woo became_the . __ "We are_ an open ~a_rty, ~~e natural Some Japanese-Americans think politi· 
first Asian-American to win a seat on the · party for Vietnamese Citizens, says Bob · cians flirt with racism when they use mili· 
Los Angeles City Council, representing a Walker, the executive director for theRe· tant protectionist rhetoric ("trade war," 
predominantly white "Yuppie" district. publican Party in San Jose and surround· "economic Pearl Harbor") . Rep. Mineta 
• Next year, Thomas Hsieh has a good ing Santa Clara County. Republicans have protested strongly last year when Walter -
chance of becoming only the second Asian· Mondale told union members, "We don't 
American ever elected to the San Fran· . want our kids sweeping up under Japanese 
cisco Board of Supervisors __ . ___ . ____ ________ _frograms for low-~n- computers." Mr. Mineta says he told Mr. 
• Philippine-born · Irene Natividad . p l d d · Mondale that kind of talk was "not good---- . 
scored another kind of first this year when come, oor y e ucate m~- trade policy, not good foreign policy, not ' 
she was elected president of the National nority groups ·don't make good domestic or ethnic politics." .. 
Women's Political Caucus. S ful G 
• Tiep D. Nguyen, a Republican lawyer much sense for a group uccess roups 
The Republican Party offers little to 
from San Jose, rna~ become the first Viet- with a higher median jam- those who believe they are victims of dis· 
namese-born Amencan to run for Congress 
I 
if he decides to challenge Democratic Rep. ily income than whites crimination. But the victimized minority 
Don Edwards in 1986. ' model may not appeal to many Asian· 
More important, Asian-Americans have lower unemployment and Americans. Programs designed to help 
low-income, poorly educated minority 
become a force in ~ampaign financing in .... .;ce the pe~rcenta:ge of groups don't make much sense for a mi-
the past 10 years, gmng money far out of ~u.r• ' 
lle d nority group that boasts a higher median proportion to their numbers. As an ethnic CO ge gra uates. family income than whites, lower rates of 
group, Asians rank second only to Jews as 
contributors to the Democratic Party. Now unemployment and a higher percentage of 
they want to turn money into power. had considerable success in registering college graduates. Affirmative-action 
new citizens of Asian ancestry as they "goals" 'for college admission or employ-
Recognition Wanted leave swearing· in ceremonies. ment in high-status jobs are likely to back· 
"We tend to be bigger · givers on aver· Democrats are concerned. Thomas fire against Asian-Americans, since they 
I 
age than any other .group, but we cancel Hsieh, a member of the Democratic Na· are over-represented. Special preferences 
each other out because we give to all can· tional Committee, went to the 1984 GOP for under-represented minorities-blacks 
dictates," says Landy Eng, a San Fran· convention and didn't like what he saw. and Hispanics-will mean fewer places for 
cisco entrepreneur and head of the Bay "In Dallas, I saw tremendous efforts by Asians, including refugee kids from genu· 
Area Committee,.a.new...nonpartisan fund· .. Republicans -to-COw1- Southeast. Asian inely disadvantaged backgrounds. (While 
raising group. "Our overall objective is to groups. They had receptions, all sorts of ·many·of the Vietnamese immigrants are . 
get Asian-Americans elected into political special attention. Our party takes for living in poverty, their children are doing 
office," he says. granted a lot of things. Asian traditions are astonishingly well in school.) 
In the past, Asians put their energies very close to the Republican Party's, very The more relevant models are the Cu· 
into hard work and education, retaining an similar. The only reason Asians join the bans and theJeWs, both groups that turned 
Eastern contempt for politics and a desire Democratic Party is because they're sym- self-sufficiency, business acumen, strong 
to keep a low profile in a frequently hostile pathetic to minority people... families and devotion to education into 
society. The new generation is more as· In trying to shed the party's special-in- ec~~omic suc~ess and political power . . 
sertive and assimilated, willing to raise its terest image, the Democrats have sent If we ach1eve ~hat the Jews nave 1~ 
voice and demand the recognition other mixed signals to Asian-Americans. The _ the last 20 years, we II be very.~uccessful, 
minority groups have received. party instituted an Asian Pacific Caucus at sa~s . fund-raiser ~dy Eng. Our lack of 
In addition, the enormous tide of immi· the 1984 convention then "de-instituted" political clout 1s hke [haVIng] a team With-
grants has more than tripled the Asian· the-{;aucus in May. in a speech last month out an offensiv_e line." . 
American population-from 1.4 million in in San Francisco, nationaJ Democratic What do _Aslan·Amencans hope t? _ac-
1970 to 5.1 million today. It is expected to Chairman Paul G. Kirk Jr.- the man who complish With any newly won political 
reach 10 million by the year 2000. By 2010, took away the caucus-proposed the for· clou~? Elec~ngmore_Asian ·Americans and 
some 12.5% of California's population is mation of a National Federation of Asian· making rac1sm politically unpalatable are 
expected to be of Asian ancestry. Pacific Americans to give them "an oppor- the ?nly goals that all can agree on. U_nlike 
Both parties are therefore wooing tunity to play a role in this party and to Je~sh or Cuban voters, AsJan·Amenc~ns 
Asians, offering different visions of their pursue a political agenda of importance don t have a common set of foreJgn·pohcy 
role in U.S. society. Republicans see them to their communities." goals. Mr. Eng says h1s committee had to 
as middle-class Americans-small·busi- Asian Democrats remain upset that a~ee no_t to discuss the issue of China vs. 
·ness men, professionals and engineers- their caucus lost its official status while Ta1wan m order to get anywhere. 
with conservative family values and a caucuses for blacks, Hispanics and women Asian -~ericans have plenty of eco-
strong tradition of self-help. Democrats remained in the party's bylaws. It showed norruc. weight to throw ~round, ~~d 1hey 
still cast Asian-Americans as members of who had clout and who didn 't. have JUSt begun to use It m politics. 
a minority gro.up needing special protec· "I fe-el it was a shortsighted, regressive 
tion from discrimination. move," says Democratic Congressman Ms. Jacobs is an editorial-page writer 
While Chinese· and Japanese·Ameri· Norm Mineta of San Jose, "especially for the San Jose Mercury News. 
CHAMBERS OF 
;iupunu <lfltltrl of Ur~ ~niub ;ihtt~g 
Jfu'ltinghtn. ~. <If. 2ll,;t.l!~ 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.. 
December 13, 1985 
Re: 84-1340 - Wygant v. Jackson Board of 
Education 
Dear Lewis: 
I shall await Thurgood's dissent. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
December 30, 1985 
84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board 
Dear Sandra: 
Your letter of December 19 - though di.squieting 
when I first received it - is in fact quite helpful. This 
is to supplement our telephone talk in which I think some of 
the points were clarified. 
The first paragraph of your letter identifies areas 
of agreement, and it seems to me that these are at the heart 
of a proper analysis in an affirmative action case. I write 
now to comment on specific concerns that you identified. I 
agree that faculty diversity (mentioned in Section III-B) 
well may be a legitimate state interest. In this particular 
case the type of diversity approved in the 1972 agreement 
makes little sense. The diversity argument apparently was 
not raised below, and was not considered by the DC or CA6. 
Accordingly, I think ""e need not address it, and I will omit 
discussion of it. 
You express concern about some of 'fhat I said in 
Section III-C in which I considered respondent's argument 
that the layoffs were part of a plan to remedy prior dis-
crimination by the Board. As I noted in Section III-A, rem-
edying prior discrimination by the Board could be a suffi-
ciently important government interest to justify a proper 
affirmative action plan. 
Confusion arises because there are many different 
types of plans for increasing the number of minority employ-
ees in a work force, whether of a private or public employ-
er. All of these tend to be called "affirmative action 
plans". [See enclosed Post editorial of 8/16/85]. It is 
entirely appropriate - and I so advised clients - to adopt a 
goal that in effect would give prior consideration to minor-
ities in filling vacancies or as new positions open up. 
Adoption of a "goal" or purpose of attaini.ng a more balanced 
workforce should not invariably exclude whites. Special 
skills may be needed or other reasons may properly require 
deviation from the plan. I have reservations about arbi-
trary "fixed quotas" - even when there are no forced lay-
offs. But we need not get into this. The central point - as 
you have observed - is that under a "goal" type plan no one 
is laid off to provide jobs for minorities or is otherwise 
directly discriminated against. 
2. 
Where a plan is adopted that does penalize existing 
employees or that requires that they be laid off, as in this 
case, the plan must be ju~tified as a means of remedying 
prior discrimination by the employer - not merely general 
societal discrimination. tlllhen such a plan is challenged in 
court it is necessary that such discrimination be proved 
unless it has been found to exist tn some other authorita-
tive way. 
Where there i.s a determination of prior discri.m1.na-
tion, the queRtion then becomes whether the remedy adopted 
is legitimate. As we have discussed, the language in prior 
equal protection cases (usually cases not involving affirma-
tive action plans) has been framed i.n t(,lrms of "narrowly 
tailored." This language is not as descriptively accurate 
in this case as in some others. nut th~ term has acquired a 
"secondary meaning," anrl I would hesitate to abandon its use 
entirely. What we really intend is that the means employed 
ln this case are 5mpermissible e'1en to accnmolish a legiti-
mate state int~rest. 
What I ha~1e said ahove does not specifically ad-
dress each of the points made in your letter. I have fo-
cused on my understanding of your primary concerns. I en-
close a revised draft that I believe will accord with your 
views. The draft has a number of err.ors that I have marked. 
The Atex system i.s partially down. 
Although you sent copies of your letter of the 19th 
to Byron and Bill, I am inclined to make the clarifying 
changes in my opinion before going <Hrectly to either of. 
them. It is particularly important to have Byron with us, 
as his "join" is essential to the Court ooinion that is so 
highly desirable. 
If you have further suggestions I will be glad to 







JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
~U:Vt"tutt <!fond of tqt 'Jtnittb ~tatts 
'Daeftington, ~. QT. 2!T.;i'!..;t 
December 13, 1985 
Re: No. 84-1340-Wygant v. Jackson Bd.of Education 
Dear Lewis: 






cc: The Conference 
C HAMBERS O F 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
December 16, 1985 
Re: 84-1340 - Wygant v. Jackson Board of 
Education 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w ... J. BRENNAN, JR. 
~~mu~omrtof~t~b~mug 
JruJri:ngt~ J. <!f. 2!1~'!~ 
December 17, 1985 
No. 84-1340 
Wygant v. Jackson Board 
of Education 
Dear Lewis, 




Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.iu.prmtt arottri .of tqt ~nitt~ ,jbdts 
~asJringht~ 10. ar. 20p~~ 
December 19, 1985 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.. 
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL 
Re: 84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 
Dear Lewis: 
I have reviewed your thorough and well-crafted draft in this 
case and fi ·.1d myself generally in agreement with your reasoning. 
I agree that Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
which you quoted from at Slip op. 6, undermines the Board's "role 
model" justification for maintaining a racial balance of minority 
teachers directly proportional to minority students. But isn't 
other language in Swann even more directly on. point, such as the 
following passage? 
If we were to read the holding of the District Court to 
require, as a matter of substantive constitutional right, 
any particular degree of racial balance or mixing, that 
approach would be disapproved and we would be obliged to 
reverse. The constitutional command to desegregate schools 
does not mean that every school in every community must 
always reflect the racial composition of the school system 






J U STICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
Dear Lewis, 
,jn.vrtntt <!}.ourt ttf tqt 'Jnittb ,jtldt% 
~~lht,gJri:ngtttlt, ~. <!} . 2.ll.;t~~ 
December 19, 1985 
I have read your draft in Wygant with great 
interest. It is an important and challenging case. I am in 
agreement with you on a number of aspects of your opinion, 
although we may differ in some important respects. I agree 
with you that the strict standard of review set forth in 
Part II is the proper one for review of all types of race 
based action by the state, including affirmative action. I 
also agree that "societal" discrimination is a concept which 
is incapable of definition or limitation, and, thus, 
remediation. A state's interest in remedying such societal 
discrimination therefore cannot be deemed sufficiently 
important to pass constitutional muster under strict 
scrutiny. I also agree with you that the use of a role-
model theory to justify a hiring goal based on the number of 
minority students in the school population was improper. 
Lastly, I agree that the layoff plan in this case imposes 
disproportionate harm on the rights and interests of some of 
the nonminority employees and fails to pass muster under the 
requirement that the employer's plan be narrowly tailored to 
effectuate its remedial purpose. 
Let me now mention some areas of possible 
difficulty which I have with your approach. First is the 
diversity interest discussion in Part IIIB. I am not at 
rest on this but ' am inclined to think there is a legitimate 
state interest in promoting racial d i ver"si ty in public 
school ' faculties. The point was raised belatedly by the 
respondents in this case and need not be addressed or 
resolved in this case, and I am not prepared. to join an 
opinion which rejects that goal as not sufficiently 
important to meet the test you propose. Your draft states 
that this question is left open, but footnote ~ interprets 
Bakke in such a way that it may preclude reliance on such an 
1nterest. 
Second, and more importantly, Part IIIC concludes 
that if the Board's purpose in adopting th~ layoff provision 
was to remedy prior discrimination, "a factual determination 
C',. I 
. ' 
must have been made, either by the Board or by a court, that 
the Board engaged in purposeful discrimination." I suppose 
that for the same reason you leave open the previous 
question, yo~d l~a-~ . ~pef.l the quest~OI) of what findings 
ar~ec~s~.~ry. I do not think Hazelwood School District, " 
)
which was concerned with the proper basis of comparison for 
purposes of statistical evaluation of a Title VII "pattern 
or practice" employment discrimination suit, embodies a 
. holding that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that past 
discrimination be proven before a state employer~ may 
institute ai1voluntary affirmative action program. Such a 
J:~uirement may""put us in the anomalous position of creating 
, a severe disincentive to voluntary compliance by public 
employers with Title VII and the civil rights laws. Also, 
the Court would be saying that what private employers may do 
voluntarily to comply with Title VII, public employers are 
constitutionally forbidden to do. 
Congress itself has made findings concerning the 
problem of employment discrimination in public employment to 
justify imposition of Title VII requirements on public 
employers. See H.R. Rep. No. 92-238 (1971). In enacting 
the 1972 amendments, Congress intended that the same Title 
VII principles be applied to public and private employers 
alike. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 u.s. 321, 331 n. 14 (1977) 
The Court has Indicated In the past that the constitutional 
requirements congressional action must meet to pass muster 
under the Fourteenth Amendment are more tolerant than those 
controlling in cases where the actions of other governmental 
actors are at issue. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 u.s. 448 
(1980). Perhaps, in ligfit of Congress' findings and its 
enactment of the 1972 amendments to Title VII, it is 
appropriate to conclude that a public employer's voluntary 
undertaking to correct a racial disparity in its work force, 
which it has a substantial, demonstrable basis for believing 
constitutes a prima facie violation of Title VII, is in fact 
a remedial measure. 
My inclinatJon, then, is to bel~e~~at if a 
state employ,er. has. a substantial basi~ ' for - believing that it 
is in p?l~a la~ie ~ihlati~n of 1itle VII, either by virtue 
of its own investigation or that of some other public agency 
charged with enforcement of such laws, its efforts to remedy 
the problem will constitute an important state interest. 
Regardless of any differences of opinion we may have 
regarding the magnitude of the state's interest in this 
context, or regarding what findings must be made and by 
whom, I think we are in accord concerning the requirement 
that the state employer's plan be narrowly tailored to 
effectuate its remedial purpose. To pass muster, the plan 
must be a temporary measure clearly intended to eliminate 
the violation, not to maintain racial balance. The plan 
also cannot impose disproportionate harm on the interests 
of, or unnecessarily trammel the rights of nonminority 
employees. 
I'm not quite sure where this leaves us. I intend 
to continue to work on the problem and to try to articulate 
my views more fully if necessary. I can at least concur in 
the judgment and perhaps join parts of the opinion as well. 
Byron may have other ideas about all of this and I am sure 
we all want to reach as much common agreement as we can. 
Justice Powell 




C HAMBERS OF 
~nvttmt <!fourt of tlrt ,-mttb .itatt.ll' 
~lfittgtttn. ~. Qt. 2llbf~' 
J U S TI C E BYRON R . WHIT E 
December 19 , 19 85 
84-1340 -
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 
Dear Lewis , 
I doubt that I shall join your proposed 
opinion in its present form and as of now 
intend to wr i te separately concurring in the 
judgment. Meanwhile , I await the dissent. 
Sincerely yours , 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
C HAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
,hvttm:t «routt ltf t!r~ ~uitt~ ~hdts 
Jlu£ringbm:. ~. ar. 20.?,.~ 
December 20, 1985 
Re: No. 84-1340, Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 
Dear Lewis : 
I shall , of course, await the dissent in this case . 
Sincerely , 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
). 
December 20, 1985 
84-1340 wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 
Dear Chief: 
Thank you for your note, and suggestion. 
I am finding it difficult to put a Court together 
in this case, as could have been anticipated from the Con-
ference discussion. You have seen Byron's note saying he 
will await the dissent. There is no possibility of a Court 
without him. 
Also, I have had extended discussions, and an ex-
change of letters, with Sandra. Even she and I are not yet 
together. But I am still working on the case, as I think it 
is of vital importance for thi~ Court to afford some guid-
ance with respect to affirmative action programs. 
I will keep you advised. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
.. .,___ . ·; - .. 
_.---r ... '/k..eYw- A...f-~&4-f) 9 
CHAMBERS OF 
.J U STICE SANDRA DAY O'CON N OR 
.invrtmt QJ1tttrt cf t4t 11tnittb .ibdt.s-
'~lht.~ftingtcn. ~.OJ . 2ll~~~ 
January 2, 1986 
No. 84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 
Dear Lewis, 
Thank you for your letter and revised draft in 
this case. I think it is helpful to either omit the faculty 
diversity discussion, as you have done, or to point out it 
was not raised below. 
The other changes you have ~e seem to me to be 
generally helpful. I continue to ha~eservations 
concerning the proposed requirement tnat the Board or a 
court must have found "purposeful discrimination" (p. 8 of 
draft) in order to justify remedial action. And I am still 
uncertain how a Title VII discriminatory effects case would 
fit under your analysis. 
I am still hoping Byron will address his concerns 
in the hope a reconciliation is possible. If you want to 
circulate the revised draft it seems to me you should do so. 
I am not prepared yet to join quite all of it and think it 





.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
~lqfrtntt Qfl11lri llf t4t ~Utb .ttatt.s' 
Jhurlfittgtltn, ~. ([f. 21lt?,.t? 
January 2, 1986 J~ 
~~-
{Jj&) ~ 
No. 84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education ~ ~ 
~ 
Dear Lewis, ~- 9~ 
Thank you for your letter and revised draft in ~J 
this case. I think it is helpful to either omit the faculty ~ j 1 
diversity discussion, as you have done, or to point out it ~~ 
\ 
was not raised below. ~ 
The other changes you have made seem to me to be ~-~ 1 
generally helpful. I continue to have reservations ~~~ · 
concerning the proposed requirement that the Board or a 
7 '7 
court must have found "purposeful discrimination" (p. 8 of 
draft) in order to justify remedial action. And I am still 
uncertain how a Title VII discriminatory effects case would 
fit under your analysis. 
I am still hoping Byron will address his concerns 
in the hope a reconciliation is possible. If you want to 
circulate the revised draft it seems to me you should do so. 
I am not prepared yet to join quite all of it and think it 




January 3, 1986 
84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 
Dear Sandra, 
Thank you for your letter of the 2d of January. I 
have made certain changes that more accurately state that 
the findings necessary to justify remedial action can be of 
a statutory or constitutional violation. I also have trf.ed 
to make clearer that these findings do not have to he con-
temporaneous with the instigation of an affirmative action 
program. As you agree that societal discrimination is not a 
legitimate basis for remedial action, there must be a find-
ing of discrimination by the state agency. 
Also, as I have said, the typical "affirmative ac-
tion plan" so prevalent today is what I have described as 
the adoption of a "goal"--a plan to make employment deci-
sions [as vacancies occur or as the work forcl:l! increases] 
with the purpose of attaining a work force more representa-
tive of the community. No finding of prior discrimination 
is required where enlightened management a~opts and imple-






THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
~u.prnnt <!Jllltrl of tqt ,-mu~ ~btfts 
:.astrmghtu. ~. <!J. 2ll,;;~$ 
January 8, 1986 









JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.jttpTmu C!Iouri d tlft ~b .Shttt• 
•a•ftingtott. ~- <!I· 211~_,., I 
February 10, 1986 
Re: No. 84-1340, Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me in your dissent • 
Sincerely, 
Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
.·· ... . ..... 
. :-
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CHAMBERS 01'" 
.JUSTICE w .. . ..1 . BRENNAN, .JR. 
·' 
February 6, 1986 
No. 84-1340 
Wygant, et al. v. Jackson Board 
of Education, etc., et al. 
Dear Thurgood, 




Copies to the Conference 
January 8, 1986 
84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board 
Dear Byron: 
My notes at Conference, and recollection of what 
you said, caused me to think that we were in accord as to 
how this case should be written. I recall parti.cularly your 
statement that you would not foreclose reliance upon "soci.-
etal discrimination" in all instances, but that it could not 
justify a race-based classification that required the lay-
off of innocent employees such as occurred in thi.s case. 
A majority of this Court never has agreed upon the 
exact formulation of a standard of equal protection analysis 
in an •affirmative action" case. Apart from affirmative 
action cases, equal protection analysis of race based clas-
sifications has been fai.rly consistent: the state must show 
a "compelling" interest and the m@an8 emnloyed must be "nar-
rowly tailored". !tloreover, the showing of the requisite 
state interest requires a determination by an appropriate 
body of prior purposeful discrimination. (E.g., Conqress in 
Fullilove). 
The Chief Justice in his Fullilove opinion - that 
you and I joined - used somewhat less specific language, and 
I have tried to follow it. Moreover, in Ful.~ilove - and 
also in Weber - the means employed ~id not require the de-
priving of innocent employees of their jobs. In Bowman 
there had been dtscrimination against pa~ticular job appli-
cants. 
It is certainly desirable -in view of the uncer-
tainty that now exists as to where this Court stands on af-
firmative action - that we try to put a majority together. 
I have made a number of changes in my 2nd draft, 
circulated on the 7th. My purpose is to write as narrowly 
as possible, and yet articulate a general framework of equal 
protection analysis for affirmative action plans adopted by 
public agencies or bodies. 
As I have discussed this case with Sandra, I am 




cca Justice O'Connor 
Sincerely, 
C HAMBERS OF 
;inpuuu Qf1rurl1tf t4e ~niub ~hrles 
Jl'aslfinghm. ~. <If. 2ll~'!." 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
,, 
February 27, 1986 
Re: 84-1340 - wygant v. Jackson Board of 
Education 
Dear Lewis: 
Although I agree with much of Thurgood's 
dissent, I will be writing separately. 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
March 19, 1986 
PERSONAL 
84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 
Dear .Sandra: 
After a lona interlude, in which we focused on 
Local 28 and Local 93, I am taking another look at my opin-
ion in Wygant. As therP has been no response of any kind 
from Byron, it is oDvious that 1 nee~ your vote rather bad-
ly. 1 therefore would welcome any suqaestions vou m3y care 
to make. 
My .9...~ is t'1at Byrot'l, '"ith his quite positive 
view about Title Vll, will write ~en?rately in thiA equal 
protection case - despite his anparent aqreement with us at 
Conference. Mv hope is that we can et least come out of 






~nttrttttt <qlfllrt ttf tqt ~ittlt ~tatt.ll' 
JIMlthtgtttn, ~. <q. 2llgt~~ 





~~~~~ ~ TM 
March 21, 1986 
Re: 84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 
Dear Lewis, 
Thanks for your letter. I fear I have 
fallen behind in getting out some of the writing I 
intend to do. I am presently trying to put my 
thoughts in this case in written form. I will give 
you a "preview" and we can talk about it to see 
whether there is anything you might v1ant to incor-
porate in your draft. If all qoes well, it will 
be ready next week. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
March 28, 1986 
84-1340 Wygant 
Dear Sandra: 
Here are two copies of a proposed third draft of my 
opinion in this case. 
For the most part, the chanqes are footnotes that 
respond to Thurgood's dissent. 1 do think, however, that 
his dissent afforded me the opportunity to clarify some of 
the basic analysis of my opinion. 
I will not circulate this until you have had an 
opportunity to take a look at it. As thi~ case presently is 
"dead in the waterft, please feel free to put this draft on 





~uttrttttt Qiltllrt .ttf t4t 'Jnittb ~hdt~ 
~a.slfingt.ttn, ~. QI. 2llgt.l!~ 
.J U STICE SA N DRA DAY O'CON N OR 
,;. ··. 
• 
March 28, 1986 
No. 84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 
Dear Lewis, 
I am enclosing an unpublished draft opinion 
concurring in part in your opinion in Wygant. I have shown 
it as joining Part I, II, III A, and V although I think what 
I say is not consisten_!: with pa.E..t__of your Part III A. I 
want to jo"in as mucn of""yoi:ir opinion as rpossi6ly can. If 
you believe we can reach common ground to a greater extent, 
I will welcome your sug estions. These affirmative action 
cases are v ry 1 1cu e, at least for me. Please let me 





.ittJtftnU <l}ourl ttl tlrt ~~~ jltatts 
Jla~lfingt~ ~. <!f. 2Dgt~~ 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. April 7, 1986 
84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 
MEMORANDUN TO JUSTICE O'CONNOR 
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Now that I have had an opportunity to read the 
draft of your opinion (delivered privately to me several 
days ago), I say first that it is exceptionally well writ-
ten. I particularly appreciate your willingness to join in 
Parts I, II, III-A and V of my opinion, and concur in the 
judgment. As you suggest, there may be shades of difference 
- though not enough to make your "join" inappropriate. 
In view of your invitation, I make the following 
comments for your consideration: 
1. You accept Thurgood's framing of the question 
(p. 1). I do not think his statement is accurate. The "af-
firmative hiring policy• before us is challenged. Could you 
not frame the question in your own words, or accept a revi-
sion of my question as follows: 
"This case presents the question whether a 
school board, pursuant to an affirmative ac-
tion plan adopted by the board and its union, 
may extend - consistently with the Equal Pro-
tection Clause - preferential protection 
against layoff to some of its employees sole-
ly because of their race or national origin?" 
· ~ 
2. In describing the various ways in which a 
standard of analysis has been framed, I have these sugges-
tions: (i) After quoting my "standard", you could cite the 
Fullilove standard that can be viewed as being substantial-
ly in accord with mine. Possibly at this point you also 
could quote John Stevens to the effect that "racial classi-
fications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the 
most exact connection between justification and classifica-
tion", Stevens, J., Fullilove, at 537. (ii) Since we hope 
(faintlyl) that Byron will join at least some part of my 
opinion, is it necessary to describe Justice Marshall's po-
sition in a way that identifies Byron with the Bakke lan-
guage, especially since he subsequently joined Fullilove? I 
note, however, that you subscribe to my formulation, and 
perhaps I should not ask for more. I like your quote from 
Mississippi University for Women, an opinion I probably 
should have joined. 
3. On p. 3, you rephrase Thurgood's position that 
there must be a legitimate "remedial purpose" and the means 
must not impose "unnecessary hardships on affected persons". 
In doing so, you speak of persons "not benefited." Would it 
not be more consistent with the facts of this case to say 
that the rights of innocent persons are directly and ad-
versely affected? 
4. The last sentence in your footnote 1 refers to 
the "apparent prior employment discrimination by the school 
2. 
district•. I do not think we fairly can say, on the record 
before us, that prior discrimination is •apparent.• One 
point of your discussion--and mine--on •findings• is that 
this Court cannot make a determination for itself whether 
there has been prior discrimination. Moreover, the state 
court in Jackson II expressly found there had been no prior 
employment discrimination during the relevant period. 
5. This brings us to your discussion of findings, 
beginning on p. 5. If I understand your position correctly, 
I find it persuasive. It is a thoughtful refinement on the 
need for some kind of evidentiary record to justify remedial 
race-conscious state action. I do not think that it is, at 
bottom, inconsistent with my views. If I understand your 
position correctly, I could perhaps adopt your reasoning on 
the subject. 
As I read it, your opinion recognizes (i) the need 
for remedial race-conscious state action to be premised on 
prior discrimination, and (ii) the need for some determina-
tion by the trial court of the legitimacy of that premise if 
it is challenged by nonminorities. You are rightly con-
cerned, however, that a requirement that the trial court 
actually make an express finding of prior discrimination 
would inhibit voluntary compliance with public employers' 
civil rights obligations. In order to initiate an affirma-
tive action program, you reason that public employers need 
only have •information which gives them a sufficient basis 
. . ~ \ 
3. 
for concluding that remedial action is necessary," slip op. 
at 9, or, rephrased slightly, "a firm basis for determining 
that affirmative action is warranted." Slip op. at 10. 1 
have no trouble agreeing with that as a sufficient basis for 
initiating an affirmative action program. 
Implicit in your statement of the burdens of proof 
and production at trial is the recognition that the trial 
court will have to make some determination whether the em-
ployer had a sufficient basis for concluding that remedial 
action is necessary (unless the plan fails for some other 
reason). I read your opinion as stating that the trial 
court must determine that the employer had sufficient evi-
dence to support an inference of prior discrimination, or, 
as you state elsewhere in the opinion, "a firm basis for 
determining that affimrative action is warranted." Slip op. 
at 10. If I am correct in describing your position in this 
way, I will include similar language in my opinion. 
6. You agree that the courts below failed to iden-
tify a sufficiently important governmental purpose, and also 
that the "layoff provision" in its operation is not "narrow-
ly tailored" to achieve its asserted remedial purpose be-
cause "it is keyed to an impermissible hiring goal." With 
these views, of course, I am very much in agreement. 
* * * 
I am not unaware that I am imposing a burden on you 
(when we already are overburdened) to consider the foregoing 
4. 
comments. I am grateful for your thoughtful contributions 
to my own views in this case. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
> I I > 
5. 
',';'' 
April 7, 1986 
84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 
MEMORANOUN TO JUSTICE O'CONNOR 
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Now that l have had an opportunity to read the 
draft of your opinion (delivered privately to me several 
days ago), 1 say first that it is exceptionally well writ-
ten. 1 particularly appreciate your willingness to join in 
Parts 1, 11, 111-A and V of my opinion, and concur in the 
judgment. As you suggest, there may be shades of difference 
- though not enough to make your "ioin" inappropriate. 
In view of your invitation, 1 make the following 
comments for your consideration: 
1. You accept Thurgood's framing of the question 
(p. 1). 1 do not think his statement is accurate. The "af-
firmative hiring policy" before us is challenged. Could you 
not frame the question in your own words, or accept a revi-
sion of my question as follows: 
"This case presents the question whether a 
school board, pursuant to an affirmative ac-
tlon plan adopted by the board and its union, 
may extend - consistently with the Equal Pro-
tection Clause - preferential protection 
agai.nst layoff to some of its employees sole-
ly because of their race or national origin?" 
2. ln describing the various ways in which a 
standard of analysis has been framed, 1 have these sugges-
tions: (i) After quoting my •standard", you could cite the 
Fullilove standard that can be viewed as being substantial-
ly in accord with mine. Possibly at this point you also 
could quote John Stevens to the effect that "racial classi-
fications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the 
most exact connection between justification and classifica-
tion", Stevens, J., Fullilove, at 537. (ii) Since we hope 
(faintly!) that Byron will join at least some part of my 
opinion, ia it nece~sary to describe Justice Marshall's po-
sition in a way that identifies Byron with the Bakke lan-
guage, especially since he subsequently joined Fullilove? 1 
note, however, that you subscribe to my formulation, and 
perhaps 1 should not ask for more. 1 like your quote from 
Mississippi University for Women, an opinion 1 probably 
should have joined. 
3. On p. 3, you rephrase Thurgood's position that 
there must be a legitimate •remedial purpose" and the means 
must not impose "unnecessary hardships on affected persons". 
ln doing so, you speak of persons •not benefited." Would it 
not be more consistent with the facts of this case to say 
that the rights of innocent persons are directly and ad-
versely affected? 
4. The last sentence in your footnote 1 refers to 




district". I do not think we fairly can say, on the record 
before us, that prior discrimination is "apparent." One 
point of your discussion--and mine--on "findings" is that 
this Court cannot make a oetermination for itself whether 
there has been prior discrimination. Moreover, the state 
court in Jackson II expressly found there had been no prior 
employment discrimination during the relevant period. 
5. ~his brings us to your discussion of findings, 
beginning on p. 5. 1f 1 understand your position correctly, 
1 find it persuasive. It is a thoughtful refinement on the 
need for some kind of evidentiary reco~~ to ju~tify remedial 
race-conscious state action. 1 do not think that it i~, at 
bottom, inconsistent wi.th my views. I~ 1 understant3 your 
position correctly, I could perhaps adopt your reasoning on 
the subject. 
As 1 read it, your opinion recognizes (i) the need 
for remedial race-conscious state action to be premised on 
prior discrimination, and (ii) the need for some determina-
tion by the trial court of the legitimacy of that premise if 
it is challenged by nonminorities. You are rightly con-
cerned, however, that a requirement that the trial court 
actually make an express finding of prior discrimination 
would inhibit voluntary compliance with public employers' 
civil rights obligations. In order to initiate an affirma-
tive action program, you reason that public employers need 
only have "information which gives them a sufficient basis 
3. 
for concluding that remedial action is necessary," slip op. 
at 9, or, rephrased slightly, "a firm basis for determining 
that affirmative action is warranted." Slip op. at 10. 1 
have no trouble agreeing with that as a sufficient basis for 
initiating an affirmative action program. 
Implicit in your statement of the burdens of proof 
and pronuction at trial is the recognition that the trial 
court will have to make some determination whether the em-
ployer had a sufficient basis for concluding that remedial 
action is necessary (unJPss the plan fails for some other 
reason). 1 read your opinion as stating that the trial 
court must determine that the employer had sufficient evi-
dence to support an inference of prior discrimination, or, 
as you state elsewhere in the opinion, "a firm basis for 
determining that affimrative action is warranted." Slip op. 
at 10. lf 1 am correct in describing your position in this 
way, I will include similar language in my opinion. 
6. You agree that the courts below failed to iden-
tify a sufficiently important governmental purpose, and also 
that the "layoff provision" in its operation is not "narrow-
ly tailored" to achieve its asserted remedial purpose be-
cause "it is keyed to an impermissible hiring goal." With 
these views, of course, 1 am very much in agreement. 
- * * 
1 am not unaware that 1 am imposing a burden on you 




comments. 1 am grateful for your thoughtful contributions 
to my own views in this case. 
L • .F.P., Jr. 
ss 
5. 
April 12, 1986 
84-1340 Wygant 
Dear Sandra: 
Here is a revised 3rd draft that contains changes 
made - in significant part - as a result of your proposed 
concurring opinion. 
1 will not circulate this until you have had an 
opportunity to look at it. Your comments are welcome. 1 






JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
~nvrttttt arltltrlttf tqt ~uittb ~tatt~ 
J'a:$lthtgtou, ~. ar. 2llbi~~ 
April 14, 1986 
Re: 84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 
Dear Lewis, 
Your changes in Wygant are most welcome 
as far as I am concerned. I have sent my concurring 
opinion to the printer and will be ready to circulate 
it when you circulate your 3rd draft. Let's hope 





JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
j;tqtrtmt Qf4tu.d llf tqt 'Jitnitt~ j;ta±tg 
11ht1lfrittgron. ~. <!f. 2ll&l"';l 
/ 
April 17, 1986 
Re: No. 84-1340-Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 
Dear Lewis: 





cc: The Conference 
May 6, 1986 
84-1340 Wygant 
Dear Sandra: 
1 have thought a good deal about your suggestion 
that 1 return to the earlier version of my Wygant opinion 
that did not specifically mention strict scrutiny. Let me 
explain briefly why 1 am inclined to stay with the latest 
draft of the opinion. 
The difference between the third draft (strict scru-
tiny not specifically mentioned) and the fourth draft is not 
really a change in the overall analysis. The third draft 
was strict scrutiny in ever.ythinq but name. The fourth 
draft in reality represents a more accurate statement of 
what the opinion was holding all along, and thus it also 
"fits• into the general body of equal protection cases. lt 
also conforms with what 1 have written in prior cases. 
lf 1 thought there were a chance to obtain a Court 
for a standard of scrutiny - something that has eluded us -
1 woul~ gladly go along unless it w~re thP. WJB/TM ~tandard 
in race cases. But as Byron has declined to join either 
your or my opinion, 1 see no real benefit to be gained going 
back to language that, as Thurgood's dissent pointed out, 
does not have a solid reference point in our earli~r opin-
ions. 
In my view, the first prong of equal protection 
scrutiny - the strength of the state's interest - is of 
minor importance in affirmative action cases. We both be-
lieve that the state interest in remedying established prior 
discrimination can satisfy even the strict scrutiny stand-
ard. Most of these cases will be won or lost on the "nar-
rowly tailored" prong. See footnote seven of my fourth 
draft (commentators agreeing that the "means" prong of equal 
protection analysis is more important than the wstate inter-
estw prong). Every draft of our opinions has required that 
the means chosen to accomplish a valid state interest be 
narrowly framed. ~he fourth draft does not change the 
·i". 
2. 
standard of analysis on this crucial aspect of this case and 
of future affirmative action cases. 
Thank you again for your help with this case. 1 am 




. ,. . .. 
lfp/ss 05/16/86 WYG SALLY-POW 
84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 
This is an affirmative action case~that comes 
to us from the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 
An affirmative action ~~n was adopted in 1972~as a 
part of a collective bargaining agreemen)fbetween the 
school board j and its union. The agreement has been 
renewed from time to time, and remains in effect. 
Its stated purpose was to employ -and pr-e'& e:z::k""' 
r 
enough minority faculty member~o equal the percentage 
of minority students in the student body. It also 
~ 
provided for preferential treatment of minority 
teacher~hen layoffs became necessary. 
Over the decade following adoption of the 
plan, there was litigation in both federal and state 
courts. Although neither court found the existence of 
past discriminatory conduct by the board,~the state 
court approved the layoff preference as justified by 
societal discrimination • 
. -=""" 
Petitioner Wendy Wygant~nd other non-minority 
teachers;'ubsequently were laid-off while minority 
teachers with less sen .~:_ityjwere retained. The ~n­





in federal District Court ) alleging ~violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause. Both the District Court and 
the Court of . Appeals, j upheld the minority preference, / 
finding it valid as a means of remedying societal 
discrimination. 
Today, we reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. There is, however ~no majority opinion for 
the standard of analy~ is. ~~pinion~ ·~~ined 
by the Chief Justice jand Justice Rehnquist,~ a
customary equal protection standard~pursuant to which 
governmental distinctions based on race;fare inherently 
suspect. This standard also calls for strict scrutiny. 
Such a racial classification may be justified~ 
by a compelling governmental purpose,j provided the 
means chosen to accomplish this purpos~are narrowly 
tailored. . 
Justice O'Connor, t:;';:~~~.J 
1\ s-.-0_ 
concurs in my opinion/ except for Part IV thereof,~&ftd 
joins in the judgment of reversal. Justice White, also 
in a separate opinion, concur~ in the~· 
.... 
The plan involved in this case is to be 
distinguishe~from the more customary type of voluntary 
affirmative action plans - plans adopted to serve a 
compelling or substantial/ governmental interest, and 
that do not di~tJY penalize ~-minority employees. 
Justice Marshall has~~~~issenting 
~ 
opinio~ joined by Justices Brennan}\ Blackmun., ~ 

















































































































































































































































































































































































here it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) w
ill b
e released, as is 
being done in
 connection w
ith this case, at the tim
e the opinion is issued. 
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the C
ourt but has been pre-
pared by the R
eporter of D
ecisions for the convenience of the reader. 
See 
U





. S. 321, 337. 
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#84-1340 Wygant v. Jackson Board (Mike) 
LFP for the Court 11/16/85 
1st draft 12/13/85 
3rd draft 4/14/86 
4th draft 4/30/86 
Joined by WHR 12/16/85 
CJ 1/8/86 
SOC joints Parts I, 11, IliA, !liB and V 4/15/86 
TM dissenting 
1st draft 2/5/86 
2nd draft 2/12/86 
3rd draft 4/22/86 
4th draft 5/1/86 
Joined by WJB 2/6/86 
HAB 2/10/86 
JPS dissenting 
1st draft 3/4/86 
2nd draft 3/10/86 
3rd draft 4/23/86 
4th draft 5/8/86 
SOC concurring in part and concurring in the judgment 
1st draft 4/15/86 
2nd draft 4/23/86 
3rd draft 5/14/86 
BRW concurring in the judgment 
1st draft 4/17/86 
TM will dissent 12/13/85 
JPS will await dissent 12/13/85 
WJB will await dissent 12/17/85 
BRW awaiting dissent 12/19/85 
HAB awaiting dissent 12/20/85 








Common Sense in Court ··n 
if' 
The U.S. Supreme Court, reviewing the the jackson Board of Education 'had ew! 
tricky little case of the Jackson, Mich., discriminated on the basis of tact;:: ~ ;;> 
schoolteachers, decided Monday that it But, no doubt to the dismay of the Reagan 
sometimes makes sense to do a little Justice Department, . the court rnjtde cle@r 
race-specific tilting when it comes to· hir- that it would eowttenance PJ:e{erential ~ 
ing, but that it is usually a good idea to be to correct past discrimination, ev~n withoUt 
race-neutral when it comes to layoffs. the necessity of proving that indiVidual aOOii-
That is not how the court put it, of course. cants had been discriminated agaii'tst ~ :n 
The opening line of Justice Lewis F. Powell The majority opinion went" on to sa~, 
Jr.'s majority o&)inion described the case · however,·that while race-coriscldus hiring 
before the court as "whether a school board, can sometimes be appropriate;·• rate-coo-
consistent with the eqUal protection clause, scious layoffs are another . ·matter. 
may extend preferential protection against "Though hiring goals may burden . .tOQ!e 
layoffs to some of its employees because of innocent individuals, they simply do not 
their race or national origin." impose the same kind of injury that layoffs 
But after laying out an acceptable constitu- impose. Denial of a future employment 
tiona! basis for hearing the case, the justices opportunity is not as intrusive as loss of an 
proceeded to deal with it as human beings: existing job," Powell wrote. 
on the basis of simple fairness and what, to The minority opinions were equally 
their minds, makes sense. founded in common sense. J1,1stice San<Jta 
Their conclusion-that hiring is one thing, Day O'Connor, concurring, noted that~ 
layoffs another-is probably as good as you school board was "trapped between the 
could hope for, unless you're one of those q>mpeting hazards of liability to minorities 
"strict constructionist" who believe that if if affrrmative action is tw1 taken to rem~ 
the Framers didn't mention television or apparent employment diaqimination • 
computers or affirmative action, then the ~abi~ty to ~nminorities ~ ~tiye ~-
court shouldn't read these things into the tion u taken. . . ..·, .• i'"" 
Constitution. Justice Thurgood Marshall. diS&eit · , 
In 1972, the ,Jackson school board, re- acknowledged that the layoffs~ unf: , 
acting to racial tension in the corrununity, but said "unfairness ought not be confu 
hammered out an agreement with the Jocal with constitutional injury." He nOted, (J~ 
education association that called for bringing pragmatically, that the court .majot:IW 
the percentage of minority teachers in line "would nullify years of negotiation and cq!!t 
with the percentage of minority students. In promise designed to solve serious edw:a-
order to protect the newly instituted faculty tional problems in the publiC ~ ~ 
integration against layoffs, it added a provi- Jackson. Mich." · · ~ 
sion calling for proportional layoffs. rather .............. -w... n.....1 ~-.- also in ""-
than a simple seniority system, in case staff ~"'d;; ~~~as <D! ~SI 
reductions became necessary. to maintain staff intqtatioo. "'t is one thing. 
A few years later, it became necessary to a white child to be taught by a white 
lay cit some teachers. In keeping with the that <Dr, like beauty, is ooly '!!kin deep'; if9s 
carefuDy constructed agreement, some black far mxe coovincing to experience that= 
teachers were retained while some whites a day-to-<lay basis during the rootine, · 
with more seniority were laid cit. Some ci ~process." . · in 
the whites sued • and on Monday they won. In short, the justices, in ways that woh:t 
The Supreme Court majority, writing like horrify Ed Meese, refused to be bound by 
lawyers but reasoning like wise human be- what the Framers of the Constitution -
ings. determined that it makes sense for a or may not have had in mind, ~ 
govenunental unit to practice some degree instead to view the case before them in * 
of race preference in order to correct earlier context of what makes sense in the ieal 
racial discrimination by that same unit, but world. Their conclusion-that affirmatiVe 
that generalized "societar discrimination is action rerilains a valid approach but one that 
"too amorphous a basis" for awarding race ought to used judiciously, and with a view to 
preference •. There had, been no ~ that fundamental fairness-makes sense to me. 
d/~./~ ¢;/86 . '· .... ~ 
r 
. . 
~l}d-Wh m ·a ? 
;~~ :1:~ d~~ ~ ~~ ~Y tlmt ~~~~. Fmrr ~ti= agree tlmt 
~· Tuesday morning concerning the latest Su- racially based layoffs, as opposed to hirings, are in 
·· preme Court decision on affinnative action general too burdensome on a small group of innocent 
·ftfiected the fact that the court is still working its workers to be justifiable-a view that makes sense 
'way through this issue and is not yet prepared to and seems only right to us. Justice O'Connor limited 
·ecme ~ wi~ general ~lines ~ ~~ thi_s her agreement to the facts in the jackson case. ·etive action ~ be .applied. ~ JUStiCes m~- This can be inferred: A clear majority of justices 
an aflirma~e action. plan m Ja~n. Mich. would, in some cases, support the use of goals and 
ic . caDed for laying off .white teacbex:s wtth tenure quotas in hiring if this remedy were necessary to 
:in order to ~ the .pbs ~ nonwhi~ who were correct past discrimination. And a majority wotild 
·atill on ~tion •. But .m do~ 80, it ISSUed five reject the administration's position that affinnative 
~te opinions, m which ~ters went beyond the action can be used to help only the actual victims of 
1icts of the Jackson case to discuss other aspects of . . . . d 
:6mative action. Reading the opinions like tea ~tion an not a ~lass. These were not 
leaves, lawyers sought to discern the position of questions be~ore the court m the Jackson ca~, but 
.ftrious justices on future cases, with special weight ~ .assumptions based on assertions made m the 
'};eiog given to Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, opiiUons. . . . . . 
.~ she is viewed as a critical swing vote on this Two affinnative-action cases will be decided by 
.~As a result, those who oppose numerical the court this tenn. One involy~ a union's failure to 
, pis in employment focused on their victory in the adhere to a c~ -orde:ed hiring plan. 'f!te other 
Jacksoo case, while civil rights forces, reading the cen~ers on the ~cult JSS~ of ra~onsctous pro-
more general language of the opinion, quickly motions. The p1eces of this complicated puzzle are 
1~ that in losing a battle they had won the war. slowly being put together in the court, and by july, 
•.. This much is clear: 1be court held that there must more of the picture will be completed. This week's 
·be coovincing evidence of prior discrimination by a issue was settled wisely, we believe, for the distinc-
::pablic employer, $UCh as the Jackson school board, tion between layoffs and hiring goals is a valid one, in 
!~ any kind of racial classification can be used to human as well as legal tenns. 
~------------Law--------------~ 
Accent on the Affirmative 
The Supreme Court says yes and no on racial preferences 
I n the eight years since the landmark Bakke case, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has tacked back and forth unpredictably 
on the issue of affirmative action, prompt-
ing Reagan Administration lawyers and 
liberal civil rights activists alike to claim 
that the results really favored them. Last 
week, in what may prove to be a decisive 
course marker, the court struck 
down by a 5-4 vote a Michigan 
school-district plan that sought 
to protect minority hiring gains 
by laying off white teachers 
ahead of blacks with less se-
niority. It was a decision with a 
bit of something for everyone. 
The Reagan Administra-
tion could, and did , take satis-
faction from the majority's view 
that the mere fact of discrimi-
nation in American life is not 
in itself a constitutionally suffi-
cient reason for resorting to 
an affirmative-action remedy. 
"It is a terrific opinion in our 
judgment," said Justice Depart-
ment Spokesman Terry East-
land . But after reviewing the 
splintered opinions, most ex-
perts agreed with Justice San-
dra Day O'Connor. She con-
cluded that the Justices have 
"forged a degree of unanimity" 
on a key rebuff to a much bruit-
firmative-action plan must be "narrowly 
tailored" to achieve its ends, he went on to 
signal an inclination to reject race-based 
firing schemes for being too harsh on the 
innocent, but to look more favorably upon 
some hiring plans. A brief separate con-
currence by Justice Byron White also 
stressed an aversion to layoff plans. 
ed claim of the Reagan Admin- Plaintiff Wygant back at work In her kindergarten class 
istration. It has argued that af-
firmative action is appropriate only to 
remedy discrimination against specific in-
dividual victims. By O'Connor's reading, 
however, the court is prepared to approve 
"a carefully constructed affirmative-ac-
tion program ," which "need not be limit-
ed to the remedying of specific instances 
of identified discrimination." 
Whatever it meant in the larger strug-
gle, the outcome meant victory for Wendy 
Wygant and the other white teachers who 
brought the suit after being laid off in 
1981. On hearing the news, she says, "we 
whooped it up a little." Most had already 
been rehired, but they may now press for 
back pay. The layoff plan had been neces-
sary, the Jackson board of education had 
contended, to assure enough minority role 
models for its minority students. Lewis 
Powell , joined by Chief Justice Warren 
Burger and William Rehnquist plus 
O'Connor, disagreed . In their view, ami-
nority preference plan could have been 
justified only by a showing of prior dis-
crimination in the hiring of teachers with-
in the district. "This court never has held 
that societal discrimination alone is suffi-
The four dissenters were satisfied that 
the district's actions were constitutionally 
acceptable. And while the majority was 
not prepared to go this far, the Justices 
across the board seemed plainly support-
ive of some race-based solutions. Powell 
wrote that "in order to remedy the effects 
of prior discrimination, it may be neces-
sary to take race into account." That 
could mean, he added , that "innocent per-
cient to justify a racial classification," Pollee aerial shot of Ciraolo's marijuana crop 
Powell said. Insisting as well that any af- Bird 's-eye viewing is O.K. , Burger rules. 
66 
sons may be called upon to bear some of 
the burden of the remedy." 
The sum of these positions, says Paul 
Bender, dean of the law school at Arizona 
State University in Tempe, "makes things 
better for affirmative action." But for 
which plans? The next tests will come 
shortly. The Justices have two more major 
cases on the subject to decide by July, 
one involving fire-department promo-
tions in Cleveland, the other the imposi-
tion of a minority-membership goal on a 
New York City union. Last week's deci-
sion would seem to bode well for those 
and other affirmative-action 
schemes. But William Bradford 
Reynolds, the combative Assis-
tant Attorney General for Civil 
Rights, insisted that he could 
still hear the Justices playing 
his tune. Because they had re-
quired a showing of prior dis-
crimination before the use of 
racial preferences, Reynolds 
now contends that a 1965 presi-
dential order authorizing mi-
nority employment goals for 
Government contractors must 
be largely abandoned. 
• • • 
The court last week also 
okayed official spying in the 
sky. Dante Ciraolo had high 
double fences around his back-
yard in Santa Clara, Calif. Even 
so, police acting on a tip were 
able to spot the 73 marijuana 
plants growing in the yard- by 
flying overhead in a chartered 
plane. Dow Chemical Co. had 
even more elaborate security 
precautions at its plant in Midland, Mich. 
So the Environmental Protection Agency 
also sent up an airplane, to get pictures as 
part of an inspection of the site. In two 5-4 
decisions, the Supreme Court ruled that 
neither search from the skies required a 
warrant. 
Warren Burger, who wrote both ma-
jority opinions, stated in the California 
case that although residential yards are 
ordinarily fully covered by the privacy 
safeguards of the Fourth Amendment, it 
was unreasonable to expect such protec-
tion for activities that are "visible to 
the naked eye" by police " traveling in the 
public airways." In the Dow case Burger 
went further, saying that a factory area 
was not comparable to a private yard , 
and that the $22,000 magnifying camera 
used by the EPA was not in the 
same league as high-tech snooping de-
vices that might require a search warrant. 
The majority's course worried Lewis 
Powell, who spoke for the dissenters in 
both cases. The failure to protect privacy 
rights, he said in the Dow decision, "will 
permit their gradual decay as technology 
advances." - By Richard Lacayo. 
Reported by Jay Branegan/Washington 
TIME, JUNE 2, 1986 
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2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1340 
WENDY WYGANT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JACKSON 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, ETC., ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[March -, 1986] 
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
In my opinion, it is not necessary to find that the Board of 
Education has been guilty of racial discrimination in the past 
to support the conclusion that it has a legitimate interest in 
employing more black teachers in the future. Rather than 
analyzing a case of this kind by asking whether minority 
teachers have some sort of special entitlement to jobs as a 
remedy for sins that were committed in the past, I believe 
that we should first ask whether the Board's action advances 
the public interest in educating children for the future. If 
so, I believe we should consider whether that public interest, 
and the manner in which it is pursued, justifies any adverse 
effects on the disadvantaged group. 1 
I 
The Equal Protection Clause absolutely prohibits the use 
of race in many governmental contexts. To cite only a few: 
the government may not use race to decide who may serve on 
'"In every equal protection case, we have to ask certain basic questions. 
What class is harmed by the legislation, and has it been subjected to a 'tra-
dition of disfavor' by our laws? What is the public purpose that is being 
served by the law? What is the characteristic of the disadvantaged class 
that justifies the disparate treatment?" 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U. S. -, - (1985) (STE-
VENS, J., concurring). 
/ 
84-1340--DISSENT 
2 WYGANT v. JACKSON BOARD OF EDUCATION 
juries,2 who may use public services,3 who may marry, 4 and 
who may be fit parents. 5 The use of race in these situations 
is "utterly irrational" because it is completely unrelated to 
any valid public purpose; 6 moreover, it is particularly perni-
cious because it constitutes a badge of oppression that is un-
faithful to the central promise of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Nevertheless, in our present society, race is not always ir-
relevant to sound governmental decisionmaking. 7 To take 
the most obvious example, in law enforcement, if an under-
cover agent is needed to infiltrate a group suspected of ongo-
ing criminal behavior-and if the members of the group are 
2 Batson v. Kentucky, -- U. S. -- (1986); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 
U. S. -- (1985); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979); Strauder v. West 
Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880). 
3 Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U. S. 350 (1962) (per curiam); Burton 
v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715 (1961). 
• Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967). 
5 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S. 429 (1984). 
6 Cleburne, supra, at-- (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) ("It 
would be utterly irrational to limit the franchise on the basis of height or 
weight; it is equally invalid to limit it on the basis of skin color"). See also 
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S., at 432 (1984) ("Classifying persons according 
to their race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public 
concerns; the race, not the person, dictates the category"). 
7 As JUSTICE MARSHALL explains, although the Court's path in Univer-
sity of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978) and Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 (1980) is tortuous, the path at least reveals that 
race consciousness does not automatically violate the Equal Protection 
Clause. In those opinions, only two Justices of the Court suggested that 
race conscious governmental efforts were inherently unconstitutional. 
See id., at 522 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by REHNQUIST, J.). Cf. 
id., at 548 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) ("Unlike Mr. Justice Stewart and MR. 
JusTICE REHNQUIST, ... I am not convinced that the Clause contains an 
absolute prohibition against any statutory classification based on race"). 
Notably, in this Court, petitioners have presented solely a constitutional 
theory, and have not pursued any statutory claims. Cf. Bakke, 438 U. S. 
at 408 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
(suggesting that constitutional issue need not be reached because statutory 
issue was dispositive). 
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all of the same race-it would seem perfectly rational to em-
ploy an agent of that race rather than a member of a different 
racial class. Similarly, in a city with a recent history of ra-
cial unrest, the superintendent of police might reasonably 
conclude that an integrated police force could develop a bet-
ter relationship with the community and thereby do a more 
effective job of maintaining law and order than a force com-
posed only of white officers. 
In the context of public education, 8 it is quite obvious that 
a school board may reasonably conclude that an integrated 
faculty will be able to provide benefits to the student body 
that could not be provided by an all white, or nearly all white, 
faculty. For one of the most important lessons that the 
American public schools teach is that the diverse ethnic, cul-
tural, and national backgrounds that have been brought to-
gether in our famous "melting pot" do not identify essential 
differences among the human beings that inhabit our land. 
It is one thing for a white child to be taught by a white 
teacher that color, like beauty, is only "skin deep"; it is far 
more convincing to experience that truth on a day to day 
basis during the routine, ongoing learning process. 
In this case, the collective-bargaining agreement between 
the Union and the Board of Education succinctly stated a 
8 The Court has frequently emphasized the role of public schools in our 
national life. See Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 864 (1982) 
(plurality opinion) ("[P]ublic schools are vitally important ... as vehicles 
for 'inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a dem-
ocratic political system"'); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U. S. 68, 76 (1979) 
("Tne importance of public schools in the preparation of individuals for par-
ticipation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which our 
society rests, long has been recognized by our decisions"); San Antonio In-
dependent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 30 (1973) ("'the grave 
significance of education both to the individual and to our society' cannot be 
doubted"); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 493 (1954) 
("[E]ducation ... is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a 
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing 
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to 
his environment"). 
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valid public purpose-"recognition of the desirability of 
multi-ethnic representation on the teaching faculty," and 
thus "a policy of actively seeking minority group personnel." 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a. Nothing in the record-not a 
shred of evidence-contradicts the view that the Board's at-
tempt to employ, and to retain, more minority teachers in the 
Jackson public school system served this completely sound 
educational purpose. Thus, there was a rational and unques-
tionably legitimate basis for the Board's decision to enter into 
the collective-bargaining agreement that petitioners have 
challenged, even though the agreement required special ef-
forts to recruit and retain minority teachers. 
II 
It is argued, nonetheless, that the purpose should be 
deemed invalid because, even if the Board of Education's 
judgment in this case furthered a laudable goal, some other 
boards might claim that their experience demonstrates that 
segregated classes, or segregated faculties, lead to better ac-
ademic achievement. There is, however, a critical differ-
ence between a decision to exclude a member of a minority 
race because of his or her skin color and a decision to include 
more members of the minority in a school faculty for that 
reason. 
The exclusionary decision rests on the false premise that 
differences in race, or in the color of a person's skin, reflect 
real differences that are relevant to a person's right to share 
in the blessings of a free society. As noted, that premise is 
"utterly irrational," Cleburne, supra, at--, and repugnant 
to the principles of a free and democratic society. Neverthe-
less, the fact that persons of different races do, indeed, have 
differently colored skin, may give rise to a belief that there is 
some significant difference between such persons. The in-
clusion of minority teachers in the educational process inev-
itably tends to dispel that illusion whereas their exclusion 
could only tend to foster it. The inclusionary decision is con-
sistent with the principle that all men are created equal; the 
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exclusionary decision is at war with that principle. One de-
cision accords with the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment; the other does not. Thus, consideration 
of whether the consciousness of race is exclusionary or 
inclusionary plainly distinguishes the Board's valid purpose 
in this case from a race-conscious decision that would rein-
force assumptions of inequality. 9 
III 
Even if there is a valid purpose to the race consciousness, 
however, the question that remains is whether that public 
purpose transcends the harm to the white teachers who are 
disadvantaged by the special preference the Board has given 
to its most recently hired minority teachers. In my view, 
there are two important inquiries in assessing the harm to 
the disadvantaged teacher. The first is an assessment of the 
procedures that were used to adopt, and implement, the 
race-conscious action. 10 The second is an evaluation of the 
nature of the harm itself. 
9 Cf. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S., at 434 (1984) ("The effects of racial 
prejudice, however real, cannot justify a racial classification removing an 
infant child from the custody of its natural mother found to be an appropri-
ate person to have such custody"); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 81 
(1917) (rejecting legitimacy of argument that the "proposed segregation 
will promote the public peace by preventing race conflicts"). 
10 Cf. Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 548-549 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (a race-
based classification "does impose a special obligation to scrutinize any gov-
ernmental decisionmaking process that draws nationwide distinctions be-
tween citizens on the basis of their race and incidentally also 
discriminates against noncitizens in the preferred racial classes. For just 
as procedural safeguards are necessary to guarantee impartial decision-
making in the judicial process, so can they play a vital part in preserving 
the impartial character of the legislative process"). That observation is, of 
course, equally applicable to a context in which the governmental decision 
is reached through a nonlegislative process. Significantly, a reason given 
for what this Court frequently calls "strict scrutiny" of certain classifica-
tions is the notion that the disadvantaged class is one that has been unable 
to enjoy full procedural participation. See United States v. Carotene 
Products, Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice against dis-
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In this case, there can be no question about either the fair-
ness of the procedures used to adopt the race-conscious pro-
vision, or the propriety of its breadth. As JUSTICE MAR-
SHALL has demonstrated, the procedures for adopting this 
provision were s<:_rulllllously fair. The U~ents 
the petitioners negotiated the provision and a eed t it; the 
agreemen was pu o a vo e o the membership, and over- _.,., 
whelmingly approved. Again, not a shred of evidence in the 
record suggests any procedural unfairness in the adoption of 
the agreement. Similarly, the provision is specifically de-
signed to achieve its objective-retaining the minority teach-
ers that have been specially recruited to give the Jackson 1 
schools, after a period of racial unrest, an integrated faculty. 11 I~ ~ ~ 
Thus, in str~procedural inadequacy and 
unjustified breadth of the race-based classification in 
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 (1980), 12 the race-con-
scious layoff policy here was adopted with full participation of -
the disadvantaged individuals and with a-naiTowly circum-
scrffiea6erth for the policy's operation. 
Finally, we must consider the harm to the petitioners. 
Every layoff, like every refusal to employ a qualified appli-
crete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seri-
ously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be 
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly 
more searching judicial inquiry"); J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 75-77 
(1980). 
11 The layoff provision states: 
"In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the number of teachers 
through layoff from employment by the Board, teachers with the most se-
niority in the district shall be retained, except that at no time will there be 
a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current per-
centage of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff." App. to 
Pet. for Cert. 23a. 
The layoff provision follows the agreement's statement of the goal of an in-
creased minority presence on the faculty and of the commitment to active 
minority recruiting and hiring efforts. ld., at 22a-23a. 
12 See 448 U. S. , at 532 (STEVENS, J. , dissenting). 
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cant, is a grave loss to the affected individual. However, the 
undisputed facts in this case demonstrate that this serious 
consequence to the petitioners is not based on any lack of re-
spect for their race, or on blind habit and stereotype. 13 
Rather, petitioners have been laid off for a combination of 
two reasons: the economic conditions that have led Jackson to 
lay off some teachers, and the special contractual protections 
intended to preserve the newly integrated character of the 
faculty in the Jackson schools. Thus, the same harm might 
occur if a number of gifted young teachers had been given 
special contractual protection because their specialties were 
in short supply and if the Jackson Board of Education faced a 
fiscal need for layoffs. A Board decision to grant immediate 
tenure to a group of experts in computer technology, an ath-
letic coach, and a language teacher, for example, might re-
duce the pool of teachers eligible for layoffs during a depres-
sion and therefore have precisely the same impact as the 
racial preference at issue here. In either case, the harm 
would be generated by the combination of economic condi-
tions and the special contractual protection given a different 
group of teachers-a protection that, as discussed above, was 
justified by a valid and extremely strong public interest. 14 
18 Cf. Mathews v. Lucas , 427 U.S. 495, 520-521 (1976) (STEVENS, J ., 
dissenting). 
14 The fact that the issue arises in a layoff context, rather than a hiring 
context, has no bearing on the constitutional question. For if the Board's 
interest in employing more minority teachers is sufficient to justify provid-
ing them with an extra incentive to accept jobs in Jackson, Michigan, it is 
also sufficient to justify their retention when the number of available jobs 
is reduced. JUSTICE PowELL's suggestion, ante, at 11-12, that there is a 
distinction of constitutional significance between a racial preference at the 
time of hiring and an identical preference at the time of discharge is thus 
wholly unpersuasive. He seems to assume that a teacher who has been 
working for a few year€ suffers a greater harm when he is laid off than the 
harm suffered by an unemployed teacher who is refused a job for which he 
is qualified. In either event, the adverse decision forecloses "only one of 
several opportunities" that may be available, ante, at 12, to the disap-
pointed teacher. Moreover, the distinction is artificial, for the layoff pro-
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IV 
We should not lightly approve the government's use of a 
race-based distinction. History teaches the obvious dangers 
of such classifications. 15 Our ultimate goal must, of course, 
be "to eliminate entirely from governmental decisionmaking 
such irrelevant factors as a human being's race." 16 In this 
case, however, I am persuaded that the decision to include 
more minority teachers in the Jackson, Michigan, school sys-
tem served a valid public purpose, that it was adopted with 
fair procedures and given a narrow breadth, that it tran-
scends the harm to petitioners, and that it is a step toward 
that ultimate goal of eliminating entirely from governmental 
decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human being's 
race. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
vision at issue in this case was included as part of the terms of the hiring of 
minority and other teachers under the collective bargaining agreement. 
16 See, e. g., Fullilove , 448 U. S. , at 534, n. 5 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). 
16 !d., at 547. 
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JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
In my opinion, it is not necessary to find that the Board of 
Education has been guilty of racial discrimination in the past 
to support the conclusion that it has a legi imate interest in 
employing more black teachers in the fut re. Rather than 
analyzing a case of this kind by askin whether minority 
teachers have some sort of special enti ement to jobs as a 
remedy for sins that were committe 'n the past, I believe 
that we should first ask whether the Board's action advances 
the public interest in educating children for the future. If 
so, I believe we should consider whether that public interest, 
and the manner in which it is pursued, justifies any adverse 
effects on the disadvantaged group. 1 
I 
The Equal Protection Clause absolutely prohibits the use 
of race in many governmental contexts. To cite only a few: 
'"In every equal protection case, we have to ask certain basic questions. 
What class is harmed by the legislation, and has it been subjected to a 'tra-
dition of disfavor' by our laws? What is the public purpose that is being 
served by the law? What is the characteristic of the disadvantaged class 
that justifies the disparate treatment?" 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U. S. -, - (1985) 
(STEVENS, J., concurring). 
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the government may not use race to decide who may serve on 
juries, 2 who may use public services, 3 who may marry, 4 
and who may be fit parents. 5 The use of race in these situa-
tions is "utterly irrational" because it is completely unrelated 
to any valid public purpose; 6 moreover, it is particularly 
pernicious because it constitutes a badge of oppression that 
is unfaithful to the central promise of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Nevertheless, in our present society, race is not always ir-
relevant to sound governmental decisionmaking. 7 To take 
the most obvious example, in law enforcement, if an under-
cover agent is needed to infiltrate a group suspected of ongo-
2Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. -- (1985); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. C :J 
545 (1979); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880). 
3 Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U. S. 350 (1962) (per curiam); Burton 
v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715 (1961). 
• Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967). 
5 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S. 429 (1984). 
• Cleburne, supra, at -- (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) ("It 
would be utterly irrational to limit the franchise on the basis of height or 
weight; it is equally invalid to limit it on the basis of skin color"). See also 
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S., at 432 (1984) ("Classifying persons according 
to their race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public 
concerns; the race, not the person, dictates the category"). 
7 As JusTICE MARSHALL explains, although the Court's path in Univer-
sity of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) and Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 (1980) is tortuous, the path at least reveals that 
race consciousness does not automatically violate the Equal Protection 
Clause. In those opinions, only two Justices of the Court suggested that 
race conscious governmental efforts were inherently unconstitutional. 
See id., at 522 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by REHNQUIST, J.). Cf. 
id., at 548 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) ("Unlike Mr. Justice Stewart and MR. 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, ... I am not convinced that the Clause contains an 
absolute prohibition against any statutory classification based on race"). 
Notably, in this Court, petitioners have presented solely a constitutional 
theory, and have not pursued any statutory claims. Cf. Bakke, 438 U. S. 
at 408 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
(suggesting that constitutional issue need not be reached because statutory 
issue was dispositive). 
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ing criminal behavior-and if the members of the group are 
all of the same race-it would seem perfectly rational to em-
ploy an agent of that race rather than a member of a different 
racial class. Similarly, in a city with a recent history of ra-
cial unrest, the superintendent of police might reasonably 
conclude that an integrated police force could develop a bet-
ter relationship with the community and thereby do a more 
effective job of maintaining law and order than a force com-
posed only of white officers. 
In the context of public education, 8 it is quite obvious that 
a school board may reasonably conclude that an integrated 
faculty will be able to provide benefits to the student body 
that could not be provided by an all white, or nearly all white, 
faculty. For one of the most important lessons that the 
American public schools teach is that the diverse ethnic, cul-
tural, and national backgrounds that have been brought to-
gether in· our famous "melting pot" do not identify essential 
differences among the human beings that inhabit our land. 
It is one thing for a white child to be taught by a white 
teacher that color, like beauty, is only "skin deep"; it is far 
more convincing to experience that truth on a day to day 
basis during the routine, ongoing learning process. 
8 The Court has frequently emphasized the role of public schools in our 
national life. See Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 864 (1982) 
(plurality opinion) ("[P]ublic schools are vitally important ... as vehicles 
for 'inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a dem-
ocratic political system"'); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U. S. 68, 76 (1979) 
("The importance of public schools in the preparation of individuals for par-
ticipation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which our 
society rests, long has been recognized by our decisions"); San Antonio In-
dependent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 30 (1973) ("'the grave 
significance of education both to the individual and to our society' cannot be 
doubted"); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 493 (1954) 
("[E]ducation ... is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a 
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing 
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to 
his environment"). 
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In this case, the collective-bargaining agreement between 
the Union and the Board of Education succinctly stated a 
valid public purpose-"recognition of the desirability of 
multi-ethnic representation on the teaching faculty," and 
thus "a policy of actively seeking minority group personnel." 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a. Nothing in the record-not a 
shred of evidence-contradicts the view that the Board's at-
tempt to employ, and to retain, more minority teachers in the 
Jackson public school system served this completely sound 
educational purpose. Thus, there was a rational and unques-
tionably legitimate basis for the Board's decision to enter into 
the collective-bargaining agreement that petitioners have 
challenged, even though the agreement required special ef-
forts to recruit and retain minority teachers. 
II 
It is argued, nonetheless, that the purpose should be 
deemed invalid because, even if the Board of Education's 
judgment in this case furthered a laudable goal, some other 
boards might claim that their experience demonstrates that 
segregated classes, or segregated faculties, lead to better ac-
ademic achievement. There is, however, a critical differ-
ence between a decision to exclude a member of a minority 
race because of his or her skin color and a decision to include 
more members of the minority in a school faculty for that 
reason. 
The exclusionary decision rests on the false premise that 
differences in race, or in the color of a person's skin, reflect 
real differences that are relevant to a person's right to share 
in the blessings of a free society. As noted, that premise is 
"utterly irrational," Cleburne, supra, at--, and repugnant 
to the principles of a free and democratic society. Neverthe-
less, the fact that persons of different races do, indeed, have 
differently colored skin, may give rise to a belief that there is 
some significant difference between such persons. The in-
clusion of minority teachers in the educational process inev-
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itably tends to dispel that illusion whereas their exclusion 
could only tend to foster it. The inclusionary decision is con-
sistent with the principle that all men are created equal; the 
exclusionary decision is at war with that principle. One de-
cision accords with the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment; the other does not. Thus, consideration 
of whether the consciousness of race is exclusionary or 
inclusionary plainly distinguishes the Board's valid purpose 
in this case from a race-conscious decision that would rein-
force assumptions of inequality. 9 
III 
Even if there is a valid purpose to the race consciousness, 
however, the question that remains is whether that public 
purpose transcends the harm to the white teachers who are 
disadvantaged by the special preference the Board has given 
to its most recently hired minority teachers. In my view, 
there are two important inquiries in assessing the harm to 
the disadvantaged teacher. The first is an assessment of the 
procedures that were used to adopt, and implement, the 
race-conscious action. 10 The second is an evaluation of the 
nature of the harm itself. 
9 Cf. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S., at 434 (1984) ("The effects of racial 
prejudice, however real, cannot justify a racial classification removing an 
infant child from the custody of its natural mother found to be an appropri-
ate person to have such custody"); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 81 
(1917) (rejecting legitimacy of argument that the "proposed segregation 
will promote the public peace by preventing race conflicts"). 
10 Cf. Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 548-549 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (a race-
based classification "does impose a special obligation to scrutinize any gov-
ernmental decisionmaking process that draws nationwide distinctions be-
tween citizens on the basis of their race and incidentally also 
discriminates against noncitizens in the preferred racial classes. For just 
as procedural safeguards are necessary to guarantee impartial decision-
making in the judicial process, so can they play a vital part in preserving 
the impartial character of the legislative process"). That observation is, of 
course, equally applicable to a context in which the governmental decision 
is reached through a nonlegislative process. Significantly, a reason given 
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In this case, there can be no question about either the 
fairness of the procedures used to adopt the race-conscious 
provision, or the propriety of its breadth. As JUSTICE 
MARSHALL has demonstrated, the procedures for adopting 
this provision were scrupulously fair. The Union that repre-
sents the petitioners negotiated the provision and agreed to 
it; the agreement was put to a vote of the membership, and 
overwhelmingly approved. Again, not a shred of evidence in 
the record suggests any procedural unfairness in the adop-
tion of the agreement. Similarly, the provision is specifically 
designed to achieve its objective-retaining the minority 
teachers that have been specially recruited to give the Jack-
son schools, after a period of racial unrest, an integrated fac-
ulty.11 Thus, in striking contrast to the procedural inade-
quacy and unjustified breadth of the race-based classification 
in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 (1980), 12 the race-
conscious layoff policy here was adopted with full participa-
tion of the disadvantaged individuals and with a narrowly 
circumscribed berth for the policy's operation. 
for what this Court frequently calls "strict scrutiny" of certain classifica-
tions is the notion that the disadvantaged class is one that has been unable 
to enjoy full procedural participation. See United States v. Carotene 
Products, Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice against dis-
crete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seri-
ously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be 
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly 
more searching judicial inquiry"); J . Ely, Democracy and Distrust 75-77 
(1980). 
11 The layoff provision states: 
"In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the number of teachers 
through layoff from employment by the Board, teachers with the most se-
niority in the district shall be retained, except that at no time will there be 
a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current per-
centage of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff." App. to 
Pet. for Cert. 23a. 
The layoff provision follows the agreement's statement of the goal of an in-
creased minority presence on the faculty and of the commitment to active 
minority recruiting and hiring efforts. Id., at 22a-23a. 
12 See 448 U. S., at 532 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). 
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Finally, we must consider the harm to the petitioners. 
Every layoff, like every refusal to employ a qualified appli-
cant, is a grave loss to the affected individual. However, the 
undisputed facts in this case demonstrate that this serious 
consequence to the petitioners is not based on any lack of re-
spect for their race, or on blind habit and stereotype. 13 
Rather, petitioners have been laid off for a combination of 
two reasons: the economic conditions that have led Jackson to 
lay off some teachers, and the special contractual protections 
intended to preserve the newly integrated character of the 
faculty in the Jackson schools. Thus, the same harm might 
occur if a number of gifted young teachers had been given 
special contractual protection because their specialties were 
in short supply and if the Jackson Board of Education faced a 
fiscal need for layoffs. A Board decision to grant immediate 
tenure to a group of experts in computer technology, an ath-
letic coach, and a language teacher, for example, might re-
duce the pool of teachers eligible for layoffs during a depres-
sion and therefore have precisely the same impact as the 
racial preference at issue here. In either case, the harm 
would be generated by the combination of economic condi-
tions and the special contractual protection given a different 
group of teachers-a protection that, as discussed above, was 
justified by a valid and extremely strong public interest. 14 
13 Cf. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520-521 (1976) (STEVENS, J., 
dissenting). 
14 The fact that the issue arises in a layoff context, rather than a hiring 
context, has no bearing on the constitutional question. For if the Board's 
interest in employing more minority teachers is sufficient to justify provid-
ing them with an extra incentive to accept jobs in Jackson, Michigan, it is 
also sufficient to justify their retention when the number of available jobs 
is reduced. JUSTICE POWELL's suggestion, ante, at 13-15, that there is a 
distinction of constitutional significance between a racial preference at the 
time of hiring and an identical preference at the time of discharge is thus 
wholly unpersuasive. He seems to assume that a teacher who has been 
working for a few years suffers a greater harm when he is laid off than the 
harm suffered by an unemployed teacher who is refused a job for which he 
is qualified. In either event, the adverse decision forecloses "only one of 
several opportunities" that may be available, ante, at 14, to the disap- t 
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IV 
We should not lightly approve the government's use of a 
race-based distinction. History teaches the obvious dangers 
of such classifications. 15 Our ultimate goal must, of course, 
be "to eliminate entirely from governmental decisionmaking 
such irrelevant factors as a human being's race." 16 In this 
case, however, I am persuaded that the decision to include 
more minority teachers in the Jackson, Michigan, school sys-
tem served a valid public purpose, that it was adopted with 
fair procedures and given a narrow breadth, that it tran-
scends the harm to petitioners, and that it is a step toward 
that ultimate goal of eliminating entirely from governmental 
decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human being's 
race. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
pointed teacher. Moreover, the distinction is artificial, for the layoff pro-
vision at issue in this case was included as part of the terms of the hiring of 
minority and other teachers under the collective bargaining agreement. 
15 See, e. g., Fullilove, 448 U.S., at 534, n. 5 (STEVENS, J ., dissenting). 
16 !d. , at 547. 
8 4-1341 
~E!-!-~ 
WYGANT v. JACKSON BOARD OF EDUCATION 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment. 
This case requires us to define and apply the standard required 
by the Equal Protection Clause when a governmental agency agrees 
to give preferences on the basis of race or national origin in 
making layoffs of employees. The specific question posed is, as 
JUSTICE MARSHALL puts it, "whether the Constitution prohibits a 
union and a local school board from developing a collective-
bargaining agreement that apportions layoffs between two raciall 
determined groups as a means of preserving the effects of an af-
firmative hiring policy, the constitutionality of which is un-
challenged [in this litigation]." Post, at [draft op. 
5-6] (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). There is no issue here of the 
interpretation and application of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
~~~f 




Act; accordingly, we have only the constitutional issue to re- 1?'/1-
so 1 ve. 
The Equal Protection Clause standard applicable to racial clas-
sifications that work to the disadvantage of "nonminorities" has 
2. 
been articulated in various ways. See, e. g., post, at 
[draft op. at 6-7] (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). JUSTICE POWELL 
now would require that: (1) the racial classification be justi-
fied by a "sufficiently important" state purpose, and (2) the 
means chosen by the State to effectuate its purpose be "narrowly 
tailored." Ante, at [draft op. at 5]. JUSTICES MARSHALL, 
BRENNAN, and BLACKMUN, however, seem to adhere to the standard 
that they authored, with JUSTICE WHITE, in University of Califor-
nia Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978): "remedial use of race 
is permissible if it serves 'important governmental objectives' 
and is 'substantially related to achievement of those objec-
tives.'" Post, at [draft op. at 6] (MARSHALL, J., dissent-
w~ ing) (quoting Bakke, supra, at 359 (opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, ~
MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.). The principal point dividing the ~~~ 
Court in formulating a single standard of review, then, is 
whether the Equal Protection Clause requires that a "benign" ra-
cial classification be "narrowly tailored" to achieve a suffi-
ciently important state interest or whether the Clause requires 
only that the classification be "substantially related" to that 
purpose. 
c:o:::;c::~:o:: :::T::n:aO:L:~ 5h:::m:::::::e:::;u::p:;edm:r: ex~ )I~ 
amining racial classifications in other contexts. In my view, 
3 0 
"the analysis and level of scrutiny applied to deter-
mine the validity of [a racial] classification do not 
vary simply because the objective appears acceptable to 
individual Members of the Court. While the validity 
and importance of the objective may affect the outcome 
of the analysis, the analysis itself does not change." 
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 u.s. 
718, 724 n. 9 (1982). 
However, I agree with JUSTICE MARSHALL that ultimately, "[b]oth 
tests seek a legitimate remedial purpose and require that the 
means chosen to achieve that purpose avoid imposing unnecessary 
hardships on the affected persons," or, as I would phrase it, 
require that the means chosen cannot impose disproportionate harm 
on the interests, or unnecessarily trammel the rights, of indi-
viduals who are not benefitted by a plan's racial preference. 
Post, at [draft op. at 7-8] (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 
Respondent School Board argues that the governmental pur pose or 
goal advanced here was the School Board's desire to correct ap- ~ ~ 4 
parent prior employment discrimination against minorities while ~ 
avoiding further litigation. See, e. g., Brief for Respondent 
15-17. See also Defendant's Brief in Support of Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss 16 (hereinafter cited as De-
fendant's Summary Judgment Brief). The Michigan Civil Rights 
Commission determined that the evidence before it supported the 
---~ 
allegations of discrimination on the part f the Jackson School 
Board, though that determination was nev reduced to formal 
4. 
findings because the School Board, with the agreement of the 
Jackson Education Association (Union), voluntarily chose to reme-
dy the perceived violation. Among the measures the School Board 
and the Union eventually agreed were nee essary to remedy the ap-
parent prior discrimination was the layoff provision challenged 
here; they reasoned that without the layoff provision, the reme-
dial gains made under the ongoing hiring goals contained in the 
collective bargaining agreement could be eviscerated by layoffs. 
The District Court and the Court of Appeals did not focus on the 
School Board's unquestionably important interest in remedying its 
apparent prior discrimination when evaluating the constitutional-
ity of the challenged layoff provision. Instead, both courts 
reasoned that the goals of remedying "societal discrimination" 
and providing "role mooels" were sufficiently important to with-
stand equal protection scrutiny. I agree with the Court that a 
governmental agency's interest in remedying "societal" discrimi-
nation, that is, discrimination not traceable to its own actions, 
cannot be deemed sufficiently important to pass constitutional 
muster under strict scrutiny. See ante, at See also 
Bakke, 438 U.S., at 307 (opinion of POWELL, J.). I also concur 
in the Court's assessment that use by the courts below of a "role 
model" theory to justify the conclusion that this plan had a le-
gitimate remedial purpose was in error.l See ante, at 
1 The goal of providing "role-models" discussed by the 
(Footnote continued) 
5 • 
Thus, in my view, the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
clearly erred in relying on these purposes and in failing to give ~ 
greater attention to the School Board's asserted purpose of rec-
tifying its own apparent discrimination. 
The error of the District Court and the Court of Appeals can be 
explained by reference to the fact that the primary issue argued 
by the parties on the cross motions for summary judgment was 
whether the School Board, a court, or another competent body had 
to have made a finding of past discrimination before or at the 
time of the institution of the plan in order for the plan to be 
upheld as remedial in purpose. 546 F. Supp. 1195, 1199-1200 (ED 
Mich. 1982). See also Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment 5-13; Defendant's Summary Judgment Brief 11-15. The 
(Footnote 1 continued from previous page) 
courts below should not be confused with the very differ-
ent goal of promoting racial diversity among the faculty. 
Because this latter goal was not urged as such in support 
of the layoff provision before the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals, however, I do not believe it necessary 
to discuss the magnitude of that interest or its applica-
bility in this case. The only governmental interests at 
issue here are those of remedying "societal" discrimina-
tion, providing "role models," and remedying apparent pri-
or employment di crimination by the School DistriC€ . .. ..--
6 . 
courts below ruled that a particularized, contemporaneous finding 
of discrimination was not necessary and upheld the plan as a rem-
edy for "societal" discrimination, apparently on the assumption 
that in the absence of a specific, contemporaneous finding, any 
discrimination addressed by an affirmative action plan could only 
be termed "societal." See, e. g., 546 F. Supp., at 1199. I be-
lieve that thi~ assumption is false and therefore agree with the 
~...., 
Court that a contemporaneous or antecedent finding of past dis-
crimination by a court or other competent body is not a constitu---
tional prerequisite to a public employer's voluntary agreement to 
~4--~- ,~~H..a.-~ 
an affirmative action plan. See ante, at [draft op. at 8]. 
A violation of federal statutory or constitutional requirements 
does not arise with the making of a finding; it arises when the 
wrong is committed. Contemporaneous findings serve solely as a 
means by which it can be made absolutely certain that the govern-
mental actor truly is attempting to remedy its own unlawful con-
duct when it adopts an affirmative action plan, rather than at-
tempting to alleviate the wrongs suffered through general soci-
etal discrimination. See, e. g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 
u.s. 448, 498 (1980) (POWELL, J., concurring) ("Because the dis-
tinction between permissible remedial action and impermissible 
racial preference rests on the existence of a constitutional or 
statutory violation, the legitimate interest in creating a race-
7. 
conscious remedy is not compelling unless an appropriate govern-
mental authority has found that such a violation has occurred."). 
Such findings, when voluntarily made by a public employer, obvi-
ously are desirable in that they provide evidentiary safeguards 
of value both to nonminority employees and to the public employer 
itself, should its affirmative action program be challenged in 
court. If contemporaneous findings were required of public em-
ployers in every case as a precondition to the constitutional 
validity of their affirmative action efforts, however, the rela-
tive value of these evidentiary advantages would dim, for they 
could be secured only by the sacrifice of other vitally important 
values. 
The imposition of a requirement that public employers make find-
ings that they have engaged in illegal discrimination before they 
engage in affirmative action programs would severely undermine 
public employers' incentive to meet voluntarily their civil 
rights obligations. See, e. g., Bakke, supra, at 364 (opinion of 
BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.); cf. Steelworkers v. 
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 210-211 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring). This 
result would clearly be at odds with this Court's and Congress' 
consistent emphasis on "the value of voluntary efforts to further 
the objectives of the law." Bakke, supra, at 364 (opinion of 
BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.); see also Albemarle 
8. 
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-418 (1975): Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). The value of volun-
tary compliance is doubly important when it is a publ i c employer 
that acts, both because of the example its voluntary assumption 
7 
of responsibility sets and because the remediation of governmen-
tal discrimination is of unique importance. See S. Rep. No. 92-
415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1971) (accompanying the amendments 
extending cove rage of Title VII to the States) ("Discrimination by 
government ... serves a doubly destructive purpose. The exclu-
sion of minorities from effective participation in the bureaucra-~ 
cy not only promotes ignorance of minority problems in that par-
ticular community, but also creates mistrust, alienation, and all 
too often hostility toward the entire process of government."). 
Imposing a contemporaneous findings requirement would produce the 
anomalous result that what private employers may voluntarily do 
to correct apparent violations of Title VII, Steelworkers v. We-
ber, 443 u.s. 193 (1979), public employers are constitutionally 
forbidden to do to correct their statutory and constitutional 
transgressions. 
Such results cannot, in my view, be justified by reference to 
the incremental value a contemporaneous findings requirement 
would have as an evidentiary safeguard. As is illustrated by 
this case, public employers are trapped between the competing 
9. 
hazards of liability to minorities if affirmative action is not I'""-.:::: J-
taken to remedy apparent employment discrimination and liability r~---· 
to nonminorities if affirmative action is taken. Where these 
employers, who are presumably fully aware both of their duty 
under federal law to respect the rights of all their employees 
and of their potential liability for failing to do so, act on the 
basis of information which gives them a sufficient basis for con-
eluding that remedial action is necessary, a contemporaneous 
findings requirement should not be necessary. 
This conclusion is consistent with our previous decisions recog-
nizing the States' ability to take voluntary race-conscious ac-
tion to achieve compliance with the law even in the absence of a 
specific finding of past discrimination. See, e. g., United Jew-
ish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165-166 (1977) (reappor-
tionment); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 u.s. 39 (1971) (school deseg-
regation). Indeed, our recognition of the responsible state ac-
tor's competency to take these steps is assumed in our recogni-
tion of the States' constitutional duty to take affirmative steps 
to eliminate the continuing effects of past unconstitutional dis-
crimination. See, e. g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education, 402 u.s. 1, 15 (1971); Green v. County School Board, 
391 u.s. 430, 437-438 (1968). 
Of course, the public employer must discharge this sensitive 
10. 
duty with great care; in order to provide some measure of protec-
tion to the interests of its nonminority employees and the em-
ployer itself in the event that its affirmative action plan is 
challenged, the public employer must have a firm basis for deter-
mining that affirmative action is war ran ted. Public employers 
are not without reliable benchmarks in making this determination. 
For example, demonstrable evidence of a disparity between the 
percentage of qualified blacks on a school's teaching staff and 
the percentage of qualified minorities in the relevant labor pool 
sufficient to support a prima facie Title VII pattern or practice 
claim by minority teachers would lend a compelling basis for a 
competent authority such as the School Board to conclude that 
implementation of a voluntary affirmative action plan is appro-
priate to remedy apparent prior employment discrimination. 
As the Court suggests, such a conclusion is not unassailable. 
See ante, at [draft op. at 8]. If a voluntary affirmative 
action plan is subsequently challenged in court by nonminority 
employees, those employees must be given the opportunity to prove 
that the plan does not meet the constitutional standard this 
Court has articulated. However, to the extent that the Court 
-----------~--~--
implies that a public employer bears the burden of convincing the 
the court must make an actual finding of prior discrimination 




based on the employer's proof before the employer's affirmative 
~~--'-~~~~~~------~~---
action plan will be upheld, see ante, at [draft op. at 8], I - ...___.__ -
must disagree. In "reverse discrimination" suits, as in any oth---------er suit, it is the plaintiffs who must bear the burden of demon-
strating that their rights have been violated. The findings a 
court must make before upholding an affirmative action plan re-
fleet this allocation of proof and the nature of the challenge 
asserted. For instance, in the example posed above, the nonmi-
nority teachers could easily demonstrate that the purpose and 
effect of the plan is to impose a race-based classification. But 
when the Board introduces its statistical proof as evidence of 
its remedial purpose, the nonminority teachers would continue to 
bear the ultimate burden of persuading the court that the Board's 
evidence did not support an inference of prior discrimination and 
thus a remedial purpose, or that the plan instituted on the basis 
of this evidence was not sufficiently "narrowly tailored." Only 
by meeting this burden could the plaintiffs establish a violation 
of their constitutional rights, and thereby defeat the presurnp-
tion that the Board's assertedly remedial action based on the 
statistical evidence was justified. 
In sum, I do not think that the layoff provision was constitu-
~
tionally infirm simply because the School Board, the Commission ----- ----_.,... 
or a court had not made particularized findings of discrimination 
. t··. 
; "" ~- ., 'j 
12. 
at the time the provision was agreed upon. But when the plan was 
challenged, the District Court and the Court of Appeals did not 
make the proper inquiry into the legitimacy of the Board's as-
serted remedial purpose; instead, they relied upon governmental _ __, 
........-c- I ( 
purposes that we have deemed insufficient to withstand strict 
. \ 
scrut1ny, and therefore failed to isolate a sufficiently impor-----
tant governmental purpose that could support the challenged pro-
4s;i!=4t.--
.,bi£J ------
..----.... ~ vision . 
There is, however, no need to inquire whether the provision ac- ~
tually had a legitimate remedial purpose based on the record, 
such as it is, because the judgment is vulnerable on yet another 
~------------------ground: the courts below applied a "reasonableness" test in eval-
e ~ ~-------
uating the relationship between the ends pursued and the means 
employed to achieve them that is plainly incorrect under any of 
the standards articulated by this Court. Nor is it necessary to 
resolve the troubling questions of whether any layoff provision 
could survive strict scrutiny or whether this particular layoff 
provision could in the abstract pass the onerous "narrowly tai-
lored" requirement. This layoff provision in its operation 
clearly is not "narrowly tailored" to achieve its asserted reme-
dial purpose because it is keyed to an impermissible hiring goal. 
Although the constitutionality of the hiring goal as such is not 
before us, it is impossible to evaluate the necessity of the lay-
13. 
off provision as a remedy for the apparent prior employment dis-
crimination absent reference to that goal. In this case, the 
hiring goal that the layoff provision was designed to safeguard 
' 
was tied to the percentage of minority students in the school 
district, not to the percentage of qualified minority teachers --within the relevant labor pool. The disparity between the per-
centage of minorities on the teaching staff and the percentage of 
minorities in the student body is not probative of employment 
discrimination; it is only when it is established that the avail-
ability of minorities in the relevant labor pool far exceeded 
those hired that one may draw an inference of deliberate dis-
crimination in employment. See Hazelwood School District, 433 
U.S. 299, 308 (1977). Because the layoff provision here acts to 
maintain levels of minority hiring that have no relation to reme-
dying employment discrimination, it cannot be adjudged "narrowly 
tailored" to effectuate its asserted remedial purpose. 
I therefore join in parts I, II, IIIA, and V of the Court's 
opinion, and concur in the judgment. 
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To: The Chief Justice 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1340 
WENDY WYGANT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JACKSON 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, ETC., ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[April -, 1986] 
JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in the judgment. 
The school board's policy when layoffs are necessary is to 
maintain a certain proportion of minority teachers. This pol-
icy requires laying off non-minority teachers solely on the 
basis of their race, including teachers with seniority, andre-
taining other teachers solely because they are black, even 
though some of them are in probationary status. None of 
the interests asserted by the board, singly or together, jus-
tify this racially discriminatory layoff policy and save it from 
the strictures of the Equal Protection Clause. Whatever the 
legitimacy of hiring goals or quotas may be, the discharge of 
white teachers to make room for blacks, none of whom has 
been shown to be a victim of any racial discrimination, is 
quite a different matter. I cannot believe that in order to 
integrate a work force, it would be permissible to discharge 
whites and hire blacks until the latter comprised a suitable 
percentage of the work force. None of our cases suggest 
that this would be permissible under the Equal Protection 
Clause. Indeed, our cases look quite the other way. The 
layoff policy in this case-laying off whites who would other-
wise be retained in order to keep blacks on the job-has the 
same effect and is equally violative of the Equal Protection 
Clause. I agree with th · · licy is un-
constitutional and he e concur in its judgment. ~ 
To: The Chief Justice --1 r, /) 
Justice Brennan L..... /./ 
Justice White 
Justice Blackmun 
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/ Justice Powell 
/ Justice Rehnquist 
Justice Stevens 
Justice O'Connor 
From: Justice Marshall 
Circulated: ________ _ 
Recirculated: APR 2 2 1986 
3rd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1340 
WENDY WYGANT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JACKSON 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, ETC., ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[April -, 1986) 
JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting. 
When this Court seeks to resolve far-ranging constitutional 
issues, it must be especially careful to ground its analysis 
firmly in the facts of the particular controversy before it. 
Yet in this significant case, we are hindered by a record that 
is informal and incomplete. Both parties now appear to real-
ize that the record is inadequate to inform the Court's deci-
sion. Both have lodged with the Court voluminous "submis-
sions" containing factual material that was not considered by 
the District Court or the Court of Appeals. Petitioners have 
submitted 21 separate items, predominantly statistical 
charts, which they assert are relevant to their claim of dis-
crimination. Respondents have submitted public documents 
that tend to substantiate the facts alleged in the brief ac-
companying their motion for summary judgment in the Dis-
trict Court. These include transcripts and exhibits from two 
prior proceedings, in which certain questions of discrimina-
tion in the Jackson schools were litigated, Jackson Education 
Association v. Board of Education, No. 4-72340 (ED Mich. 
1976) (Jackson 1), and Jackson Education Association v. 
Board of Education, No. 77-011484CZ (Jackson Cty. Cir. 
Ct. 1979) (Jackson 11). 
We should not acquiesce in the parties' attempt to try their 
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take simply to ignore altogether, as the plurality has done, 
the compelling factual setting in which this case evidently has 
arisen. No race-conscious provision that purports to serve a 
remedial purpose can be fairly assessed in a vacuum. 
The haste with which the District Court granted summary 
judgment to respondents, without seeking to develop the fac-
tual allegations contained in respondents' brief, prevented 
the full exploration of the facts that are now critical to reso-
lution of the important issue before us. Respondents' ac-
quiescence in a premature victory in the District Court 
should not now be used as an instrument of their defeat. 
Rather, the District Court should have the opportunity to de-
velop a factual record adequate to resolve the serious issue 
raised by the case. I believe, therefore, that it is improper 
for this Court to resolve the constitutional issue in its current 
posture. But, because I feel that the plurality has also erred 
seriously in its legal analysis of the merits of this case, I write 
further to express my disagreement with the conclusions that 
it has reached. 
I, too, believe that layoffs are unfair. But unfairness 
ought not be confused with constitutional injury. Paying no 
heed to the true circumstances of petitioners' plight, the lfttl-
t\1..~\,l~ jePity 8as Hl:llH§ed years of negotiation and compromise de-
signed to solve serious educational problems in the public 
schools of Jackson, Michigan. Because I believe that a pub-
lic employer, with the full agreement of its employees, should 
be permitted to preserve the benefits of a legitimate and con-
stitutional affirmative-action hiring plan even while reducing 
its work force , I dissent. 
I 
The record and extra-record materials that we have before 
us persuasively suggest that the plurality has too quickly as-
sumed the absence of a legitimate factual predicate, even 
under the plurality's own view, for affirmative action in the 
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lie Schools was hired in 1954. 1 In 1969, when minority 
representation on the faculty had risen only to 3.9%, the 
Jackson branch of the NAACP filed a complaint with the 
Michigan Civil Rights Commission, alleging that the Board 
had engaged in various discriminatory practices, including 
racial discrimination in the hiring of teachers. Respondents' 
Lodging No. 6 (complaint). The Commission conducted an 
investigation and concluded that each of the allegations had 
merit. 2 
In settlement of the complaint, the Commission issued an 
order of adjustment, under which the Jackson Board of Edu-
cation (Board) agreed to numerous measures designed to im-
prove educational opportunities for black public-school stu-
dents. Among them was a promise to "[t]ake affirmative 
steps to recruit, hire and promote minority group teachers 
and counselors as positions bec[a]me available .... " Re-
spondents' Lodging No. 1-B, p. 3. As a result of the Board's 
efforts to comply with the order over the next two years, the 
percentage of minority teachers increased to 8.8%. 
In 1971, however, faculty layoffs became necessary. The 
contract in effect at that time, between the Board and the 
'Unless otherwise indicated, the historical facts herein recited have 
been taken from the Defendants' Brief in Support of its Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment before the District Court, Record, Doc. No.4, pp. 1-6. 
1 The Commission concluded that "[r)acial tension continues to be a part 
of the entire Jackson School System from the elementary level through 
high school. It would appear, therefore, that each of the allegations as 
stated in the complaint can be substantiated based upon organizational 
records , court files , school records, special committee reports and the ap-
praisal conducted by the Superintendent of Schools." Respondents' Lodg-
ing No. 1-B, p. 11 (order of adjustment). This conclusion is supported by 
extra-record materials suggesting that the shortage of minority teachers 
was the result of past discrimination in teacher hiring. For example, the 
then-Superintendent of Schools testified that "an administrator . . . told 
me she had tried to get a position in Jackson in the early 1950's and was 
told that they didn't hire colored people." This was the "type of thing," he 
stated, that led to adoption of Article XII. Respondents' Lodging No. 3, 
pp. 22-23. 
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Jackson Education Association (Union), provided that layoffs 
would be made in reverse order of seniority. Because of the 
recent vintage of the school system's efforts to hire minor-
ities, the seniority scheme led to the layoff of a substantial 
number of minority teachers, ''literally wip[ing] out all the 
gain" made toward achieving racial balance. Respondent's 
Lodging No. 3, p. 24 (deposition of Superintendent of 
Schools). Once again, minority teachers on the faculty were 
a rarity. 
By early 1972, when racial tensions in the schools had esca-
lated to violent levels, school officials determined that the 
best course was full integration of the school system, includ-
ing integration of the faculty. But they recognized that, 
without some modification of the seniority layoff system, gen-
uine faculty integration could not take place. See App. 41; I 
Respondents' Lodging No. 3, p. 69 (deposition of Superin-
tendent of Schools); Respondents' Lodging No. 2, pp. 16-20 
(testimony of Union Executive Director, Jackson 1). The 
Minority Affairs Office of the Jackson Public Schools submit-
ted a questionnaire to all teachers, asking them to consider 
the possibility of abandoning the "last hired, first fired" ap-
proach to layoffs in favor of an absolute freeze on layoffs of 
minority teachers. The teachers overwhelmingly voted in 
favor of retaining the straight seniority system. N egotia-
tions ensued between the two camps~n the one hand, the 
Board, which favored a freeze of minority layoffs and, on the 
other, the Union, urging straight seniority-and the negoti-
ators ultimately reached accord. One union leader charac-
terized the development of the layoff compromise as the most 
difficult balancing of equities that he had ever encountered. 
Record, Doc. No.4, p. 5. 
The compromise avoided placing the entire burden of lay-
offs on either the white teachers as a group or the minority 
teachers as a group. Instead, each group would shoulder a 
portion of that burden equal to its portion of the faculty. 
Thus, the overall percentage of minorities on the faculty 
84-134~DISSENT 
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would remain constant. Within each group, seniority would 
govern which individuals would be laid off. This compromise 
was the provision at issue here, subsequently known as Arti-
cle XII: 
"In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the 
number of teachers through layoff from employment by 
the Board, teachers with the most seniority in the dis-
trict shall be retained, except that at no time will there 
be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off 
than the current percentage of minority personnel em-
ployed at the time of the layoff. . . . Each teacher so af-
fected will be called back in reverse order for positions 
for which he is certified maintaining the above minority 
balance." App. 13. 
The Board and the Union leadership agreed to the adoption 
of Article XII. The compromise was then presented to the 
teachers, who ratified it by majority vote. Each of the six 
times that the contract has been renegotiated, Article XII 
has been presented for reconsideration to the members of the 
Union, at least 80% of whom are white, and each time it has 
been ratified. 
To petitioners, at the bottom of the seniority scale among 
white teachers, fell the lot of bearing the white group's pro-
portionate share of layoffs that became necessary in 1982. 
Claiming a right not to lose their jobs ahead of minority 
teachers with less seniority, petitioners brought this chal-
lenge to Article XII under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
II 
From the outset, it is useful to bear in mind what this case 
is not. There has been no court order to achieve racial bal-
ance, which might require us to reflect upon the existence of 
judicial power to impose obligations on parties not proven to 
have committed a wrong. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 16 (1971). There is 
84-1340-DISSENT 
6 WYGANT v. JACKSON BOARD OF EDUCATION 
also no occasion here to resolve whether a white worker may 
be required to give up his or her job in order to be replaced 
by a black worker. See Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 
193, 208 (1979). Nor are we asked to order parties to suffer 
the consequences of an agreement that they had no role in 
adopting. See Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S. 561, --
(1984). Moreover, this is not a case in which a party to a col-
lective-bargaining agreement has attempted unilaterally to 
achieve racial balance by refusing to comply with a contrac-
tual, seniority-based layoff provision. Cf. Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U. S. 324, 350, 352 (1977). 
The sole question posed by this case is whether the Con-
stitution prohibits a union and a local school board from . 
developing a collective-bargaining agreement that apportions 
layoffs between two racially detennined groups as a means of 
preserving the effects of an affinnative hiring policy, the con-
stitutionality of which is unchallenged. s 
•JuSTICE O'CONNOR rests her disposition of this case on the propriety of 
the hiring plan, even though petitioners have not challenged it. She ap-
pears to rely on language in the preamble to the collective-bargaining 
agreement, which suggests that the "goal of such [affirmative action] policy 
shall be to have at least the same percentage of minority racial representa-
tion on each individual staff as is represented by the student population of 
the Jackson Public Schools." Article VII.D.l, App. to Pet. for Cert. la. 
Believing that the school system's hiring "goal" ought instead to be the per-
centage of qualified minorities in the labor pool, JUSTICE O'CoNNOR con-
cludes that the challenged layoff provision itself is overly broad. Ante, at 
- . Among the materials considered by the District Court and Court of 
Appeals, however, there is no evidence to show the actual proportion of 
minority teachers in the Jackson schools, either in relation to the qualified 
minority labor force or in relation to the number of minority students. If 
the distinction between the two goals is to be considered critical to the con-
stitutionality of the affirmative-action plan, it is incumbent on petitioners-
plaintiffs below-to demonstrate that, at the time they were laid off, the 
proportions of minority teachers had equaled or exceeded the appropriate 
percentage of the minority labor force, and that continued adherence to af-
finnative action goals, therefore, unjustifiably caused their injuries. This 
petitioners have failed to do. Outside of the First Amendment context, I 
know of no justification for invalidating a provision because it might, in a 
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A 
Agreement upon a means for applying the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to an affirmative-action program has eluded this 
Court every time the issue has come before us. In Univer-
sity of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978), 
four Members of the Court concluded that, while racial dis-
tinctions are irrelevant to nearly all legitimate state objec-
tives and are properly subjected to the most rigorous judicial 
scrutiny in most instances, they are highly relevant to the 
one legitimate state objective of eliminating the pernicious 
vestiges of past discrimination; when that is the goal, a less 
exacting standard of review is appropriate. Nevertheless, 
we eschewed the least rigorous, "rational basis" standard of 
review, recognizing that any racial classification is subject to 
misuse. We determined that remedial use of race is permis-
sible if it serves "important governmental objectives" and is 
"substantially related to achievement of those objectives." 
/d., at 359 (opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and 
BLACKMUN, JJ.); see also id., at 387 (opinion of MARSHALL, 
J.); id., at 402 (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.). This standard is 
genuinely a "strict and searching" judicial inquiry. !d., at 
362. The only other Justice to reach the constitutional issue 
in Bakke suggested that, remedial purpose or no, any racial 
distinctions "call for the most exacting judicial examination." 
/d., at 291 (opinion of POWELL, J.). 
In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 (1980), the Court 
again disagreed as to the proper standard of review. Three 
Justices, of whom I was one, concluded that a statute reserv-
ing 10% of federal funds for minority contractors served im-
hypothetical case, apply improperly to other potential plaintiffs. Petition-
ers have attempted to fill the gap in their case by supplying statistical 
charts to this Court. See, e. g., Petitioners' Lodging, pp. 56-62. 
Clearly, however, we are not equipped for such factfinding, and if the hor-
tatory ceiling of the affinnative-action plan is indeed to be considered a sig-
nificant aspect of the case, then that would be an appropriate subject of 
inquiry on remand. 
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portant governmental objectives and was substantially re-
lated to achievement of those objectives, surviving attack 
under our Bakke test. 448 U. S., at 519 (MARSHALL, J., 
joined by BRENNAN and BLACKMUN, JJ., concurring in judg-
ment). Three other Justices expressly declined to adopt any 
standard of review, deciding that the provision survived judi-
cial scrutiny under either of the formulae articulated in 
Bakke. 448 U. S., at 492 (opinion of BURGER, C. J., joined 
by WHITE and POWELL, JJ.). 
Despite the Court's inability to agree on a route, we have 
reached a common destination in sustaining affirmative ac-
tion against constitutional attack. In Bakke, we determined 
that a state institution may take race into account as a factor 
in its decisions, 438 U. S., at 326, and in Fullilove, the Court 
upheld a congressional preference for minority contractors 
because the measure was legitimately designed to ameliorate 
the present effects of past discrimination, 448 U. S., at 520. 
B 
Paying little heed to the significant division on the Court 
with respect to a standard of review, the plurality asserts a 
new test for constitutional analysis: a "racial classification 
must be justified by a sufficiently important state purpose" 
and "the means chosen by the State to effectuate its purpose 
must be 'narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal,'" 
ante, at 5 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, supra, at 480 
(opinion of BURGER, C. J.))-a standard not found as such in 
any other case. The scope and application of this newly 
minted two-part test are not explained in JUSTICE POWELL's 
opinion. We are not informed how compelling a state pur-
pose will have to be to be considered "sufficient." And Jus-
TICE PoWELL does not explain what he means by ''narrowly 
tailored," except to say that interference with seniority-
based layoffs, by definition, is not. Despite the plurality's 
allusions to strict scrutiny, its new test shares at least some 
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tests seek a legitimate remedial purpose and require that the 
means chosen to achieve that purpose avoid imposing unnec-
essary hardships on the affected persons. 
In this case, it should not matter which test the Court ap-
plies. What is most important, under any approach to the 
constitutional analysis, is that a reviewing court genuinely 
consider the circumstances of the provision at issue. The 
history and application of Article XII, assuming verification 
upon a proper record, demonstrate that this provision would 
pass constitutional muster, no matter which standard the 
Court should adopt. 
III 
The principal state purpose supporting Article XII is·the 
need to preserve the levels of faculty integration achieved 
through the affirmative hiring policy adopted in the early 
1970's. Brief for Respondents 41-43. Justification for the 
hiring policy itself is found in the turbulent history of the ef-
fort to integrate the Jackson Public Schools-not even men-
tioned in the majority opinion-which attests to the bona 
fides of the Board's current employment practices. 
The record and lodgings indicate that the Commission, en-
dowed by the State Constitution with the power to investi-
gate complaints of discrimination and the duty to secure the 
equal protection of the laws, Mich. Const., Art. V, §29, 
prompted and oversaw the remedial steps now under at-
tack. • When the Board agreed to take specified remedial ac-
tion, including the hiring and promotion of minority teachers, 
the Commission did not pursue its investigation of the appar-
• The Commission currently describes its participation in the Jackson 
matter as follows: "[T]he Commission investigated the allegations and 
sought to remedy the apparent violations by negotiating an order of adjust-
ment with the Jackson Board . ... [T]he out-of-line seniority layoff provi-
sions in the Jackson Board of Education's employment contracts with its 
teachers since 1972 are consistent with overall desegregation efforts under-
taken in compliance with the Commission's order of adjustment." Brief 
for Michigan Civil Rights Commission, Michigan Dept. of Civil Rights as 
A.micus Curiae 14 (emphasis added). 
. ' ' . 
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ent violations to the point of rendering fonnal findings of 
discrimination. 
Instead of subjecting an already volatile school system to 
the further disruption of formal accusations and trials, it ap-
pears that the Board set about achieving the goals articulated 
in the settlement. According to the then-Superintendent of 
Schools, the Board was aware, at every step of the way, that 
"[t]he NAACP had its court suit ready if either the Board 
postponed the [integration] operation or abandoned the at-
tempts. They were willing t~they were ready to go into 
Federal court and get a court order, as happened in Kalama-
zoo." Respondents' Lodging No. 3, p. 44. Rather than 
provoke the looming lawsuit, the Board and the Union 
worked with the committees to reach a solution to the racial 
problems plaguing the school system. In 1972, the Board 
explained to parents why it had adopted a voluntary .integra-
tion plan: 
''Waiting for what appears the inevitable only flames 
passions and contributes to the difficulties of an orderly 
transition from a segregated to a desegregated school 
system. Firmly established legal precedents mandate a 
change. Many citizens know this to be true. 
''Waiting for a court order emphasizes to many that we 
are quite willing to disobey the law until the court orders 
us not to disobey the law. . . . Further, court orders cost 
money for both the school system and the litigants." 
Respondents' Lodging No. 1, pp.1-2 (Exhibit No.8, 
Jackson 1). 
An explicit Board admission or judicial determination of cul-
pability, which the petitioners and even the Solicitor General I 
urge us to hold was required before the Board could under-
take a race-conscious remedial plan, see Brief for Petitioners 
27-29; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29, would 
only have exposed the Board in this case to further litigation 
and liability, including individual liability under 42 U. S. C. 





WYGANT v. JACKSON BOARD OF EDUCATION 11 
the advancement of the community's urgent objective of inte-
grating its schools. 
The real irony of the argument urging mandatory, formal 
findings of discrimination lies in its complete disregard for a 
longstanding goal of civil rights reform, that of integrating 
schools without taking every school system to court. Our 
school desegregation cases imposed an affirmative duty on 
local school boards to see that "racial discrimination would be 
eliminated root and branch." Green v. County School 
Board, 391 U. S. 430, 437-438 (1968); see Brown v. Board of 
Education, 349 U. S. 294, 299 (1955). Petitioners would \ 
now have us inform the Board, having belatedly taken this 
Court's admonitions to heart, that it should have delayed fur= 
ther, disputing its obligations and forcing the aggrieved par-
ties to seek judicial relief. This result would be wholly in- \ 
consistent with the national policies against overloading 
judicial dockets, maintaining groundless defenses, and im-
peding good-faith settlement of legal disputes. Only last 
Term, writing for the Court, THE CHIEF JUSTICE reaffirmed 
that civil rights litigation is no exception to the general policy 
in favor of settlements: "Indeed, Congress made clear its con-
cern that civil rights plaintiffs not be penalized for 'helping to 
lessen docket congestion' by settling their cases out of court . 
. . . In short, settlements rather than litigation will serve the 
interests of plaintiffs as well as defendants." Marek v. 
Chesny, 473 U.S.-,- (1985). It would defy equity to 
penalize those who achieve harmony from discord, as it would 
defy wisdom to impose on society the needless cost of super-
fluous litigation. The Court is correct to recognize, as it 
does today, that formal findings of past discrimination are not 
a necessary predicate to the adoption of affirmative-action 
policies, and that the scope of such policies need not be lim-
ited to remedying specific instances of identifiable discrimina-
tion. See ante, at 8 (opinion of POWELL, J.); ante, at 6 (opin-
ion of O'CONNOR, J.) . 
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Moreover, under the apparent circumstances of this case, 
we need not rely on any general awareness of "societal dis-
crimination" to conclude that the Board's purpose is of suffi-
cient importance to justify its limited remedial efforts. 
There are allegations that the imperative to integrate the 
public schools was urgent. Racially motivated violence had 
erupted at the schools, interfering with all educational objec-
tives. We are told that, having found apparent violations of 
the law and a substantial underrepresentation of minority 
teachers, the state agency responsible for ensuring equality 
of treatment for all citizens of Michigan had instituted a set-
tlement that required the Board to adopt affirmative hiring 
practices in lieu of further enforcement proceedings. That 
agency, participating as amicus curiae through the Attorney 
General of Michigan, still stands fully behind the solution that 
the Board and the Union adopted in Article XII, viewing it as 
a measure necessary to attainment of stability and · educa-
tional quality in the public schools. See n. 4, supra. Surely ' 
this supplies the "[e]videntiary support for the conclusion 
that remedial action is warranted" that the plurality purports 
to seek, ante, at 8. 
Were I satisfied with the record before us, I would hold 
that the state purpose of preserving the integrity of a valid 
hiring policy-which in turn sought to achieve diversity and 
stability for the benefit of all students-was sufficient, in this 
case, to satisfy the demands of the Constitution. 
IV 
The second part of any constitutional assessment of the dis-
puted plan requires us to examine the means chosen to 
achieve the state purpose. Again, the history of Article 
XII, insofar as we can determine it, is the best source of 
assistance. 
A 
Testimony of both Union and school officials illustrates that 
the Board's obligation to integrate its faculty could not have 
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eliminate the last hired. See App. 41; Respondents' Lodging 
No. 3, p. 69 (deposition of Superintendent of Schools); Re-
spondents' Lodging No. 2, pp. 16-20 (testimony of Union Ex-
ecutive Director, Jackson[). In addition, qualified minority 
teachers from other States were reluctant to uproot their 
lives and move to Michigan without any promise of protection 
from imminent layoff. The testimony suggests that the lack 
of some layoff protection would have crippled the efforts to 
recruit minority applicants. ld., at 20, 55, 56. Adjustment 
-of the layoff hierarchy under these circumstances was a nec-
essary corollary of an affirmative hiring policy. 
B 
Under JusTICE PoWELL's approach, the community of 
Jackson, having painfully watched the hard-won benefits of 
its integration efforts vanish as a result of massive layoffs, 
would be informed today, simply, that preferential layoff pro- \ 
tection is never permissible because hiring policies serve the 
same purpose at a lesser cost. See ante, at 13-14. As a 
matter of logic as well as fact, a hiring policy achieves no pur-
pose at all if it is eviscerated by layoffs. JUSTICE PowELL's \ 
position is untenable. 
JUSTICE POWELL has concluded, by focusing exclusively on J 
the undisputed hardship of losing a job, that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause always bars race-conscious layoff plans. This 
analysis overlooks, however, the important fact that Article 
XII does not cause the loss of jobs; someone will lose a job 
under any layoff plan and, whoever it is, that person will not 
deserve it. Any per se prohibition against layoff protection, 
therefore, must rest upon a premise that the tradition of bas-
ing layoff decisions on seniority is so fundamental that its 
modification can never be permitted. Our cases belie that 
premise. 
The general practice of basing employment decisions on 
relative seniority may be upset for the sake of other public 
policies. For example, a court may displace innocent work-
ers by granting retroactive seniority to victims of employ-
f • 
..--·'"'- .. . -
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ment discrimination. Franks v. Bowman Transportation 
Co., 424 U. S. 747, 775 (1976). Further, this Court has long 
held that "employee expectations arising from a seniority 
system agreement may be modified by statutes furthering a 
strong public policy interest." Id., at 778. And we have 
recognized that collective-bargaining agreements may go fur-
ther than statutes in enhancing the seniority of certain em-
ployees for the purpose of fostering legitimate interests. 
See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 339-340 
(1953). Accordingly, we have upheld one collectively bar-
gained provision that bestowed enhanced seniority on those 
who had served in the military before employment, id., at 
340, and another that gave preferred seniority status to 
union chairmen, to the detriment of veterans. Aeronautical 
Industrial District Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U. S. 521, 
529 (1949). 
In Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979), we specifi-
cally addressed a departure from the seniority principle de-
signed to alleviate racial disparity. In Weber, a private em- (] 
ployer and a union negotiated a collective agreement that 
reserved for black employees one half of all openings in a 
plant training program, replacing the prior system of award-
ing all seats on the basis of seniority. This plan tampered 
with the expectations attendant to seniority, and redistrib-
uted opportunities to achieve an important qualification to-
ward advancement in the company. We upheld the chal-
lenged plan under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because it was 
designed to "eliminate traditional patterns of racial segrega-
tion" in the industry and did not "unnecessarily trammel the 
interests of the white employees." ld., at 201, 208. Were-
quired no judicial finding or employer admission of past dis-
crimination to justify that interference with the seniority hi-
erarchy for the sake of the legitimate purposes at stake. 
These cases establish that protection from layoff is not al-
together unavailable as a tool for achieving legitimate societal 
goals. It remains to be determined whether the particular 
,, 
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fonn of layoff protection embodied in Article XII falls among 
the permissible means for preserving minority proportions on 
the teaching staff. 
c 
Article XII is a narrow provision because it allocates the 
impact of an unavoidable burden proportionately between 
two racial groups. It places no absolute burden or benefit on 
one race, and, within the confines of constant minority pro-
portions, it preserves the hierarchy of seniority in the selec-
tion of individuals for layoff. Race is a factor, along with se-
niority, in determining which individuals the school system 
will lose; it is not alone dispositive of any individual's fate. 
Cf. Bakke, 438 U. S., at 318 (opinion of POWELL, J.). More-
over, Article XII does not use layoff protection as a tool for 
increasing minority representation; achievement of that goal 
is entrusted to the less severe hiring policies. 6 And Article 
XII is narrow in the temporal sense as well. The very bilat-
eral process that gave rise to Article XII when its adoption 
was necessary will also occasion its demise when remedial 
measures are no longer required. Finally, Article XII modi-
fies contractual expectations that do not themselves carry 
any connotation of merit or achievement; it does not interfere 
with the "cherished American ethic" of "[f]airness in individ-
ual competition," Bakke, supra, at 319, n. 53, depriving indi-
viduals of an opportunity that they could be said to deserve. 
In all of these important ways, Article XII metes out the 
hardship of layoffs in a manner that achieves its purpose with 
the smallest possible deviation from established nonns. 
6 JUSTICE WHITE assumes that respondents' plan is equivalent to one 
that deliberately seeks to change the racial composition of a staff by firing 
and hiring members of predetennined races. Ante, at - . That as-
sumption utterly ignores the fact that the Jackson plan involves only the 
means for selecting the employees who will be chosen for layoffs already 
necessitated by external economic conditions. This plan does not seek to 
supplant whites with blacks, nor does it contribute in any way to the num-
ber of job losses. 
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The Board's goal of preserving minority proportions could 
have been achieved, perhaps, in a different way. For exam-
ple, if layoffs had been determined by lottery, the ultimate 
effect would have been retention of current racial percent-
ages. A random system, however, would place every 
teacher in equal jeopardy, working a much greater upheaval 
of the seniority hierarchy than that occasioned by Article 
XII; it is not at all a less restrictive means of achieving the 
Board's goal. Another possible approach would have been a 
freeze on layoffs of minority teachers. This measure, too, 
would have been substantially more burdensome than Article 
XII, not only by necessitating the layoff of a greater number 
of white teachers, but also by erecting an absolute distinction 
between the races, one to be benefited and one to be bur-
dened, in a way that Article XII avoids. Indeed, neither pe- \ 
titioners nor any Justice of this Court has suggested an alter-
native to Article XII that would have attained the stated goal 
in any narrower or more equitable a fashion. Nor can I con-
ceive of one. 
v 
It is no accident that this least burdensome of all conceiv-
able options is the very provision that the parties adopted. 
For Article XII was forged in the crucible of clashing inter-
ests. All of the economic powers of the predominantly white 
teachers' union were brought to bear against those of the 
elected Board, and the process yielded consensus. 
The concerns that have prompted some Members of this 
Court to call for narrowly tailored, perhaps court-ordered, 
means of achieving racial balance spring from a legitimate 
fear that racial distinctions will again be used as a means to 
persecute individuals, while couched in benign phraseology. 
That fear has given rise to mistrust of those who profess to 
take remedial action, and concern that any such action ''work 
the least harm possible to other innocent persons competing 
for the benefit." Bakke, supra, at 308 (opinion of POWELL, 
J.). One Justice has warned that ''if innocent employees are 
f. 
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to be made to make any sacrifices ... , they must be repre-
sented and have had full participation rights in the negotia-
tion process," Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S., at 588, n. 3 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring), and another has called for a 
"principle for deciding whether preferential classifications re-
flect a benign remedial purpose or a malevolent stigmatic 
classification .... " Bakke, supra, at 294-295, n. 34 (opin-
ion of POWELL, J. ). This case answers that call. 
The collective-bargaining process is a legitimate and pow-
erful vehicle for the resolution of thorny problems, and we 
have favored "minimal supervision by courts and other gov-
ernmental agencies over the substantive terms of collective-
bargaining agreements." American Tobacco Co. v. Patter-
son, 456 U. S. 63, 76-77 (1982). We have also noted that 
"[s]ignificant freedom must be afforded employers and unions 
to create differing seniority systems," California Brewers 
Assn. v. Bryant, 444 U. S. 598, 608 (1980). 6 The perceived 
dangers of affirmative action misused, therefore, are natu-
rally averted by the bilateral process of negotiation, agree-
ment, and ratification. The best evidence that Article XII is 
a narrow means to serve important interests is that repre-
sentatives of all affected persons, starting from diametrically 
opposed perspectives, have agreed to it-not once, but six 
times since 1972. 
VI 
The narrow question presented by this case, if indeed we 
proceed to the merits, offers no occasion for the Court to 
issue broad proclamations of public policy concerning the 
controversial issue of affirmative action. Rather, this case 
calls for calm, dispassionate reflection upon exactly what has 
been done, to whom, and why. If one honestly confronts 
each of those questions against the factual background sug-
• This deference is warranted only if the union represents the interests 
of the workers fairly; a union's breach of that duty in the fonn of racial dis-
crimination gives rise to an action by the worker against the union. See 
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 823 U.S. 192, 207 (1944). 
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gested by the materials submitted to us, I believe the conclu-
sion is inescapable that Article XII meets, and indeed sur-
passes, any standard for ensuring that race-conscious 
programs are necessary to achieve remedial purposes. 
When an elected school board and a teachers' union collec-
tively bargain a layoff provision designed to preserve the ef-
fects of a valid minority recruitment plan by apportioning 
layoffs between two racial groups, as a result of a settlement 
achieved under the auspices of a supervisory state agency 
charged with protecting the civil rights of all citizens, that 
provision should not be upset by this Court on constitutional 
grounds. 
The alleged facts that I have set forth above evince, at the 
very least, a wealth of plausible evidence supporting the 
Board's position that Article XII was a legitimate and neces-
sary response both to racial discrimination and to educational 
imperatives. To attempt to resolve the constitutional issue 
either with no historical context whatever, as the plurality \ 
has done, or on the basis of a record devoid of established 
facts, is to do a grave injustice not only to the Board and 
teachers of Jackson and to the State of Michigan, but also to 
individuals and governments committed to the goal of elimi-
nating all traces of segregation throughout the country. 
Most of all, it does an injustice to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment itself. I would vacate the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and remand with instructions that the case be re-
manded to the District Court for further proceedings consist-
ent with the views I have expressed. 7 
7 I do not envy the District Court its task of sorting out what this Court 
has and has not held today. It is clear, at any rate, that from among the 
many views expressed today, two noteworthy results emerge: a majority 
of the Court has explicitly rejected the argument that an aftirmative-action 
plan must be preceded by a fonnal finding that the entity seeking to insti-
tute the plan has committed discriminatory act.s in the past; and the Court 
has left open whether layoffs may be used as an instrument of remedial 
action. 
r 
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Absent a finding of discrimination as in 
Rlllilove, we have had no occasion to consider whether a 
fixed quota of hiring preference comports with the Equal 
Protection Clause. Such a quota is to be distinguished 
from hiring goals adopted as a means of achieving a fairer 
and more balanced work force. 
.· 
lfp/ss 12/27/85 Rider A, p. 9 (Wygant) 
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The term "narrowly tailored" so frequently used in our 
cases, has acquired a secondary meaning. More 
specifically, as commentators have indicated, the term may 
be used to require consideration whether lawful 
alternative means could have been used. Or, as Professor 
Ely has noted (see below), the classification at issue 
must "fit" with greater precision alternative means. In 
this case, for example, the use of hiring goals that do 
not involve the laying off of innocent individuals is now 
widely used. 
2. 
Note to Mike: 
You may recall that Justice O'Connor does not 
like our use of the term "narrowly tailored" in this case. 
She thinks it can be fairly argued that the plan adopted 
by the Board was narrowly tailored. Although 1 disagree 
with her, 1 think it is desirable to have her concern in 
mind. 1 have never liked the term "narrowly tailored" 
because it reminds me that 1 have had my trousers 
"narrowly tailored" when they were 20 inches at the bottom 
rather than the fashionable 16 inches. The above 
language, with appropriate changes, could be worked into 
footnote 6 - possibly as the leading sentences, and with 
appropriate changes in what we now have in footnote 6. 
This is quite an important note. 
lfp/ss 12/27/85 Rider A, p. 12 (Wygant) 
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We therefore hold that, as a means of accomplishing 
purposes that otherwise may be legitimate, the Board's 
layoff plan is unnecessarily burdensome. 9 Other, less 
burdensome means of accomplishing similar goals - such as 
the adoption of hiring goals on indeed the Board's hiring 
program in this case - are available. 
Note to Mike: 
1 suggest the foregoing - or similar language -
as a substitute for the second and third sentences on p. 
12. 1 would retain footnotes 9 and 11 as 1 have lightly 
2. 
edited them. I am inclined either to omit footnote 10 or 
move it to another place in the opinion. It seems 
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The inclusion of "Orientals" and "persons of Spanish 
dissent" as "minorities" illustrates the undifferentiated 
nature of the Board's rule. The term "Orientals" includes 
more than a billion people, including many of ancient 
civilizations who have never been discriminated against in 
this country. Similarly, to brand all "persons of Spanish 
dissent" as minorities who have suffered societal 
discrimination is without foundation in fact. Perhaps the 
intention was to focus on immigrants and possibly 
undocumented aliens from Spanish-American countries in his 
hemisphere. But to imply that all persons of Spanish 
dissent have been the victims of societal discrimination 
2. 
is unsupportable and could well be offensive. There is no 
explanation of why the Board chose to include these 
extremely broad categories, or how members of some of the 
categories could ever be identified. Moreover, 
respondents have never suggested - much less formally 
found - that the Board ever engaged in prior, purposeful 
discrimination against members of each of these groups. 
mwm 11/26/85 
No. 84-1340 
WYGANT V. JACKSON BOARD OF EDUCATION 
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
--~ 
JUSTICE opinion of the co'firJ;;.A~ trj ~ 
v ,---...,_;.,_,_(_ ~~ 
School Board,~ f>art ~ ~ 
~1-d_ 
<JJ In 1972 the Jackson 
an overall e£.fo..r-t- -t-o--alleviate problems it was enpet'i"> 
eRC±ng ~~~~{'~ensior{ ~s~ .:nsidered 
adding a layoff provision to the Collective Bargaining 
( c 13~) 
Agreement between the Board and the Jackson Education 
1\ 
(~~) 
Association that would protect certain minorities 
'\ 
against layoffs. Prior to ~e bargaining on 
~~{;/) 
' the Minority Affairs Office of the Jackson 
Public Schools issued a questionnaire to all teachers, 
a.. 
soliciting their views as to ~ layoff policy. Two 
"' 
alternatives were proposed; continuation of the exist-
ing straight seniority system, or a freeze of minority 
~-
~~ 
11/26/85; 5:00 PM DRAFT 
/. ~ble,.Vk ~ 
layoffs to ensure ret ntion of minority teachers in 
exact ratio to the inority student population. Nine-
the teachers expressed a preference 
for the straight eniority system. 
'$"/.h-. 
8£ief fer Resp. at 
~~ 
9. !\ ~n agreemen § ~tuall~ worked out that re-
sulted in approval of a new provision, Article XII of 
the Collective Bargaining Agreement, covering layoffs. 
It stated: 
In the event that it becomes neces-
sary to reduce the number of teachers 
throught layoff from employment by the 
Board, teachers with the most seniority in 
the district shall be retained, except that 
at no time will there be a greater percent-
age of minority personnel laid off than the 
current percentage of minority personnel 
employed at the time of the layoff. In no 
event will the number given notice of possi-
ble layoff be greater than the number of 
positions to be eliminated. Each teacher so 
affected will be called back in reverse 
order for positions for which he is certi-
fied maintaining the above minority balance. 
J. A. at 13. 
page 2. 
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ln the layoffs of 1973, the contract language 
was followed. When layoffs became necessary in 1974, 
it was evident that adherence to the contract would 
result in the layoff of tenured nonminority teachers 
while minority teachers on probationary status were 
f 
retained. The Board retained the tenured teacher and ,.., 
failed to maintain the percentage of minority person-
page 3. 
nel that existed at the time of the layoff. 
~ 
The J..«.e-k - ) 
/\ 
teachers laid off as a result of the Board's noncom-
pliance with Article Xll, brought suit in federal 
~~~ 
court, Jackson Education Association v. Board of Edu-
'1 
that 
the Board's failure to adhere to the layoff provision 
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Title Vll. They also urged the district 
court to take pendent jurisdiction over state law 
breach of contract claims. In that action, the ~ 
11/26/85; 5:00 PM 
/ 
o~t~~ vr JJw ~ 
v-~r~ . 
~1 Board denied that it had engaged in dis-
criminatory employment practices that caused the al-
leged underemployment of minority. The district court 
held that the evidence of a de facto statistical im-
balance submitted by plaintiffs was insufficient to 
confer jurisdiction over that claim, citing washington 
v. Davis, 426 u.s. 229 (1976). The court also found 
that plaintiffs had not fulfilled the jurisdictional 
)~~Ld.. 
prerequisite to a Title VII cla~t~y tid not demon-
strate that discrimination charges were filed with the 
EEOC. Without jurisdiction over the federal claims, 
the district court declined to exercise pendent juris-
diction over the state law breach of contract claims. 
Instead of appealing to the CA6, the same 
plaintiffs instituted a suit in state court on the 
state law claims, Jackson Education Association v. 
Board of Education, No. 77-0011484CZ (Jackson County 
(~JI) .. 
Circuit Court, 1979)A The trial judge found that the 
page 4. 
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Board had breached its contract with the plaintiffs, 
and _that Article XII did not violate the Michigan 
Teacher Tenure Act. The state trial court did note 
that it "had not been established that the board had 
discriminated against minorities in its hiring prac-
tices. The minority representation on the faculty was 
the result of societal racial discrimination." J.A. 
43. N~·e~~ela~,~e court held that Article XII did 
not violate the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
The Board thereafter adhered to Article XII. 
As a result, one group of petrs was laid off during 
the 1976-1977 school year, and another group~ 
~ 
(J of~ during the 1981-1982 school year. Petitioners are 
1\ 
nonminority teachers who were displaced by minority 
teachers with less seniority. Petitioners brought 
suit in federal district court, alleging violations 
the equal protection clause, Title VII, §1983 and var-
11/26;85; 5:00 PM DRAFT 
ious other federal and state statutes. On cross mo-
tions for summary judgment, the district court dis-
missed all of petitioners' claims. 
protection claim is now before this Court~On that 
~ 
claim, the district court held that a finding of prior 
discrimination was not a prerequisite for the racial 
!J tt-~ 
preferences granted by the ~olleetive bar~aining 
agLeem~at. Instead, the court held that the Equal 
,(. 
Protection Clause was satisfied if <J> there is a 
~d4, 
ss~nd basis for concluding that minority underrepre-
1 
lj)) 
sentation is substantial and chronic and (2f the af-
firmative action plan meets a test of reasonableness. 
The court found substantial and chronic underrepresen-
tation by comparing the percentage of minority teach-
ers with the percentage of minority students in the 
student body. 
~ 
Based on -th-is "role model" theory the 
1\ 
court upheld the constitutionality of the layoff pro-
vision. 
page 6. 
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The Court of Appeals affirmed. It adopted 
the reasoning of the district court and extensively 
quoted from the district court's opinion. Because of 
the importance of the issue of the constitutionality 
of race-based layoffs by public employers, we granted 
certiorari. ********* We now reverse. 
II. 
Petitioners' central claim is that they were 
laid off solely because of their race in violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution.2footnote on CBA's as state 
action. "Decisions based on race or ethnic origin by 
faculties and administrators of [public schools) are 
reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment," Bakke, 
supra, at ___ , (opinion of POW J. , joined by 
WHITE, J.) but "not ..• all racial or ethnic classifi-
page 7. 
11uk- ~ ;J 
r10/~r 
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page 8. 
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a 
single racial group are immediately suspect. That is 
not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitu-
tional. It is to say that courts must subject them to 
the most rigid scrutiny." Korematsu, 323 US at 216. 
That is because "[dJistinctions between citizens sole-
ly because of their ancestry are by their very nature 
odious to a free people whose institutions are founded 
upon the doctrine of equality." Hirabayashi, 320 us 
"Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort 
are inherently suspect and thus call for the most ex-







(opinion of POWELL, J :J 
"\ 
rJ r( vJ ~- lk 
~ -
classifica- ~ ~ c. y ~ 
~ 
While judicial review of racial 
tions necessarily must be "rigid" or "exacting," it 
i~ot clear that the ~t levels of equal protec-
~ ~ ~~- ~lr- a.+<. aA~ 
tion scrutiny are useful in the context of public 
1\ 
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cooflkt~ constitutional duties. They a-£e uooer 
"~~~~,;@_ <\ 
stri~t obligatio~ starting with. this Court's decision 
" in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 u.s. 294 (1955) 
(Brown II); to remedy the last vestiges of racial seg-
regation and discrimination. This remedial task takes 
on added importance in schools because they are "a 
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultur-
al values, in preparing him for later professional 
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his 
environment." Brown v. Board of Education, 347 u.s. 
483, 493 (1954) (Brown II) • In addition, compulsory 
attendance laws lend added support to the idea that 
the school environment should be free of the slightest 
vestige of state-sponsored discrimination. 
page 9. 
- ~ ~ c;~~-'-L 
On the other hand, public schools-'\ also are /-~~- -
under the costitutional command not to "make distinc-
tions between citizens solely because of their ances-
try." Hirabayashi, 320 u.s. at 100. A public 
~ · ~r 
~ ?~ 
~, .... ~~ ~ ... ----· ..........-~ 
~~ r--"' &--""~e . 
11/26/85; 5:00 PM DRAFT page 10. 
~ 
school's good faith effort to balaAce these ~duties 
is entitled to some deference so as not to inhibit the 
~~kily 
remedial process. At the same time this Cour~ r~- ~~ 
~ that the "ultimate goal must be to eliminate 
entirely from governmental decisionmaking such irrele-
vant factors as a human being's race." Fullilove, 448 
US 448 at (Stevens, J., dissenting). In public 
school cases we must interpret the Equal Protection 
Clause with the view of assuring to all persons "the 






while at the same time "confonting a legacy of slavery 
~~~ 
and racial discrimination." Bakke, supra, at 294 . .--- /2.~ 
In the context of affirmative action, it has 
previously been stated that "[a]ny preference based on 
racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a 
most searching examination to make sure that it does 
not conflict with constitutional guarantees." 
Fullilove v. K1utznick, 448 u.s. 448, 491 (1980) 
11/26/85; 5:00 PM DRAFT page 11. 
(opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE) . There are two prongs 
to this analysis, First, the State's purpose behind 
the racial classification must be sufficiently impor-
tant to justify the race-based action. Second, the 
means chosen by the State to effectuate its purpose 
must be "narrowly tailored to the achievement of that 
goal." ld., at 480. Whether the layoff provision is 
supported by a sufficiently important State purpose, 
and whether the means chosen to accomplish that pur-




The Court of Appeals, relying on the reason-
ing of the District Court, held that the Board's in-
terest in providing minority role models for its mi-
nority students was sufficiently important to satisfy 
the "purpose" prong of equal protection analysis. ~ 
11/26/85; 5:00 PM DRA.FT 
~lAA--1 /rA_ 
w~ the role model theory)~ the Dis-
trict Court ~ conclud~that minorities were 
I'\ 
underrepresented on the faculty. It reasoned that 
some showing of underrepresentation was necessary in 
order to "'permit the court to determine that the pur-
pose of the affirmative action plan is legitimate.'" 
Pet. App. 7a, quoting Valentine v. Smith, 654 .F.2d 
503, 508 (CA8), cert. denied, 454 u.s. 1124 (1981). 
llLI~ U~ ~ 
hrn e~ad- e'E comparing the percentage of ~or i ty facul-
~ ~ 
ty to the percentage of minority applicants in the 
page 12. 
~~ t' ~ ~ /2-&.J. • t-~k ~ ~- e-(.;u) / 
relevant labort~l, the District Court found under-
..1\.. t\ 
representatio~~mparing the percentage of minority 
1\ 
faculty to the percentage of minority students. It 
~~~~-
justified this unusual departure from ~1 sta-
'\ "'\ 
12-.-,-.~aet!u~. -  
a-~~~~~~~e-~~n tistical analysis 
) 
by noting that 
teachers "are role models for their students," and 
11/26/85; 5:00 PM DRAFT 
that "societal discrimination has often deprived mi-
nority children of other role-models." 29a 
~~~ 
This "role model" theory is an insufficiently 
1"\ 
~~ 
strong State interest to lend constitutional validity 
1\ 
to the Board's race-based layoff plan. As expounded 
by the District Court, it has two aspects; first, it 
page 13. 
is an attempt to alleviate the effects of societal 
discrimination, second, i~~~d~al theory 7 
As an attempt to alleviate the effects of 
societal discrimination, the role model theory runs 
afoul of the principle that requires identified prior 
discrimination by the government unit involved before 
the State's remedial action can be constitutionally 
~ff'~/l.4.~ ~~ 
justified.~ focal fo"chool _.,Boards ar~ r qualified to 
engage in the task of remedying the effects of soci-
etal discrimination--"an amorous concept of injury 
that may be ageless in its reach into the past" and 
11/26/85; 5:00 PM DRAFT page 14. 
~~~~ / ~) 
timeless in its ability to affect t e future, Bakke, 
1~ 
supra, at 307. A 
~ 
The~c nature o "societal discrimina-
~w-JA+i_~J 
tion'\as ~basis for race-co state action is 
There are )rnumer~~reaso 
the percentage of minority tudents and the percentage 
of minority faculty, them completely unrelated ~ 
~ ~0~ 
to discrimination of any ki d. In fact, there is no ~ ~~ ·. 
~ ~ ft--1, ~ ~ u.~d<<·-R ~c~.~ 
~raa~ily apparent connection ~1 between the two 
groups. The statistical comparison made by the Dis-
trict Court demonstrates that there are few if any 










relating some harm to the evil of societal discrimina- ~ ~ 
~)/ 
·~ 
... ~ 1/ 
tion. 
,. f /) ~ 
""1A' .)~~- ~/ 
1''-VY"" ~ ~ 
A1he role model theory)~ be justified as 
~ ~ ~--~at:J '4! 
 educational~Y· I~,jt 
stands on even weaker ground, unrelated either to pri-
ll/26/85; 5:00 PM DRAFT page 15. 
or discrimination by the Board or to societal dis-





educational theories, even if the theories are 
valid attempts to improve education, are simply insuf-
ficient to overcome the constitutional prohibition 
agains;r t 
color of their skin, 
B 
~ 
Respondents contend that the State purpose 
J\ 
behind the layoff provision can be viewed more broad-
ly, as an attempt to provide for a diverse faculty. 
Brief of Respondents at 27-31. Respondents cite ~ 
school desegregation cases stating that 
"ethnic and racial diversity in the classroom is a 
~
desirable component of sound education." Columbus 
Board of Education v. Penick, 443 u.s. 449, 486 (1979) 
~· (POWELL, ~dissenting) , 
~~. 
These cases c~ rec-
~/L 
• 
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ognize that the state has a valid interest in a ra-
cially diverse student body, and respondents make the 
plausible argument that the state has an equally valid 
interest in a racially diverse faculty. Of course, 
~~ 
the context here is ~Y dif'ferent from the 
1\ 
cases cited by respondents. While those cases recog-
nized the state's interest in a racially diverse 
d-d~f~l-
classroom, they o~~i~a~r~Io~t~~a± w~~the question whether 
that interest would support race-conscious action that 
page 16. 
deprived ~ a benefit ~y because of that 
person's race: No students were ~cPs~~ 
"""' 
order to accompli~ racial 
. 1 
~~-~~1-L·~~ · 
diversyty. In addition, 
'\ 
the racial classifications in the school desegregation 
cases "were designed as remedies for the vindication 
of Constitutional entitlement," while respondents sug-
gest that the Board's interest in diversity is valid 
even in the complete absence of prior discrimination. 
Brief of Respondents at 28. 
11/26/85: 5:00 PM DRAFT page 17. 
Respondents also cite to the diversity inter-
est recognized as constitutionally legitimate in 
~ ~
BAKKE. ~yAinteres~in Bakke was not limit-
ed to racial or ethnic diversity. In fact, its le-
~~~~ 
gitimacy was premised on the ~n that a person's 
1\ 
race would simply be one factor among many in an at-
___,_ -
tempt to identify those individual characteristics 
that contribute to a richer learning environment. In 
). 
that way, no individual's oportunity to compete for 
the relevant benefit would be foreclosed simply be-
cause of race. in "educational diversi-
ty" was recognized as a "constitutionally permissible 
goal for an institution of higher education," Bakke, 
supra, at 311-312, because it was grounded on this 
r 
Court's longstanding respect for academic freedom, 
tN:J 
orWfii~h is viewed as "a special concern of the First 
Amendment," id., at 312. When Justice Frankfurter 
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core of academic freedom, he described a principle 
that only has direct application in the university 
setting: 
It is the business of a university 
to provide that atmosphere which is most 
conducive to speculation, experiment and 
creation. It is an atmosphere in which 
there prevail "the four essential freedoms" 
of a university--to determine for itself on 
academic grounds who may teach, what may be 
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may 
be admitted to study. Sweezy v. New Hamp-
shire, 354 u.s. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurt-
er, J., concurring in the result). 
~ 
Secondary and elementary schools do not seek to create 
an atmosphere of speculation and experimentation to 
the same extent that universities do, nor are they as 
inclined to to promote a "robust exchange of ideas," 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 u.s. 589, 603 
(1967). The First Amendment, on which this Court's 
recognition of the State's interest in diversity is 
founded, simply does not have the same force in public 
11/26/85; 5:00 PM DRAFT 
interest asserted here and the 
interestin racial diversity recognized 
" 
n cases such as Washington v. Seattle School District 
• 1, 458 u.s. 457 (1982), and the legitimate inter-
in educational diversity recognized in Bakke, we 
ecline to decide whether the Board has an interest in 
acial diversity in the faculty that will support 
programs that are not premised on reme-
prior discrimination. we reserve this question 
page 19. 
~~~ 




state intere diversity are ~ narrowly 
""' 
tJ()__,(~h_ ~.Lz. _ft.-..~~ 
c 4 
~-A.~~~ ~L,.-r~ze, ~ 
~~~~)~~~~ 
 ~ ~~ ~~~-~-~-~ 
~L-J-r n- 4-<'< ... € ~~.)~ ~ ~ 
~~7~~ 
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~: t:::h-~~·.D c. 
J.o ~ l.l.~ ~ ~ 1-uvv ~ ~ 
Respondents also argue that the 
~;~ 
sion was necessary to provide protection against lay- ~h 
~~ "'~ rtw.. ~· 
off;fin order to accomplish the legitimate goal of ~~~~ 
~ ~.~ 
remedying prior~scrimination.cite*** Get Lain~, ;;J. ~ k 
~-----. ·~ ~~ ~~ 
hiring program instituted to remedy~ discrimina-
tC 
tion ~ould be a constitutionally legitimate purpose 
under even the most exacting scrutiny. In order to 
demonstrate that the Board's OYer~l plan in fact 
qualifies as a remedial effort, it would be necessary 
to demonstrate the existence of the following condi-
tions. 
~r--~ 
First, the overall hiring ~n must have as 
1\ 
its purpose the remedying of prior discrimination by 














ity group. That necessarily requires ~ae ab-se~ 




in court, a determination be made that 
~~ 
prior discrimination. Here, no such finding 
'1. 
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has ever been made, despite the fact that this provi-
sion has been the subject of prior litigation. 
77 ~1 ~,~. In fact, in the prior state court trial, the Board 
denied the existence of~crimination~a~that court 
"1 ., 
attributed the statistical disparity to societal dis-
crimina~ fhe lack of any determination 
action is premised on 
prior discrimination can in part be attributed to the 
unusual procedural history of this case.••••Note how 
said prepared to show 
a determination, the bare assertion that a race-based 
program is "remedial" is insufficient to provide the 
required constitutionally legitimate state purpose. 
The Board also must be able to demonstrate 
that its legitimate goal of remedying prior discrimi-
nation has not already been accomplished. 0~ 
~ce the goal has been ~ accomplished, the 
Board's purpose loses its remedial character and is no 
llj26j85: 5:00 PM DRAFT page 22. 
longer ~onstitutionally sufficient. In the context of 
employment discrimination, the goal of remedying the 
discrimination is accomplished when the discriminatory 
practices are eliminated and when the percentage of 
~ 
I 
victimized minorities in the affected workforce equals 
the percentage of qualified applicants in the relevant 
labor market. Racial classifications enforced past 
the time of accomplishment of the remedy "reinforce 
habitual ways of thinking in terms of classes instead 
of individuals," Fullilove at 547 (stevens) and "delay 
the time when race will become a truly irrelevant, or 
at least insignificant, factor," Id at 545. 
In this case, the DC made no finding of 
whether the percentage of minority faculty in the 
Jackson School District had reached the level of mi-
nority applicantsin the relevant labor market. Thus, 
the DC did not deal with or answer the question 
whether the goal of the Board's legitimate interest in 
(. 
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remedying identified prior discrimination had been 
accomplished. Before us now, the parties hotly dis-
pute this very issue, and submit statistics and argu-
ments in support of both conclusions. But it is not 
for us at this stage to decide this essentially factu-
al question. At any rate, we need not do so because 
of our resolution of the "narrowly tailored" prong of 
analysis. 
chosen to accom-
plish the race-conscious 
11 ~f ~ UA ~~4·~~ uf 
"reasonablenes." That standarc;< pi inly T incorrect. ~ ~ 
av~~,.......p~~x) . ~ ~ 
and 
~e>j~/-LJt.d-..4~-<~~~ c~ ~ 
V1 tZ-· ..e.A Ad.. 1s c es 
1
0apheld so long a~ they are reasonable. Much more 
11/26/85; 5:00 PM DRAFT 
H-.-_ A_ ~b ~~.~1~~~ . ...c,.f ~~. -"V1s( ~ 
is required efore'\ rac1a class1 1Cat1or;.- enga~eu ~n 
~ 1 
pes 
by the State can pos~oiy satisfy the demands of the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
The second prong of analysis in ;{qual ¥rotec-
tion ~e cases requires that, whatever the purpose 
asserted, the means chosen must be narrowly tailored 
to the accomplishment of that purpose . .Fullilove at 
480. "Racial classification are simply too pernicious 
to permit any but the most exact connection between 
justification and classification." !d., at 537 (STE-
VENS, J., dissenting)~ 
(r.h ~r eq u ire men t that. ~ lfte'a·fH't -efts.s e-R--fftl:l ~~ -Se 
"'\ 
o---nar!Oe\Tly tailQ.,J;e-Q ha\ been held to mean that the meth-
od of accomplishing the State's valid purposes must be 
page 24. 
no more intrusive on other interests than necessary to 
accomplish the purpose. Cite~ see also Bakke, supra, 
""' 
at , stating that judicial oversight "assures that 
[the racial classification] will work the least haarm 
11/26/85; 5:00 PM DRAFT page 25. 
possible to the innocent persons competing for the 
benefit." 
We have recognized that in order to remedy 
~ 
the effects of prior discrimination, it may be neces-
~ 
sary to take race into account. 
actually require that race be taken into 
account, see North CArolina Board of Education v. 
Swann, 402 u.s. 43, 46 (1971 • As part of this Na-
tion's fundamental dedication to eradicating racial 
discrimination, some innocent persons~ be called 
upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy. "When 
effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to 
cure the effects of prior discrimination, such a 
'sharing of the burden' by innocent parties is not 
impermissible." Fullilove, supra, at 484, quoting 
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 u.s. 747 
(1976). The ability of Congress in its remedial ca-
pacity to require a limited "sharing of the burden" 
11/26/85; 5:00 PM DRAFT page 26. 
allowed the remedy to stand in Fullilove, where THE 
CHIEF JUSTICE concluded that the "actual burden shoul-
dered by nonminority firms is relatively light." !d., 
f-tu_ ~ 
at 484. In part for that same reason, ~approved the 
hiring program in United Steelworkers of America v. 
Weber, 443 u.S. 193, 208 ( 1979) ("the plan does not 
unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white em-
~ 
ployees"). 
But those cases all involved valid hiring 
goals. In this case, the particular means chosen to 
achieve ~ the purposes discussed supra is that of 
- .Hu. 12.:,~ ~ ~ ~­
laying off innocent teachers~with greater seniority in 
order to retain minority teachers with less seniority. 
e have pr:e¥-H;)~sJ..y 
that must be borne by innocent parties when the chosen 
means is layoffs, see Firefighters Local Union No. 
1784 v. Stotts, 104 s.ct. 2576, 2586, 2588 (1984); 
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the discharge of white workers and their 
placement with new black nJJ.~~~ 
valid ~ goals, the burden to be borne by innocent 
().-~ 
individuals is diffused toAaome~ extent among society 
page 27. 
~~- ~
generally, ana wfienJt does fall on specific individ-
~ ~ 
.aA-- ~ ~ ~ 4. 4 ~'-1~-~ ~ 
uals' it does not;. .it~~pose tl=le- same kiod-o.f -Aarm .that .6.6-=P-1'-e~?=t:l 
1\. 
la¥offs it~~~e. 3 Denial of a future opportunity sim-
~;-u.v;-f,­
ply is not as intrusive as y an existing 
benefit or right. 
burden an innocent person is asked to bear when 
state~him at a disadvantage at the hiring 
1\. 
~~wz...u...~~ 
and when the state takes away h1s job, 
orarily. 
Many of our cases involve union seniority 
_.-7 ~~ 
plans with wage earners heavily dependent on wages for 
their day-to-day living. Loss of their jobs even tern-
porarily means a consequent loss of dignity and self-
respect. A worker may invest many productive years in 
11/26/85; 5:00 PM DRA.FT page 28. 
one job and one city with the expectation of earning 
the stability and security of seniority. "At that 
point, the rights and expectations surrounding senior-
ity make up what is probably the most valuable capital 
asset that the worker "owns," worth even more than the 
current equity in his home." .Fallon and Weiler, Con-
flicting Models of Racial Justice, The Supreme Court 
Review, 1984. 4quote Douglas on work In addition, lay-
offs disrupt settled expectations of innocent workers 
in a way that hiring goals do not. 
~ 
.Finally, as a eooT~ 
1~ -~o ~aci~ prejudice, layof~' far more than 
goals, aeeua~ly may ~avo~the 
~ ~ 
~feet ~f exacerbat~ tension between the races. 
1\ /\ 
While the hiring goals involve a diffuse bur-
den that in some cases may mean only that one of sev-
eral opportunities is foreclosed, layoffs focus the 
entire burden on select, innocent individuals who be-
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almost total disruption of their lives. Layoffs im-
pose too intrusive a burden on innocent persons. As a 
means to accomplish otherwise legitimate State pur-
poses, a layoff plan is not sufficiently narrowly tai-
lored.5 For these reasons, the Roard's selection of 
layoffs as the means of accomplishing even arguably 
valid purposes cannot satisfy the demands of the Equal 
Protection Clause. 6 
mwm 11/26/85 
lThe Solicitor General arg~es that in DeFunis v. 
Odegaard, 416 u.s. 312 (1974), petr Defunis, "a Se-
phardic Jew from a relatively poor background" was 
called upon by society to "sacrifice his aspirations 
for a legal career to serve the greater public good." 
Brief for the United States at 9. The reality demon-
strates the diffuse nature of the "burden" that inno-
cent persons bear in cases involving hiring goals--
DeFunis actually was accepted at the Oregon, Idaho, 
Gonzaga and Willamette Law Schools, 82 Wash. 2d at 30 
n.ll, 507 P.2d at 1181 n.ll. Defunis' harm is not of 
the same kind or degree with the harm that would 
resulted from removing someone from law school in 
their third year. Even that may not approximate the 
harm to a union member from being laid off. 
2"Presumably no one would suggest taking a white 
~; 
~~ ~ home or pension benefits, either to fund a 
J. ~ j..-.-A~ ~7 
:. ~~~,.))}! . 
11/26/85; 5:01 PM DRAFT page 2. 
program of affirmative action or to promote racial 
equality in post retirement income." Fallon and 
Weiler, The Supreme Court Review, 1984. 
lwe have previously recognized that in order to pro-
vide make-whole relief to the actual, identified vic-
~a-...~~ 
tims of individual discrimination, a court may iA aome 
t\ 
~ award competitive seniority. See Franks v. 
Bowman Transportation Co., 424 u.s. 747 (1976). 
4Further evidence that the layoff provision is not 
sufficiently narrowly tailored is the Board's defini-
tion of minority, which included Blacks, Orientals, 
American Indians, and persons of Spanish descent. 
There is no explanantion for why this particular 
grouping of minorities was favored over other, perhaps 
. 11/26/85; 5:01 PM DRAFT page 3. 
equally deserving groups. Nor does the Board explain 
why it is that innocent nonrninorities must lose their 
~/d4_.,~ 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1340 
WENDY WYGANT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JACKSON 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, ETC., ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[December -, 1985] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether a school board 
may extend preferential protection against layoffs to some of 
its employees because of their race or national origin. 
I 
In 1972 the Jackson School Board, because of racial tension 
in the community that extended to its schools, considered 
adding a layoff provision to the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment (CBA) between the Board and the Jackson Education 
Association (the Union) that would protect employees who 
were members of certain minorities against layoffs. 1 The 
Board and the Union eventually approved a new provision, 
Article XII of the CBA, covering layoffs. It stated: 
"In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the 
number of teachers through layoff from employment by 
the Board, teachers with the most seniority in the dis-
1 Prior to bargaining on this subject, the Minority Affairs Office of the 
Jackson Public Schools sent a questionnaire to all teachers, soliciting their 
views as to a layOff policy. The questionnaire proposed two alternatives: 
continuation of the existing straight seniority system, or a freeze of minor-
ity layoffs to ensure retention of minority teachers in exact proportion to 
the minority student population. Ninety-six percent of the teachers who 
responded to the questionnaire expressed a preference for the straight se-
niority system. 
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trict shall be retained, except that at no time will there 
be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off 
than the current percentage of minority personnel em-
ployed at the time of the layoff. In no event will the 
number given notice of possible layoff be greater than 
the number of positions to be eliminated. Each teacher 
so affected will be called back in reverse order for posi-
tions for which he is certified maintaining the above mi-
nority balance." Joint App. 13. 
When layoffs became necessary in 1974, it was evident that 
adherence to the CBA would result in the layoff of tenured 
nonminority teachers while minority teachers on probation-
ary status were retained. Rather than complying with Arti-
cle XII, the Board retained the tenured teachers and laid off 
probationary minority teachers, thus failing to maintain the 
percentage of minority personnel that existed at the time of 
the layoff. The Union, together with two minority teachers 
who had been laid off, brought suit.in federal court, id., at 30, 
(Jackson Education Association v. Board of Education, 
(Jackson I) (mem. op.)), claiming that the Board's failure to 
adhere to the layoff provision violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. They also urged the District Court 
to take pendent jurisdiction over state law contract claims. 
In its answer the Board denied any prior employment dis-
crimination and argued that the layoff provision conflicted 
with the Michigan Teacher Tenure Act. Following trial, the 
District Court sua sponte concluded that it lacked jurisdiction 
over the case, in part because there was no evidence to sup-
port the plaintiffs' claim that the Board had engaged in dis-
criminatory hiring practices prior to 1972, id., at 35, and in 
part because the plaintiffs had not fulfilled the jurisdictional 
prerequisite to a Title VII claim by filing discrimination 
charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
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sion. After dismissing the federal claims, the District Court 
declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law 
contract claims. 
Rather than taking an appeal, the plaintiffs instituted a 
suit in state court, Jackson Education Association v. Board 
of Education, No. 77-0011484CZ (Jackson County Circuit 
Court, 1979) (Jackson II), raising in essence the same claims 
that had been raised in Jackson I. In entering judgment for 
the plaintiffs, the state court found that the Board had 
breached its contract with the plaintiffs, and that Article XII 
did not violate the Michigan Teacher Tenure Act. In reject-
ing the Board's argument that the layoff provision violated 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the state court found that it 
"had not been established that the Board had discriminated 
against minorities in its hiring practices. The minority 
representation on the faculty was the result of societal racial 
discrimination." Joint App. 43. The state court also found 
that "[t]here is no history of overt past discrimination by the · 
parties to this contract." I d., at 49. Nevertheless, the 
court held that Article XII was permissible, despite its dis-
criminatory effect on nonminority teachers, as an attempt to 
remedy the effects of societal discrimination. 
After Jackson II, the Board adhered to Article XII. As a 
result, during the 1976-1977 and 1981-:1982 school years, 
nonminority teachers were laid off, while minority teachers 
with less seniority were retained. The displaced nonminor-
ity teachers, petitioners here, brought suit in federal district 
court, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause, 
Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and other federal and state 
statutes. On cross motions for summary judgment, the Dis-
trict Court dismissed all of petitioners' claims. With respect 
to the equal protection claim, 2 the District Court held that 
the racial preferences granted by the Board need not be 
grounded on a finding of prior discrimination. Instead, the 
2 Petitioners have sought review in this Court only of their claim based 
on the Equal Protection Clause. 
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court decided that the racial preferences were permissible 
under the Equal Protection Clause as an attempt to remedy 
societal discrimination by providing "role models" for minor-
ity' schoolchildren, and upheld the constitutionality of the lay-
off provision. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, 
largely adopting the reasoning and language of the District 
Court. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 746 F. 2d 
1152 (1984). We granted certiorari, 471 U. S. -- (1985), to 
resolve the important issue of the constitutionality of race-
based layoffs by public employees. We now reverse. 
II 
Petitioners' central claim is that they were laid off because 
of their race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Decisions by faculties and admin-
istrators of public schools based on race or ethnic origin are 
reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 While this 
Court has "consistently repudiated '[d]istinctions between 
citizens· solely because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to a 
free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine 
of equality,"' Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967) quot-
ing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943), 
"[t]hat is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitu-
tional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most 
rigid scrutiny." Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 
216 (1944). "Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are in-
herently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial 
examination." Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 291 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J., 
joined by WHITE, J.) 
In the context of affirmative action, it has previously been 
recognized that "[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic 
3 School district collective bargaining agreements constitute state action 
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Abood v. Detroit Board of 
Ed., 431 U. S. 209, 218, and n. 12 (1977). 
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criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examina-
tion to make sure that it does not conflict with constitutional 
guarantees." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 491 
(1980) (opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE). There are two 
prongs to this examination. First, the racial classification 
must be justified by a sufficiently important state purpose. 
Second, the means chosen by the State to effectuate its pur-
pose must be "narrowly tailored to the achievement of that 
goal." I d., at 480. We must therefore decide whether the 
layoff provision is supported by a sufficiently important State 
purpose and whether the means chosen to accomplish that 
purpose are narrowly tailored. 
III 
A 
The Court of Appeals, relying on the reasoning and lan-
guage of the District Court's opinion, held that the Board's 
interest in providing minority role models for its minority 
students, as an attempt to alleviate the effects of societal dis-
crimination, was sufficiently important to justify the racial 
classification embodied in the layoff provision. Wygant, 746 
F . 2d, at 1156-1157. The court discerned a need for more 
minority faculty role models by finding that the percentage of 
minority teachers was less than the percentage of minority 
students. I d., at 1156. 
This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone 
is sufficient to justify a racial classification. Rather, the 
Court has insisted upon proven instances of prior discrimina-
tion by the governmental unit involved before allowing lim-
ited use of racial classifications in order to remedy such dis-
crimination. In Hazelwood School District v. United States, 
433 U. S. 299 (1977), this Court reasoned that, absent em-
ployment discrimination by the school board, "hiring prac-
tices [would have] result[ed] in a work force more or less rep-
r.esentative of the racial and ethnic composition of the 
population in the community from which the employees are 
..... -f 
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hired." !d., at 307, quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 
U. S. 324, 340 n. 20 (1977). Based on that reasoning, the 
Court held that the proper comparison for determining the 
existence of actual discrimination by the school board was 
"between the racial composition of [the school's] teaching 
staff and the racial composition of the qualified public school 
teacher population in the relevant market." I d., at 308. 
Hazelwood demonstrates this Court's focus on proven prior 
discrimination as the justification for, and the limitation on, a 
state's adoption of race-based remedies. 
Unlike the analysis in Hazelwood, the role model theory 
employed by the District Court has no logical stopping point. 
The role model theory allows the Board to engage in discrimi-
natory hiring and layoff practices long past the point required 
by any legitimate remedial purpose. Indeed, by tying the 
required percentage of minority teachers to the percentage of 
minority students, it requires just the sort of year-to-year 
calibration the Court stated was unnecessary in Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 
31-32 (1971): 
"At some point these school authorities and others like 
them should have achieved full compliance with this 
Court's decision in Brown I. . . . Neither school au-
thorities nor district courts are constitutionally required 
to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial compo-
sition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to de-
segregate has been accomplished and racial discrimina-
tion through official action is eliminated from the 
system." 
Moreover, because the role model theory does not neces-
sarily bear a relationship to the harm caused by prior dis-
criminatory hiring practices, it actually could be used to es-
cape the obligation to remedy such practices by justifying the 
small percentage of black teachers by reference to the small 
percentage of black students. See United States v. 
Hazelwood School District, 392 F. Supp. 1276, 1286-1287 
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(ED Mo. 1975), rev'd, 534 F. 2d 805 (CA8 1976), rev'd andre-
manded, Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 
U. S. 299 (1977). Carried to its logical extreme, the idea 
that black students are better off with black teachers could 
lead to the very system the Court rejected in Brown v. Board 
of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) (Brown I). 
Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a 
basis for finding race-conscious state action and for imposing 
a racially classified remedy. The role model theory annunci-
ated by the District Court and the resultant holding typify 
this indefiniteness. There are numerous explanations for a 
disparity between the percentage of minority students and 
the percentage of minority faculty, many of them completely 
unrelated to discrimination of any kind. 4 In fact, there is no 
apparent connection between the two groups. N everthe-
less, the District Court combined irrelevant comparisons be-
tween these two groups with an indisputable statement that 
there has been societal discrimination, and upheld state ac-
tion predicated upon racial classifications. No one doubts 
that there has been serious racial discrimination in this coun-
try. But as the basis for imposing discriminatory legal rem-
edies that work against innocent people, it is insufficient and 
over expansive: without any particularized findings, a court 
can uphold remedies that are ageless in their reach into the 
past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future. 
B 
Respondents argue that the State purpose behind the lay-
off provision can be viewed more broadly as an attempt to 
provide for a diverse faculty. Respondents cite school de-
segregation cases for the proposition that all children "benefit 
from exposure to 'ethnic and racial diversity in the class-
room."' Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 
U. S. 457, 472 (1982), quoting Columbus Board of Education 
' Such explanations include influx of new minority group~ Md char see cz 
ift 4lhe stt engot;h of eel'tftift iBEh:tst:P~ • 
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v. Penick, 443 U. S. 449, 486 (1979) (POWELL, J., dissent-
ing). These decisions recognize that the state has a valid in-
terest in a racially diverse student body, and respondents 
make the plausible argument that the state has an equally 
valid interest in a racially diverse faculty. But the racial 
classifications in the desegregation cases were designed to 
remedy identifiable prior unconstitutional discrimination, 
while respondents suggest that the Board's purpose to 
achieve diversity is valid even in the absence of prior dis-
crimination. Brief for Respondents 28. 
We need not decide if this purpose is sufficiently important 
to justify the Board's adoption of the racial classification be-
cause, as we conclude below, the means selected are not nar-
rowly tailored toward that end. We leave open the question 
whether the state's interest in diversity, if pursued through a 
less intrusive means, ever could be sufficiently important to 
satisfy the demand of the Equal Protection Clause. 5 
c 
Respondents also now argue that their purpose in adopting 
the layoff provision was to remedy prior discrimination 
against minorities by the Jackson School District in hiring 
teachers. For such a remedial purpose to be constitutionally 
valid, a factual determination must have been made, either 
by the Board or by a court, that the Board engaged in pur-
poseful discrimination. Without such a finding, an appellate 
~ As further support for their asserted interest in a diverse faculty, re-
spondents rely on Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 
311-312 (opinion of POWELL, J.), which recognized that the state has ale-
gitimate interest in the diversity of the student body at its colleges and uni-
versities. Unlike respondents asserted interest, the interest identified in 
Bakke was not limited to racial or ethnic diversity. The interest was le-
gitimate because it was premised on the far broader view that a person's 
race would simply be one factor among many in an attempt to identify 
those individual characteristics that contribute to a richer learning environ-
ment. I d., at 318. Thus, development of that interest did not foreclose 
any opportunity to compete for the relevant benefit simply because of race. 
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court reviewing a challenge to such action cannot determine 
if the the race-based action is justified as a remedy for prior 
discrimination. In this case, despite the fact that Article 
XII of the CBA has spawned years of litigation and three 
separate lawsuits, no such finding ever has been made. Al-
though the litigation position of the Board was different in 
Jackson I and Jackson II, it has previously denied the exist-
ence of prior discriminatory hiring practices. This precise 
issue was litigated in both those suits. Both courts con-
cluded that any statistical disparities were the result of gen-
eral societal discrimination, not of prior discrimination by the 
Board. The Board now contends either that a finding of 
prior discrimination is unnecessary, or that, given another 
opportunity, it could establish the existence of prior dis- · 
crimination. As to its first argument, the Board is mis-
taken. While its second argument is belated, we need not 
consider the question since we conclude below that the layoff 
provision was not a narrowly tailored means of achieving 
even a valid purpose. 6 
IV 
The Court of Appeals examined the means chosen to ac-
complish the Board's race-conscious purposes under a test of 
"reasonableness." That standard has no suppo~ in the deci-
sions of this Court. As demonstrated in Part II above, our 
decisions always have employed a more stringent standard-
however articulated-to test the validity of the means chosen 
by a state to accomplish its race-conscious purposes. See, 
e. g., Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 480 (opinion of THE CHIEF Jus-
6 Similarly, the record does not disclose whether or not the Board's as-
serted goal of remedying prior discrimination already has been accom-
plished. Even iflegitimate at the outset, such a purpose loses its remedial 
character once the initial goal is accomplished. Racial classifications en-
forced beyond this point "reinforce habitual ways of thinking in terms of 
classes instead of individuals," Fullilove v. Klutznick , 448 U. S. 448, 547 
(1980) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) and "delay the time when race will become 
a truly irrelevant, or at least insignificant, factor" id., at 545. 
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TICE) ("We recognize the need for careful judicial evaluation 
to assure that any ... program that employs racial or ethnic 
criteria to accomplish the objective of remedying the present 
effects of past discrimination is narrowly tailored to the 
achievement of that goal"); Bakke, 438 U. S., at 362 (opinion 
of BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., re-
quiring a "strict and searching judicial inquiry" even at the 
intermediate level of scrutiny.) Whatever the purpose as-
serted to justify a racial preference, the means chosen must 
be narrowly tailored to the accomplishment of that purpose. 
Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 480 (opinion of THE CHIEF Jus-
TICE). 7 "Racial classifications are simply too pernicious to 
permit any but the most exact connection between justifica-
tion and classification." I d., at 537 (STEVENS, J., 
dissenting). 
We have recognized, however, that in order to remedy the 
effects of prior discrimination, it may be necessary to take 
race into account. As part of this Nation's dedication to 
eradicating racial discrimination, innocent persons may be 
called upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy. 
7 Several commentators have insisted, no matter what the weight of the 
asserted governmental purpose, that the means chosen to accomplish the 
purpose be narrowly tailored. In arguing for a form of intermediate scru-
tiny, Professor Greenawalt contends that, "while benign racial classifica-
tions call for some weighing of the importance of ends they call for even 
more intense scrutiny of means, especially of the administrability of less 
onerous alternative classifications." Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Be-
nign" Racial preference in Law School Admissions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 
559, 565 (1975). Professor Ely has suggested that "special scrutiny in the 
suspect classification context has in fact consisted not in weighing ends but 
rather in insisting that the classification in issue fit a constitutional permis-
sible state goal with greater precision than any available alternative." 
Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
723, 727 n. 26 (1974). Professor Gunther argues that judicial scrutiny of 
legislative means is more appropriate than judicial weighing of the impor-
tance of the legislative purpose. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolv-
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protec-
. tion, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 20-21 (1972). 
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"When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to 
cure the effects of prior discrimination, such a 'sharing of the 
burden' by innocent parties is not impermissible." I d., at 
484, quoting Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 
U. S. 747 (1976). In Fullilove, the challenged statute re-
quired at least ten percent of federal public works funds to be 
used in contracts with minority-owned business enterprises. 
This requirement was found to be within the remedial powers 
of Congress in part because the "actual burden shouldered by 
nonminority firms is relatively light." Ibid. Similarly, the 
Court approved the hiring program in United Steelworkers of 
America v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 208 (1979), in part because 
the plan did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of the 
white employees." 8 
Significantly, the cases discussed above all involved hiring 
goals. Here, by contrast, the means chosen to achieve the 
Board's asserted purposes is that of laying off nonminority 
teachers with greater seniority in order to retain minority 
teachers with less seniority. We have previously expressed 
concern over the burden that a preferential layoffs scheme 
imposes on innocent parties. See Firefighters Local Union 
No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2586, 2588 (1984); see also 
Weber, supra, at 208 ("The plan does not require the qi,:3-
charge of white workers and their replacement with new 
black hirees"). In cases involving valid hiring goals, the 
burden to be borne by innocent individuals is diffused to a 
considerable extent among society generally. Though hiring 
goals may burden some innocent individuals, they simply do 
not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs impose. De-
8 Since Weber involved a private company, its reasoning concerning the 
validity of the hiring plan at issue there is not directly relevant to this case, 
which involves a state-imposed plan. No equal protection claim was pre-
sented in Weber. Absent a finding of discrimination as in Fullilove, we 
have had no occasion to consider whether a fixed quota of hiring preference 
comports with the Equal Protection Clause. Such a quota is to be distin-
guished from hiring goals adopted as a means of achieving a fairer and 
more balanced workforce. 
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nial of a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive as 
loss of an existing job. 
Many of our cases involve union seniority plans with em-
ployees who are typically heavily dependent on wages for 
their day-to-day living. Even a temporary layoff may have 
adverse psychological as well as financial effects. A worker 
may invest many productive years in one job and one city 
with the expectation of earning the stability and security of 
seniority. "At that point, the rights and expectations sur-
rounding seniority make up what is probably the most valu-
able capital asset that the worker 'owns,' worth even more 
than the current equity in his home." Fallon and Weiler, 
Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 
58. Layoffs disrupt these settled expectations in a way that 
general hiring goals do not. 
While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclos-
ing only one of several opportunities, 9 layoffs impose the en-
tire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individ-
uals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives. 
That burden is too intrusive. We therefore hold that, as a 
means of accomplishing otherwise legitimate State purposes, 
a layoff plan is not sufficiently narrowly tailored. 10 Other, 
less intrusive means of accomplishing the same goals-such 
9 For example, in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (197.4) while peti-
tioner's complaint alleged that he had been denied admission to the Univer-
sity of Washington Law School because of his race, he also had been ac-
cepted at the Oregon, Idaho, Gonzaga and Willamette Law Schools. 
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 30 n. 11, 507 P. 2d 1169, 1181 n. 11. 
The injury to Defunis' was not of the same kind or degree as the injury that 
he would have suffered had he been removed from law school in his third 
year. Even this analogy may not rise to the level of harm suffered by a 
union member who is laid off. 
10 We have previously recognized that, in order to provide make-whole 
relief to the actual, identified victims of individual discrimination, a court 
may in an appropriate case award competitive seniority. See Franks v. 
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976). 
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as the Board's hiring program in this case-are available. 11 
For these reasons, the Board's selection of layoffs as the 
means to accomplish even a valid purpose cannot satisfy the 
demands of the Equal Protection Clause. 12 
v 
We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
11 "[Courts] should give particularly intense scrutiny to whether a nonra-
cial approach or a more narrowly tailored racial classification could pro-
mote the substantial interest about as well and at tolerable administrative 
expense." Greenawalt, supra, at 578-579. 
12 Further evidence that the layoff provision is not sufficiently narrowly 
tailored is the Board's definition of minority, which included Blacks, Orien-
tals, American Indians, and persons of Spanish descent. There is no 
explanantion for why the Board chose to favor these particular minorities. 
Moreover, respondents have never suggested-much less formally found-
that they have engaged in prior, purposeful discrimination against mem-
bers of each of these minority groups. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether a school board 
may extend preferential protection against layoffs to some of 
its employees because of their race or national origin. 
I 
In 1972 the Jackson School Board, because of racial ten-
sion in the community that extended to its schools, consid-
ered adding a layoff provision to the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement (CBA) between the Board and the Jackson Edu-
cation Association (the Union) that would protect employees 
who were members of certain minorities against layoffs. 1 
The Board and the Union eventually approved a new pro-
vision, Article XII of the CBA, covering layoffs. It 
stated: 
"In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the 
number of teachers through layoff from employment by 
1 Prior to bargaining on this subject, the Minority Affairs Office of the 
Jackson Public Schools sent a questionnaire to all teachers, soliciting their 
views as to a layoff policy. The questionnaire proposed two alternatives: 
continuation of the existing straight seniority system, or a freeze of minor-
ity layoffs to ensure retention of minority teachers in exact proportion to 
the minority student population. Ninety-six percent of the teachers who 





2 WYGANT v. JACKSON BOARD OF EDUCATION 
the Board, teachers with the most seniority in the dis-
trict shall be retained, except that at no time will there 
be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off 
than the current percentage of minority personnel em-
ployed at the time of the layoff. In no event will the 
number given notice of possible layoff be greater than 
the number of positions to be eliminated. Each teacher 
so affected will be called back in reverse order for posi-
tions for which he is certified maintaining the above mi-
nority balance." Joint App. 13.2 
When layoffs became necessary in 1974, it was evident that 
adherence to the CBA would result in the layoff of tenured 
nonminority teachers while minority teachers on probation-
ary status were retained. Rather than complying with Arti-
cle XII, the Board retained the tenured teachers and laid off 
probationary minority teachers, thus failing to maintain the 
percentage of minority personnel that existed at the time of 
the layoff. The Union, together with two minority teachers 
who had been laid off, brought suit in federal court, id., at 30, 
(Jackson Education Association v. Board of Education, 
(Jackson I) (mem. op.)), claiming that the Board's failure to 
adhere to the layoff provision violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. They also urged the District Court 
to take pendent jurisdiction over state law contract claims. 
In its answer the Board denied any prior employment dis-
crimination and argued that the layoff provision conflicted 
with the Michigan Teacher Tenure Act. Joint App. 33. 
Following trial, the District Court sua sponte concluded that 
it lacked jurisdiction over the case, in part because there was 
insufficient evidence to support the plaintiffs' claim that the 
Board had engaged in discriminatory hiring practices prior to 
1972, id., at 35-37, and in part because the plaintiffs had not 
2 Article VII of the CBA defined "minority group personnel" as "those \. 
employees who are Black, American Indian, Oriental, or of Spanish 
descendancy." Joint App. 15. 
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fulfilled the jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII claim by 
filing discrimination charges with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission. Mter dismissing the federal 
claims, the District Court declined to exercise pendent juris-
diction over the state law contract claims. 
Rather than taking an appeal, the plaintiffs instituted a 
suit in state court, Jackson Education Association v. Board 
of Education, No. 77-011484CZ (Jackson County Circuit 
Court, 1979) (Jackson II), raising in essence the same claims 
that had been raised in Jackson I. In entering judgment for 
the plaintiffs, the state court found that the Board had 
breached its contract with the plaintiffs, and that Article XII 
did not violate the Michigan Teacher Tenure Act. In reject-
ing the Board's argument that the layoff provision violated 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the state court found that it 
"had not been established that the Board had discriminated 
against minorities in its hiring practices. The minority 
representation on the faculty was the result of societal racial 
discrimination." Joint App. 43. The state court also found 
that "(t]here is no history of overt past discrimination by the 
parties to this contract." Id., at 49. Nevertheless, the 
court held that Article XII was permissible, despite its dis-
criminatory effect on nonminority teachers, as an attempt to 
remedy the effects of societal discrimination. 
Mter Jackson II, the Board adhered to Article XII. As a 
result, during the 1976-1977 and 1981-1982 school years, 
nonminority teachers were laid off, while minority teachers 
with less seniority were retained. The displaced nonminor-
ity teachers, petitioners here, brought suit in federal district 
court, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause, 
Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and other federal and state 
statutes. On cross motions for summary judgment, the Dis-
trict Court dismissed all of petitioners' claims. With respect 
to the equal protection claim, 3 the District Court held that 
3 Petitioners have sought review in this Court only of their claim based 
on the Equal Protection Clause. 
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the racial preferences granted by the Board need not be 
grounded on a finding of prior discrimination. Instead, the 
court decided that the racial preferences were permissible 
under the Equal Protection Clause as an attempt to remedy 
societal discrimination by providing "role models" for minor-
ity schoolchildren, and upheld the constitutionality of the lay-
off provision. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, 
largely adopting the reasoning and language of the District 
Court. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 746 F. 2d 
1152 (1984). We granted certiorari, 471 U. S. -- (1985), to 
resolve the important issue of the constitutionality of race-
based layoffs by public employees. We now reverse. 
II 
Petitioners' central claim is that they were laid off because 
of their race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Decisions by faculties and admin-
istrators of public schools based on race or ethnic origin are 
reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 While this 
Court has "consistently repudiated '[d]istinctions between 
citizens solely because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to a 
free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine 
of equality,"' Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967) quot-
ing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943), 
"[t]hat is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitu-
tional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most 
rigid scrutiny." Korematsu v. United, States, 323 U. S. 214, 
216 (1944). "Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are in-
herently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial 
examination." Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke, 438 U. 8. 265, 291 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J., 
joined by WHITE, J.) 
• School district collective bargaining agreements constitute state action 
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Abood v. Detroit Board of 
Ed., 431 U. S. 209, 218, and n. 12 (1977). 
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In the context of affirmative action, it has previously been 
recognized that "[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic 
criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examina-
tion to make sure that it does not conflict with constitutional 
guarantees." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 491 
(1980) (opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE). There are two 
prongs to this examination. First, the racial classification 
must be justified by a sufficiently important state purpose. 
Second, the means chosen by the State to effectuate its pur-
pose must be "narrowly tailored to the achievement of that 
goal." Id., at 480. We must therefore decide whether the 
layoff provision is supported by a sufficiently important State 
purpose and whether the means chosen to accomplish that 
purpose are narrowly tailored. 
III 
A 
The Court of Appeals, relying on the reasoning and lan-
guage of the District Court's opinion, held that the Board's 
interest in providing minority role models for its minority 
students, as an attempt to alleviate the effects of societal dis-
crimination, was sufficiently important to justify the racial 
classification embodied in the layoff provision. Wygant, 746 
F. 2d, at 1156-1157. The court discerned a need for more 
minority faculty role mode1s by finding that the percentage of 
minority teachers was less than the percentage of minority 
students. I d., at 1156. 
This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone 
is sufficient to justify a racial classification. Rather, the 
Court has insisted upon a showing of prior discrimination by 
the governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of 
racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination. 
This Court's reasoning in Hazelwood School District v. ( 
United States, 433 U. S. 299 (1977), illustrates that the rele-
vant analysis in cases involving proof of discrimination 
by statistical disparity focuses on those disparities that dem-
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onstrate such prior governmental discrimination. In 
Hazelwood the Court concluded that, absent employment dis-
crimination by the school board, "nondiscriminatory hiring 
practices will in time result in a work force more or less rep-
resentative of the racial and ethnic composition of the popula-
tion in the community from which the employees are hired." 
Id., at 307, quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 
324, 340 n. 20 (1977). Based on that reasoning, the Court 
held that the proper comparison for determining the exist-
ence of actual discrimination by the school board was "be-
tween the racial composition of [the sch~ol's] teaching staff 
and the racial composition of the qualified public school 
teacher population in the relevant market." I d., at 308. 
Hazelwood demonstrates this Court's focus on prior discrimi-
nation as the justification for, and the limitation on, a state's 
adoption of race-based remedies. See also Swann v. Char-\ 
lotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971). 
Unlike the analysis in Hazelwood, the role model theory 
employed by the District Court has no logical stopping point. 
The role model theory allows the Board to engage in· discrimi-
natory hiring and layoff practices long past the point required 
by any legitimate remedial purpose. Indeed, by tying the 
required percentage of minority teachers to the percentage of 
minority students, it requires just the sort of year-to-year 
calibration the Court stated was unnecessary in Swann, 
supra, at 31-32: 
"At some point these school authorities and others like 
them 'Should have achieved full compliance with this 
Court's decision in Brown I . . . . Neither school au-
thorities nor district courts are constitutionally required 
to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial compo-
sition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to de-
segregate has been accomplished and racial discrimina-
tion through official action is eliminated from the 
system." 
See also id., at 24. 
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Moreover, because the role model theory does not neces-
sarily bear a relationship to the harm caused by prior dis-
criminatory hiring practices, it actually could be used to es-
cape the obligation to remedy such practices by justifying the 
small percentage of black teachers by reference to the small 
percentage of black students. See United States v. 
Hazelwood School District, 392 F. Supp. 1276, 1286-1287 
(ED Mo. 1975), rev'd, 534 F. 2d 805 (CAS 1976), rev'd and 
remanded, Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 
U. S. 299 (1977). Carried to its logical extreme, the idea 
that black students are better off with black teachers could 
lead to the very system the Court rejected in Brown v. Board 
of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1). 
Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a 
basis for finding race-conscious state action and for imposing 
a racially classified remedy. The role model theory an-
nounced by the District Court and the resultant holding 
typify this indefiniteness. There are numerous explanations 
for a disparity between the percentage of minority students 
and the percentage of minority faculty, many of them com-
pletely unrelated to discrimination of any kind. In fact, 
there is no apparent connection between the two groups. 
Nevertheless, the District Court combined irrelevant com-
parisons between these two groups with an indisputable 
· statement that there has been societal discrimination, and 
upheld state action predicated upon racial classifications. 
No one doubts that there has been serious racial discrimina-
tion in this country. But as the basis for imposing discrimi-
natory legal remedies that work against innocent people, it is 
insufficient and over expansive: without any particularized 
findings, a court can uphold remedies that are ageless in their 
reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the ( 
future. 
B 
Respondents also now argue that their purpose in adopting 
the layoff provision was to remedy prior discrimination 
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against minorities by the Jackson School District in hiring 
teachers. For such a remedial purpose to be constitutionally 
valid when it involves State action, a factual determination 
must be made, either by the Board or by a court, that the 
Board engaged in purposeful discrimination in violation of the 
Constitution or an applicable federal statute. Such aJinding 
need not be contemporaneous with the instigation br the af-
firmative action program. But in the absence of a finding of 
discrimination, an appellate court reviewing a challenge to 
such action cannot determine if the the race-based action is 
justified as a remedy for prior discrimination. In this case, 
despite the fact that Article XII of the CBA has spawned 
years of litigation and three separate lawsuits, no such find-
ing ever has been made. Although the litigation position of 
the Board was different in Jackson I and Jackson II, it de-
nied the existence of prior discriminatory hiring practices. 
Joint App. 33. This precise issue was litigated in both those 
suits. Both courts concluded that any statistical disparities 
were the result of general societal discrimination, not of prior 
discrimination by the Board. The Board now contends 
either that a finding of prior discrimination is unnecessary, or 
that, given another opportunity, it could establish the exist-
ence of prior discrimination. As to its first argument, the 
Board is mistaken. While its second argument is belated, 
we need not consider the question since we conclude below 
that the layoff provision was not a legally appropriate means 1 
of achieving even a valid purpose. 5 
6 Similarly, the record does not disclose whether or not the Board's as-
serted goal of remedying prior discrimination already has been accom-
plished. Even if legitimate at the outset in 1972, supra, at 1, such a pur-
pose loses its remedial character once the initial goal is accomplished. 
Racial classifications enforced beyond this point "reinforce habitual ways of 
thinking in terms of classes instead of individuals," Fullilove v. Klutznick, 
448 U. S. 448, 547 (1980) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) and "delay the time 
when race will become a truly irrelevant, or at least insignificant, factor" 
id., at 545. 
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IV 
The Court of Appeals examined the means chosen to ac-
complish the Board's race-conscious purposes under a test of 
"reasonableness." That standard has no support in the deci-
sions of this Court. As demonstrated in Part II above, our 
decisions always have employed a more stringent standard-
however articulated-to test the validity of the means chosen 
by a state to accomplish its race-conscious purposes. See, 
e. g., Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 480 (opinion of THE CHIEF Jus-
TICE) ("We recognize the need for careful judicial evaluation 
to assure that any ... program that employs racial or ethnic 
criteria to accomplish the objective of remedying the present 
effects of past discrimination is narrowly tailored to the 
achievement of that goal") 6; Bakke, 438 U. S., at 362 (opin-
ion of BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., 
requiring a "strict and searching judicial inquiry" even at the 
intermediate level of scrutiny.) Whatever the purpose as-
serted to justify a racial preference, the means chosen must 
be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that pur-
pose. Fullilove, 448 U. S. , at 480 (opinion of THE CHIEF 
JUSTICE). 7 "Racial classifications are simply too pernicious 
6 The term "narrowly tailored," so frequently used in our cases, has ac-
quired a secondary meaning. More specifically, as commentators have in-
dicated, the term may be used to require consideration whether lawful al-
ternative and less restrictive means could have been used. Or, as 
Professor Ely has noted, the classification at issue must "fit" with greater 
precision than any alternative means. Ely, The Constitutionality of Re-
verse Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 727 n. 26 (1974) (hereinafter 
Ely). "[Courts] should give particularly intense scrutiny to whether a 
nonracial approach or a more narrowly tailored racial classification could 
promote the substantial interest about as well and at tolerable adminis-
trative expense." Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial 
Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 578-579 
(1975) (hereinafter Greenawalt). 
7 Several commentators have emphasized, no matter what the weight of 
the asserted governmental purpose, that the means chosen to accomplish 
the purpose be narrowly tailored. In arguing for a form of intermediate 
scrutiny, Professor Greenawalt contends that, "while benign racial classifi-
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to permit any but the most exact connection between justifi-
cation and classification." Id., at 537 (STEVENS, J., 
dissenting). 
We have recognized, however, that in order to remedy the 
effects of prior discrimimp:.ion, it may be necessary to take 
race into account. As •part of this Nation's dedication to 
eradicating racial discrimination, innocent persons may be 
called upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy. 
"When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to 
cure the effects of prior discrimination, such a 'sharing of the 
burden' by innocent parties is not impermissible." Id., at 
484, quoting Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 
U. S. 747 (1976). In Fullilove, the challenged statute re-
quired at least ten percent of federal public works funds to be 
used in contracts with minority-owned business enterprises. 
This requirement was found to be within the remedial powers 
of Congress in part because the "actual burden shouldered by 
nonminority firms is relatively light." Ibid. Similarly, the 
Court approved the hiring program in United Steelworkers of 
America v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 208 (1979), in part because 
the plan did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of the 
white employees." 8 
cations call for some weighing of the importance of ends they call for even 
more intense scrutiny of means, especially of the administrability of less 
onerous alternative classifications." Greenawalt 565. Professor Ely has 
suggested that "special scrutiny in the suspect classification context has in 
fact consisted not in weighing ends but rather in insisting that the classifi-
cation in issue fit a constitutional permissible state goal with greater preci-
sion than any available alternative." Ely 727 n. 26. Professor Gunther 
argues that judicial scrutiny of legislative means is more appropriate than 
judicial weighing of the importance of the legislative purpose. Gunther, 
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model 
For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 20-21 (1972). 
8 Since Weber involved a private company, its reasoning concerning the 
validity of the hiring plan at issue there is not directly relevant to this case, 
which involves a state-imposed plan. No equal protection claim was pre-
sented in Weber. Absent a finding of discrimination as in Fullilove, we 
have had no occasion to consider whether a fixed quota of hiring preference 
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Significantly, the cases discussed above all involved hiring 
goals. Here, by contrast, the means chosen to achieve the 
Board's asserted purposes is that of laying off nonminority 
teachers with greater seniority in order to retain minority 
teachers with less seniority. We have previously expressed 
concern over the burden that a preferential layoffs scheme 
imposes on innocent parties. See Firefighters Local Union 
No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2586, 2588 (1984); see also 
Weber, supra, at 208 ("The plan does not require the dis-
charge of white workers and their replacement with new 
black hirees"). In cases involving valid hiring goals, the 
burden to be borne by innocent individuals is diffused to a 
considerable extent among society generally. Though hiring 
goals may burden some innocent individuals, they simply do 
not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs impose. De-
nial of a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive as 
loss of an existing job. 
Many of our cases involve union seniority plans with em-
ployees who are typicaliy heavily dependent on wages for 
their day-to-day living. Even a temporary layoff may have 
adverse psychological as well as financial effects. A worker 
may invest many productive years in one job and one city 
with the expectation of earning the stability and security of 
seniority. "At that point, the rights and expectations sur-
rounding seniority make up what is probably the most valu-
able capital asset that the worker 'owns,' worth even more 
than the current equity in his home." Fallon and Weiler, 
Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 
58. Layoffs disrupt these settled expectations in a way that 
general hiring goals do not. 
comports with the Equal Protection Clause. Such a quota [requiring that ( 
only specified minorities be employed until the quota is reached and main-
tained] is to be distinguished from hiring goals adopted as a means of 
achieving a fairer and more balanced workforce. 
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While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclos-
ing only one of several opportunities, 9 layoffs impose the en-
tire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individ-
uals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives . 
. • That burden is too intrusive. We therefore hold that, as a 
, ~ means of accomplishing purposes that otherwise may be le-
gitimate, the Board's layoff plan is not sufficiently narrowly 
tailored. 10 Other, less intrusive means of accomplishing sim-
ilar purposes-such as the adoption of hiring goals-are \ 
available. For these reasons, the Board's selection of layoffs 
as the means to accomplish even a valid purpose cannot sat-
isfy the demands of the Equal Protection Clause. 11 
v 
We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
9 For example, in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (1974) while peti-
tioner's complaint alleged that he had been denied admission to the Univer-
sity of Washington Law School because of his race, he also had been 
accepted at the Oregon, Idaho, Gonzaga and Willamette Law Schools. 
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 30 n. 11, 507 P. 2d 1169, 1181 n. 11. 
The injury to Defunis' was not of the same kind or degree as the injury that 
he would have suffered had he been removed from law school in his third 
year. Even this analogy may not rise to the level of harm suffered by a 
union member who is laid off. 
10 We have recognized, however, that in order to provide make-whole 
relief to the actual, identified victims of individual discrimination, a court 
may in an appropriate case award competitive seniority. See Franks v. 
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976). 
11 Further evidence that the layoff provision is not a legitimate means is 
the Board's definition of minority to include Blacks, Orientals, American 
Indians, and persons of Spanish descent, supra, at -- n. 2. There is no 
explanantion for why the Board chose to favor these particular minorities 
or how in fact members of some of the categories can be identified. More- I 
over, respondents have never suggested-much less formally found-that 
they have engaged in prior, purposeful discrimination against members of 
each of these minority groups. 
03/27 To: The Chief Justice 5 b 1- C.. 
Justice Brennan 
Justice White lf1.1.- '3 / Z $ /f' 
Justice Marshall ~ ltJ 
Justice Blackmun f 
Justice Rehnquist ~/'"t-PlA.. 
Justice Stevens 
Justice O'Connor 
From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: __________ _ 
Recirculated: _______ __ _ 
,.~· 3rd DRAFT 
~ ...,~SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
~ ~~p~ No.84-1340 
{~ ~ 
I ' ~ ":J.~ ~NDY WYGANT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JACKSON 
S ~ .,., .(vf"' P' BOARD OF EDUCATION, ETC., ET AL. 
'... ~ ~~ ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
-  APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT v. ~ JY [March-, 1986] 
~ · ~ ~ ~ J ~ JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
fJ'I' _v,.,.., 1 This case presents the question whether a school board 
j f"" -. ~I may extend preferential protection against layoffs to some of r;,r its employees because of their! race or national origin. 
In 1972 the Jackson School Board, because of racial tension 
in the community that extended to its schools, considered 
adding a layoff provision to the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment (CBA) between the Board and the Jackson Education 
Association (the Union) that would protect employees who 
were members of certain minorities against layoffs. 1 The 
Board and the Union eventually approved a new provision, 
Article XII of the CBA, covering layoffs. It stated: 
"In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the 
number of teachers through layoff from employment by 
the Board, teachers with the most seniority in the dis-
1 Prior to bargaining on this subject, the Minority Affairs Office of the 
Jackson Public Schools sent a questionnaire to all teachers, soliciting their 
views as to a layoff policy. The questionnaire proposed two alternatives: 
continuation of the existing straight seniority system, or a freeze of minor-
ity layoffs to ensure retention of minority teachers in exact proportion to 
the minority student population. Ninety-six percent of the teachers who 
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trict shall be retained, except that at no time will there 
be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off 
than the current percentage of minority personnel em-
ployed at the time of the layoff. In no event will the 
number given notice of possible layoff be greater than 
the number of positions to be eliminated. Each teacher 
so affected will be called back in reverse order for posi-
tions for which he is certified maintaining the above mi-
nority balance." Joint App. 13.2 
When layoffs became necessary in 1974, it was evident that 
adherence to the CBA would result in the layoff of tenured 
nonminority teachers while minority teachers on probation-
ary status were retained. Rather than complying with Arti-
cle XII, the Board retained the tenured teachers and laid off 
probationary minority teachers, thus failing to maintain the 
percentage of minority personnel that existed at the time of 
the layoff. The Union, together with two minority teachers 
who had been laid off, brought suit in federal court, id., at 30, 
(Jackson Education Association v. Board of Education, 
(Jackson I) (mem. op.))', claiming that the Board's failure to 
adhere to the layoff provision violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. They also urged the District Court 
to take pendent jurisdiction over state law contract claims. 
In its answer the Board denied any prior employment qjs-
crimination and argiie"'"ct that the layoff provisiOn conflicted 
w1tiit'i1e Michigan Teacher Tenure Act. Joint App. 33. 
Following trial, the District Court sua sponte concluded that 
it lacked jurisdiction over the case, in part because there was 
insufficient evidence to support the plaintiffs' claim that the 
Board had engaged in discriminatory hiring practices prior to 
1972, id., at 35-37, and in part because the plaintiffs had not 
fulfilled the jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII claim by 
• Article VII of the CBA defined "minority group personnel" as "those 
employees who are Black, American Indian, Oriental, or of Spanish 
descendancy." Joint App. 15. 
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filing discrimination charges with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission. After dismissing the federal 
claims, the District Court declined to exercise pendent juris-
diction over the state law contract claims. 
Rather than taking an appeal, the plaintiffs instituted a 
suit in state court, Jackson Education Association v. Board 
of Education, No. 77-011484CZ (Jackson County Circuit 
Court, 1979) (Jackson II), raising in essence the same claims 
that had been raised in Jackson I. In entering judgment for 
the plaintiffs, the state court found that the Board had 
breached its contract with the plaintiffs, and that Article XII 
did not violate the Michigan Teacher Tenure Act. In reject-
ing the Board's argument that the layoff provision violated 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the state court found that it 
"had not been established that the Board had discriminated 
against minOrities m · s irr--- actices. - The mi~ority 
r presentation on the faculty was the result of societal racial 
discrimination." Joint App. 43. The state court also found 
that "[t]here is no histor}l of o:t~t discrimination by the 
parties to this contract." ld., at 49. Nevertheless, the 
court held that Article XII was permissible, despite its dis-
criminatory effect on nonminority teachers, as an attempt to 
remedy the effects of societal discrimination. 
After Jackson II, the Board adhered to Article XII. As a 
result, during the 1976-1977 and 1981-1982 school years, 
nonminority teachers were laid off, while minority teachers 
with less seniority were retained. The displaced nonminor-
ity teachers, petitioners here, brought suit in federal district 
court, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause, 
Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and other federal and state 
statutes. On cross motions for summary judgment, the Dis-
trict Court dismissed all of petitioners' claims. With respect 
to the equal protection claim, 3 the District Court held that 
the racial preferences granted by the Board need not be 
3 Petitioners have sought review in this Court only of their claim based 
on the Equal Protection Clause. 
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grounded on a finding of prior discrimination. Instead, the 
court decided that the racial preferences were permissible 
under the Equal Protection Clause as an attempt to remedy 
societal discrimination by providing "role models" for minor-
ity schoolchildren, and upheld the constitutionality of the lay-
off provision. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, 
largely adopting the reasoning and language of the District 
Court. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 746 F. 2d 
1152 (1984). We granted certiorari, 471 U. S. -- (1985), to 
resolve the important issue of the constitutionality of race-
based layoffs by public employers. We now reverse. 
II 
Petitioners' central claim is that they were laid off because 
of their race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Decisions by faculties and admin-
istrators of public schools based on race or ethnic origin are 
reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 This Court 
has "consistently repudiated '[d]istinctions between citizens 
solely because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to a free peo-
ple whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equal-
ity,"' Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967) quoting 
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943). 
"Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently sus-
pect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination." 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 
265, 291 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J., joined by WHITE, J.) 
In the context of affirmative action, it has previously been 
recognized that "[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic 
criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examina-
tion to make sure that it does not conflict with constitutional 
guarantees." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 491 
• School district collective bargaining agreements constitute state action 
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Abood v. Detroit Board of 
Ed., 431 U. S. 209, 218, and n. 12 (1977). 
. tJ-,..1,., ... ...A 
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(1980) (opinion of THE CHIEF JuSTICE). There are two 
prongs to this examination. First, the racial classification 
must be justified by a sufficiently important state purpose. 
Second, the means chosen by the State to effectuate its pur-
pose must be "narrowly tailored to the achievement of that 
goal." Id., at 480. We must therefore decide whether the 
layoff provision is supported by a sufficiently important State 
purpose and whether the means chosen to accomplish that 
purpose are narrowly tailored. 
III 
A 
The Court of Appeals, relying on the reasoning and lan-
guage of the District Court's opinion, held that the Board's 
interest in providing minority role models for its minority 
students, as an attempt to alleviate the effects of societal dis-
crimination, was sufficiently important to justify the racial 
classification embodied in the layoff provision. Wygant, 746 
F. 2d, at 1156-1157. The court discerned a need for more 
minority faculty role models by finding that the percentage of 
minority teachers was less than the percentage of minority 
students. I d., at 1156. 
This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone 
is sufficient to justify a racial classification. Rather, the 
Court has insisted upon a showing of prior discrimination by 
the governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of 
racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination. ,(' 
This Court's reasoning in Hazelwood School District v. 
United States, 433 U. S. 299 (1977), illustrates that the rele-
vant analysis in cases involving proof of discrimination by 
statistical disparity focuses on those disparities that demon-
strate such prior governmental discrimination. In 
Hazelwood the Court concluded that, absent employment dis-
crimination by the school board, "nondiscriminatory hiring 
practices will in time result in a work force more or less rep-
resentative of the racial and ethnic composition of the popula-
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tion in the community from which the employees are hired." 
!d., at 307, quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 
324, 340 n. 20 (1977). Based on that reasoning, the Court 
held that the proper comparison for determining the exist-
ence of actual discrimination by the school board was "be-
tween the racial composition of [the school's] teaching staff 
and the racial composition of the qualified public school 
teacher population in the relevant market." I d., at 308. 
Hazelwood demonstrates this Court's focus on prior discrimi-
nation as the justification for, and the limitation on, a state's 
adoption of race-based remedies. See also Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971). 
Unlike the analysis in Hazelwood, the role model theory 
employed by the District Court has no logical stopping point. 
The role model theory allows the Board to engage in discrimi-
natory hiring and layoff practices long past the point required 
by any legitimate remedial purpose. Indeed, by tying the 
required percentage of minority teachers to the percentage of 
minority students, it requires just the sort of year-to-year 
calibration the Court stated was unnecessary in Swann, 
supra, at 31-32: 
"At some point these school authorities and others like 
them should have achieved full compliance with this 
Court's decision in Brown I. . . . Neither school au-
thorities nor district courts are constitutionally required 
to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial compo-
sition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to de-
segregate has been accomplished and racial discrimina-
tion through official action is eliminated from the 
system." 
See also id., at 24. 
Moreover, because the role model theory does not neces-
sarily bear a relationship to the harm caused by prior dis-
criminatory hiring practices, it actually could be used to es-
cape the obligation to remedy such practices by justifying the 
small percentage of black teachers by reference to the small 
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percentage of black students. See United States v. 
Hazelwood School District, 392 F. Supp. 1276, 1286-1287 
(ED Mo. 1975), rev'd, 534 F. 2d 805 (CA8 1976), rev'd and 
remanded, Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 
, U. S. 299 (1977). Carried to its logical extreme, the idea 
that black students are better off with black teachers could 
lead to the very system the Court rejected in Brown v. Board 
of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) (Brown I). 
Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a 
basis for imposing a racially classified remedy. The r. 
model theory announced by the District Court and the 
tant holding typify this indefiniteness. There are 
explanations for a disparity between the percenta of minor-
ity students and the percentage of minority fac ty, many of 
them completely unrelated to discrimination of ny kind. In 
fact, there is no apparent connection bet een the two 
groups. Nevertheless, the District Court c mbined irr. 
vant comparisons between these two group with a ndis-
le statement that there has been so etal d · crimina-
tion, a upheld state action predica d 
cla, ifications. No one doubts that there 
racial discriJ\!nat in this country. Bu~~~ 
posing discriminator legal remedies that 
centpeople, i~· ~·~~~· ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
particularized findings a court :r:phold remedies that are 
ageless in their reach into the pas and timeless in their abil-
ity to affect the future. B ~
Respondents also now argue that their purpose in adopting 
the layoff provision was to remedy prior discrimination 
against minorities by the Jackson School District in hiring 
teachers. For such a remedial purpose to be constitutionally 
valid when it involves State action, a factual determination 
must be made, either by the Board or by a court, that the 
Board engaged in purposeful discrimination in violation of the 
Constitution or an applicable federal statute. Such a finding 
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need not be contemporaneous with the instigation of the af-
firmative action program. But in the absence of a finding of 
discrimination, an appellate court reviewing a challenge to 
such action cannot determine if the the race-based action is 
justified as a remedy for prior discrimination. In this case, 
despite the fact that Article XII of the CBA has spawned 
years of litigation and three separate law_wits, no such find-
ing ever has been made. Although its litigation position was 
diffe~ in Jackson I and Jackson II denied the 
existence of prior discriminatory hiring practices. Joint 
App. 33. This precise issue was litigated in both those suits. 
Both courts cone u e that any s a IS 1cal disparities were 
the result of general societal discrimination, not of prior dis-
crimination by the Board. The Board now contends either 
that a finding of prior discrimination is unnecessary, or that, 
given another opportunity, it could establish the existence of 
prior discrimination. As to its first argument, the Board is 
mistaken. While its second argument is belated, we need 
not consider the question since we conclude below that the 
layoff provision was not a legally appropriate means of 
achieving even a valid purpose. 5 
5 JUSTICE MARSHALL contends that "the majority has too quickly as-
sumed the absence of a legitimate factual predicate for affirmative action in 
the Jackson schools," post, at--. In support of that assertion, he en-
gages in an unprecedented reliance on non-record documents that respond-
ent has "lodged" with this Court. This selective citation to factual materi-
als not considered by the District Court or the Court of Appeals below is 
--~~i!tiltl&~l"t~li~ttg enough by itself. Even relying on these non-record materials , 
~ .. ~~r' .. J M ' . d d .., ...- USTICE ARSHALL s argument IS re uce to assertions without citations 
for key points; see, e. g., post at 4 ("without some modification of the se-
niority layoff system, genuine faculty integration could not take place"). 
The Court's disagreement with JuSTICE MARSHALL, however, is more fun-
damental than any disagreement over the heretofore unquestioned rule 
that this Court decides cases based on the record before it. JUSTICE MAR-
SHALL does not define what he means by "legitimate factual predicate," nor 
does he demonstrate the relationship of these non-record materials to his 
undefined predicate. If, for example, his dissent assumes that general so-
cietal discrimination is a sufficient factual predicate, then there is no need 
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IV 
The Court of Appeals examined the means chosen to ac-
complish the Board's race-conscious purposes under a test of 
"reasonableness." That standard has no support in the deci-
sions of this Court. As demonstrated in Part II above, our 
decisions always have employed a more stringent standard-
however articulated-to test the validity of the means chosen 
by a state to accomplish its race-conscious purposes. See, 
e. g., Fullilove, 448 U.S., at 480 (opinion of THE CHIEF Jus-
TICE) ("We recognize the need for careful judicial evaluation 
to refer to respondents' lodgings as to its own employment history. No-
one disputes that there has been race discrimination in this country. If 
that fact alone can justify race-conscious action by the State, despite the 
Equal Protection Clause, then the dissent need not rely on non-record ma-
terials to show a "legitimate factual predicate." If, on the other hand, 
JusTICE MARSHALL is assuming that the necessary factual predicate is 
prior discrimination by the Board, there is no escaping the need for a fac-
tual finding below-a finding that does not exist. 
The real dispute, then, is not over the state of the record. It is dis-
agreement as to what constitutes a "legitimate factual predicate." If the 
necessary factual predicate is prior discrimination-that is, that race-
based state action is taken to remedy prior discrimination by the govern-
mental unit involved-then the very nature of appellate review requires 
that a factfinder make a finding of prior discrimination. Nor can the re-
spondent unilaterally insulate itself from this key constitutional question 
by conceding that is has discriminated in the past, now that it is in its inter-
est to make such a concession. Contrary to the dissent's assertion, the 
requirement of a finding is not some arbitrary barrier set up by today's 
opm10n. Rather, it is a necessary result of the requirement that race-
based state action be remedial. 
At any rate, much of the material relied on by JuSTICE MARSHALL has 
been the subject of the previous lawsuit in Jackson II. In that case the 
court concluded that it "had not been established that the Board had dis-
criminated against minorities in its hiring practices." I d., at --. 
Rather than being the result of any employment discrimination by the 
Board, the court concluded that "[t]he minority representation on the fac-
ulty was the result of societal discrimination." /d., at--." Moreover, 
as noted supra, at 2, in Jackson I the Board expressly denied that it had 
engaged in employment discrimination. 
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to assure that any ... program that employs racial or ethnic 
criteria to accomplish the objective of remedying the present 
effects of past discrimination is narrowly tailored to the 
achievement of that goal") 6; Bakke, 438 U. S., at 362 (opin-
ion of BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., 
requiring a "strict and searching judicial inquiry" even at the 
intermediate level of scrutiny.) Whatever the purpose as-
serted to justify a racial preference, the means chosen must 
be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that pur-
pose. Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 480 (opinion of THE CHIEF 
JUSTICE). 7 "Racial classifications are simply too pernicious 
to permit any but the most exact connection between justifi-
6 The term "narrowly tailored," so frequently used in our cases, has ac-
quired a secondary meaning. More specifically, as commentators have in-
dicated, the term may be used to require consideration whether lawful al-
ternative and less restrictive means could have been used. Or, as 
Professor Ely has noted, the classification at issue must "fit" with greater 
precision than any alternative means. Ely, The Constitutionality of Re-
verse Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 727 n. 26 (1974) (hereinafter 
Ely). "[Courts] should give particularly intense scrutiny to whether a 
nonracial approach or a more narrowly tailored racial classification could 
promote the substantial interest about as well and at tolerable adminis-
trative expense." Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial 
Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 578-579 
(1975) (hereinafter Greenawalt). 
7 Several commentators have emphasized, no matter what the weight of 
the asserted governmental purpose, that the means chosen to accomplish 
the purpose should be narrowly tailored. In arguing for a form of interme-
diate scrutiny, Professor Greenawalt contends that, "while benign racial 
classifications call for some weighing of the importance of ends they call for 
even more intense scrutiny of means, especially of the administrability of 
less onerous alternative classifications." Greenawalt 565. Professor Ely 
has suggested that "special scrutiny in the suspect classification context 
has in fact consisted not in weighing ends but rather in insisting that the 
classification in issue fit a constitutional permissible state goal with greater 
precision than any available alternative." Ely 727 n. 26. Professor Gun-
ther argues that judicial scrutiny of legislative means is more appropriate 
than judicial weighing of the importance of the legislative purpose. Gun-
ther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A 
Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 20-21 (1972). 
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dissenting). 
at 537 (STEVENS, J., 
We have recognized, however, that in order to remedy the 
effects of prior discrimination, it may be necessary to take 
race into account. As part of this Nation's dedication to 
eradicating racial discrimination, innocent persons may be 
called upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy. 
"When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to 
cure the effects of prior discrimination, such a 'sharing of the 
burden' by innocent parties is not impermissible." I d., at 
484, quoting Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 
U. S. 747 (1976). 8 In Fullilove, the challenged statute re-
8 Of course, when a state implements a race-based plan that requires 
such a sharing of the burden, it cannot justify the discriminatory effect on 
some individuals because other individuals had approved the plan. Any 
"waiver" of the right not to be dealt with by the government on the basis of 
one's race must be made by those affected. Yet JuSTICE MARSHALL re-
peatedly contends that the fact that Article XII was approved by a major-
ity vote of the Union somehow val\dates this plan. He sees this case not in 
terms of individual constitutional rights, but as an allocation of burdens 
"between two racial groups." Post, at 13. Thus, Article XII becomes a 
political compromise that "avoided placing the entire burden of layoffs on 
either the white teachers as a group or the minority teachers as a group." 
Post, at 4. But the petitioners before us today are not "the white teachers 
as a group." They are Wendy Wygant and other individuals who claim 
that they were fired from their jobs because of their race. That claim can-
not be waived by petitioners' more senior colleagues. In view of the way 
union seniority works, it is not surprising that while a straight freeze on 
minority layoffs was overwhelmingly rejected, a "compromise" eventually 
was reached that placed the entire burden of the compromise on the most 
junior union members. The more senior union members simply had noth-
ing to lose from such a compromise. See post, at 5 ("To petitioners, at the 
bottom of the seniority scale among white teachers, fell the lot of bearing 
the white group's proportionate share of layoffs that became necessary in 
1982.") The fact that such a painless accomodation was approved by the 
more senior union members six times since 1972 is irrelevant. The Con-
stitution does not allocate constitutional rights to be distributed like bloc 
grants within discrete racial groups; and until it does, petitioners' more se-
nior union colleagues cannot vote away petitioners' rights. 
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quired at least ten percent of federal public works funds to be 
used in contracts with minority-owned business enterprises. 
This requirement was found to be within the remedial powers 
of Congress in part because the "actual burden shouldered by 
nonminority firms is relatively light." Ibid. 9 
Significantly, none of the cases discussed above involved ( 
layoffs. 10 Here, by contrast, the means chosen to achieve the 
Board's asserted purposes is that of laying off nonminority 
teachers with greater seniority in order to retain minority 
teachers with less seniority. We have previously expressed 
concern over the burden that a preferential layoffs scheme 
imposes on innocent parties. See Firefighters Local Union 
No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2586, 2588 (1984); see also 
Weber, supra, at 208 ("The plan does not require the dis-
JUSTICE MARSHALL also attempts to portray the layoff plan as one that 
has no real invidious effect, stating that "within the confines of constant 
minority proportions, it preserves the hierarchy of seniority in the selec-
tion of individuals for layoff." Post, at 14. "WftHe .that phrase ii bigl:l• 
liQ'mding, in reality it merely expresses the tautology that layoffs are 
based on seniority except as to those nonminority teachers who are dis-
placed by minority teachers with less seniority. This is really nothing 
more than group-based analysis: "each group would shoulder a portion of 
[the layoff] burden equal to its portion of the faculty." Post, at 4. The 
constitutional problem remains: the decision that petitioners would be laid 
off was based on their race. 
9 Similarly, the Court approved the hiring program in United Steelwork-
ers of America v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 208 (1979), in part because the plan 
did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees." 
Since Weber involved a private company, its reasoning concerning the va-
lidity of the hiring plan at issue there is not directly relevant to this case, 
which involves a state-imposed plan. No equal protection claim was pre- C J 
sented in Weber. 
10 There are cases involving alteration of strict seniority layoffs, see, 
e. g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330 (1953); Aeronautical In-
dustrial District Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U. S. 521 (1949), but they do 
not involve the critical element here-layoffs based on race. The Con-
stitution does not require layoffs to be based on strict seniority. But it 
does require the state to meet a heavy burden of justification when it im-
plements a layoff plan based on race. 
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charge of white workers and their replacement with new 
black hirees"). In cases involving valid hiring goals, the 
burden to be borne by innocent individuals is diffused to a 
considerable extent among society generally. Though hiring 
goals may burden some innocent individuals, they simply do 
not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs impose. De-
nial of a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive as 
loss of an existing job. 
Many of our cases involve union seniority plans with em-
ployees who are typically heavily dependent on wages for 
their day-to-day living. Even a temporary layoff may have 
adverse financial as well as psychological effects. A worker 
may invest many productive years in one job and one city 
with the expectation of earning the stability and security of 
seniority. "At that point, the rights and expectations sur-
rounding seniority make up what is probably the most valu-
able capital asset that the worker 'owns,' worth even more 
than the current equity in his home." Fallon and Weiler, 
Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 
58. Layoffs disrupt these settled expectations in a way that 
general hiring goals do not. 
While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclos-
ing only one of several opportunities, 11 layoffs impose the en-
tire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individ-
uals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives. 
That burden is too intrusive. We therefore hold that, as a 
11 The "school admission" cases, that involve the same basic concepts as I 
cases involving hiring goals, illustrate this principle. For example, in 
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (1974) while petitioner's complaint al-
leged that he had been denied admission to the University of Washington 
Law School because of his race, he also had been accepted at the Oregon, 
Idaho, Gonzaga and Willamette Law Schools. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 
Wash. 2d 11, 30 n. 11, 507 P. 2d 1169, 1181 n. 11. The injury to Defunis' 
was not of the same kind or degree as the injury that he would have suf-
fered had he been removed from law school in his third year. Even this 
analogy may not rise to the level of harm suffered by a union member who 
is laid off. 
. , 
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means of accomplishing purposes that otherwise may be le-
gitimate, the Board's layoff plan is not sufficiently narrowly 
tailored. 12 Other, less intrusive means of accomplishing sim-
ilar purposes-such as the adoption of hiring goals-are 
available. For these reasons, the Board's selection of layoffs 
as the means to accomplish even a valid purpose cannot sat-
isfy the demands of the Equal Protection Clause. 13 
v 
We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
12 We have recognized, however, that in order to provide make-whole 
relief to the actual, identified victims of individual discrimination, a court 
may in an appropriate case award competitive seniority. See Franks v. 
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976). 
13 The Board's definition of minority to include Blacks, Orientals, Ameri-
can Indians, and persons of Spanish descent, supra, at -- n. 2, further 
illustrates the undifferentiated nature of the plan. There is no explanation 
for why the Board chose to favor these particular mi11r or how in fact 
members of some of the categories can be identified. oreover, respond-
ents have never suggested-much less formally found-that they have en-
gaged in prior, purposeful discrimination against members of each of these 
minority groups. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether a school board, 
consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, may extend 
preferential protection against layoffs to some of its employ-
ees because of their race or national origin. 
I 
In 1972 the Jackson Board of Education, because of racial 
tension in the community that extended to its schools, consid-
ered adding a layoff provision to the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement (CBA) between the Board and the Jackson Edu-
cation Association (the Union) that would protect employees 
who were members of certain minorities against layoffs. 1 
'l'he Board and the Union eventually approved a new provi-
sion, Article XII of the CBA, covering layoffs. It stated: 
"In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the 
number of teachers through layoff from employment by 
' Prior to bargaining on this subject, the Minority Affairs Office of the 
Jackson Public Schools sent a questionpaire to all teachers, soliciting their 
views as to a layoff policy. The questionnaire proposed two alternatives: 
continuation of the existing straight seniority system, or a freeze of minor-
ity layoffs to ensure retention of minority teachers in exact proportion to 
the minority student population. Ninety-six percent of the teachers who 
responded to the questionnaire expressed a preference for the straight se-
niority system. 
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the Board, teachers with the most seniority in the dis-
trict shall be retained, except that at no time will there 
be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off 
. than the current percentage of minority personnel em-
ployed at the time of the layoff. In no event will the 
number given notice of possible layoff be greater than 
the number of positions to be eliminated. Each teacher 
so affected will be called back in reverse order for posi-
tions for which he is certificated maintaining the above 
minority balance." App. 13.2 
When layoffs became necessary in 1974, it was evident that 
adherence to the CBA would result in the layoff of tenured 
nonminority teachers while minority teachers on probation-
ary status were retained. Rather than complying with Arti-
cle XII, the Board retained the tenured teachers and laid off 
probationary minority teachers, thus failing to maintain the 
percentage of minority personnel that existed at the time of 
the layoff. The Union, together with two minority teachers 
who had been laid off, brought suit in federal court, id., at 30, 
(Jackson Education Assn. v. Board of Education, (Jackson 
I) (mem. op.)), claiming that the Board's failure to adhere to 
the layoff provision violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. They also urged the District Court to take 
pendent jurisdiction over state law contract claims. In its 
answer the Board denied any prior employment discrimina-
tion and argued that the layoff provision conflicted with the 
Michigan Teacher Tenure Act. App. 33. Following trial, 
the District Court sua sponte concluded that it lacked juris-
diction over the case, in part because there was insufficient 
evidence to support the plaintiffs' claim that the Board had 
engaged in discriminatory hiring practices prior to 1972, id., 
at 35-37, and in part because the plaintiffs had not fulfilled 
2 Article VII of t~e CBA defined "minority group personnel" as ''those 
employees who are Black, American Indian, Oriental, or of Spanish 
descendancy." App. 15. 
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the jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII claim by filing 
discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission. After dismissing the federal claims, the 
District Court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over 
the state law contract claims. 
Rather than taking an appeal, the plaintiffs instituted a 
suit in state court, Jackson Education Assn. v. Board of 
Education, No. 77-011484CZ (Jackson County Circuit 
Court, 1979) (Jackson II), raising in essence the same claims 
that had been raised in Jackson I. In entering judgment for 
the plaintiffs, the state court found that the Board had 
breached its contract with the plaintiffs, and that Article XII 
did not violate the Michigan Teacher Tenure Act. In reject-
ing the Board's argument that the layoff provision violated 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the state court found that it 
"ha[d] not been established that the board had discriminated 
against minorities in its hiring practices. The minority 
representation on the faculty was the result of societal racial 
discrimination." App. 43. The state court also found that 
"[t]here is no history of overt past discrimination by the par-
ties to this contract." ld., at 49. Nevertheless, the court 
held that Article XII was permissible, despite its discrimina-
tory effect on nonminority teachers, as an attempt to remedy 
the effects of societal discrimination. 
After Jackson II, the Board adhered to Article XII. As a 
result, during the 1976-1977 and 1981-1982 school years, 
nonminority teachers were laid off, while minority teachers 
with less seniority were retained. The displaced nonminor-
ity teachers, petitioners here, brought suit in Federal Dis-
trict Court, alleging violations of the Equal Protection 
Clause, Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and other federal and 
state statutes. On cross motions for summary judgment, 
the District Court dismissed all of petitioners' claims. With 
respect to the equal protection claim, 3 the District Court held 
3 Petitioners have sought review in this Court only of their claim based 
on the Equal Protection Clause. 
• 
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that the racial preferences granted by the Board need not be 
grounded on a finding of prior discrimination. Instead, the 
court decided that the racial preferences were permissible 
under the Equal Protection Clause as an attempt to remedy 
societal discrimination by providing "role models" for minor-
ity schoolchildren, and upheld the constitutionality of the lay-
off provision. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, 
largely adopting the reasoning and language of the District 
Court. 746 F. 2d 1152 (1984). We granted certiorari, 471 
U. S. -- (1985), to resolve the important issue of the c.on-
stitutionality of race-based layoffs by public employers. We 
now reverse. 
II 
Petitioners' central claim is that they were laid off because 
of their race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Decisions by faculties and admin-
istrators of public schools based on race or ethnic origin are 
reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment. • This Court 
has "consistently repudiated '[d]istinctions between citizens 
solely because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to a free peo-
ple whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equal-
ity,"' Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967) quoting 
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943). C ") 
"Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently sus-
pect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination." 
Regents of University ofCalifornia v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 
291 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J., joined by WHITE, J.) 
In the context of affirmative action, it has previously been 
recognized that "[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic 
criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examina-
tion to make sure that it does not conflict with constitutional 
guarantees." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 491 
• School district collective bargaining agreements constitute state action 
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Abood v. Detroit Board of 
Ed., 431 U. S. 209, 218, and n. 12 (1977). 
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(1980) (opinion of BURGER, C. J.). There are two prongs to 
this examination. First, the racial classification must be jus-
tified by a sufficiently important state purpose. Second, the 
means chosen by the State to effectuate its purpose must be 
"narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal." I d., at 
480. We must therefore decide whether the layoff provision 
is supported by a sufficiently important state purpose and 




The Court of Appeals, relying on the reasoning and lan-
guage of the District Court's opinion, held that the Board's 
interest in providing minority role models for its minority 
students, as an attempt to alleviate the effects of societal dis-
crimination, was sufficiently important to justify the racial 
classification embodied in the layoff provision. 746 F. 2d, at 
1156-1157. The court discerned a need for more minority 
faculty role models by finding that the percentage of minority 
teachers was less than the percentage of minority students. 
I d., at 1156. 
This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone 
is sufficient to justify a racial classification. Rather, the 
Court has insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination 
by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited 
use of racial classifications in order to remedy such dis-
crimination. This Court's reasoning in Hazelwood School 
District v. United States, 433 U. S. 299 (1977), illustrates 
that the relevant analysis in cases involving proof of dis-
crimination by statistical disparity focuses on those dispari-
ties that demonstrate such prior governmental discrimina-
tion. In Hazelwood the Court concluded that, absent 
employment discrimination by the school board, "'nondis-
criminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force 
more or less representative of the racial and ethnic compo-
sition of the population in the community from which the em-
. ~ ·' . .· 
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ployees are hired."' ld., at 307, quoting Teamsters v . 
. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 340, n. 20 (1977). See also 
Wygant, supra, 746 F. 2d, at 1160 (Wellford, J., concurring) 
("Had the plaintiffs in this case presented data as to the per-
centage of qualified minority teachers in the relevant labor 
market to show that defendant Board's hiring of black teach-
ers over a number of years had equalled that figure, I believe 
this court may well have been required to reverse . . . . ") 
Based on that reasoning, the Court held that the proper com-
parison for determining the existence of actual discrimination 
by the school board was "between the racial composition of 
[the school's] teaching staff and the racial composition of the 
qualified public school teacher population in the relevant 
labor market." 433 U. S., at 308. Hazelwood demonstrates 
this Court's focus on prior discrimination as the justification 
for, and the limitation on, a State's adoption of race-based 
remedies. See also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board 
of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971). 
Unlike the analysis in Hazelwood, the role model theory 
employed by the District Court. has no logical stopping point. 
The role model theory allows the Board to engage in discrimi-
natory hiring and layoff practices long past the point required 
by any legitimate remedial purpose. Indeed, by tying the 
required percentage of minority teachers to the percentage of 
minority students, it requires just-the sort of year-to-year 
calibration the Court stated was unnecessary in Swann, 402 
U. S., at 31-32: 
"At some point these school authorities and others like 
them should have achieved full compliance with this 
Court's decision in Brown I. . . . Neither school au-
thorities nor district courts are constitutionally required 
to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial compo-
sition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to de-
segregate has been accomplished and racial discrimina-
tion through official action is eliminated from the 
system." 
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See also id., at 24. 
Moreover, because the role model theory does not neces-
sarily bear a relationship to the harm caused by prior dis-
criminatory hiring practices, it actually could be used to es-
cape the obligation to remedy such practices by justifying the 
small percentage of black teachers by reference to the small 
percentage of black students. See United States v. 
Hazelwood School District, 392 F. Supp. 1276, 1286-1287 
(ED Mo. 1975), rev'd, 534 F. 2d 805 (CA8 1976), rev'd and 
remanded, 433 U. S. 299 (1977). Carried to its logical ex-
treme, the idea that black students are better off with black 
teachers could lead to the very system the Court rejected in 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) (Brown 
/). 
Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a 
basis for imposing a racially classified remedy. The role 
model theory announced by the District Court and the resul-
tant holding typify this indefiniteness. There are numerous 
explanations for a disparity between the percentage of minor-
ity students and the percentage of minority faculty, many of 
them completely unrelated to discrimination of any kind. In 
fact, there is no apparent connection between the two 
groups. Nevertheless, the District Court combined irrele-
vant comparisons between these two groups with an indis-
putable statement that there has been societal discrimina-
tion, and upheld state action predicated upon racial 
classifications. No one doubts that there has been serious 
racial discrimination in this country. But as the basis for im-
posing discriminatory legal remedies that work against inno-
cent people, it is insufficient and over expansive: without any 
particularized findings, a court can uphold remedies that are 
ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their abil-
ity to affect the future. 
B 
Respondents also now argue that their purpose in adopting 
the layoff provision was to remedy prior discrimination 
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against minorities by the Jackson School District in hiring 
teachers. Public schools, like other public employers, oper-
ate under two interrelated constitutional duties. They are 
under a clear command from this Court, starting with Brown 
v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 (1955), to eliminate 
every vestige of racial segregation and discrimination in the 
schools. Pursuant to that goal, race-conscious remedial ac-
tion may be necessary. North Carolina State Board of Edu-
cation v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43, 46 (1971). On the other 
hand, public employers, including public schools, also must 
act in accordance with a "core purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment" which is to "do away with all governmentally 
imposed distinctions based on race." Palmore v. Sidoti, 104 
S. Ct. 1879, 1881-1882 (1984). These related constitutional 
duties are not always harmonious; reconciling them requires 
public employers to act with extraordinary care. In particu-
lar, a public employer like the Board must ensure that, be-
fore it embarks on an affirmative action program, it has con-
vincing evidence that remedial action is warranted. That is, 
it must have sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that 
there has been prior discrimination. 
Evidentiary support for the conclusion that remedial action 
is warranted becomes crucial when the remedial program is 
challenged in court by nonminority employees. In this case, 
for example, petitioners contended at trial that the remedial 
program-Article XII-had the purpose and effect of insti-
tuting a racial classification that was not justified by a reme-
dial purpose. 546 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (ED Mich. 1982). In 
such a case, the trial court must make a factual determination 
that the employer had a strong basis in evidence for its con-
clusion that remedial action was necessary. The ultimate 
burden remains with the employees to demonstrate the un-
constitutionality of an affirmative action program. But un-
less such a determination is made, an appellate court review-
ing a challenge to remedial action by nonminority employees 
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cannot determine whether the race-based action is justified \ 
as a remedy for prior discrimination. 
Despite the fact that Article XII has spawned years of liti-
gation and three separate lawsuits, no such determination 
ever has been made. Although its litigation position was dif-
ferent, the Board in Jackson I and Jackson II denied the ex-
istence of prior discriminatory hiring practices. App. 33. 
This precise issue was litigated in both those suits. Both 
courts concluded that any statistical disparities were.. the re-
sult of general societal discrimination, not of prior discrimina-
tion by the Board. The Board now contends that, given an-
other opportunity, it could establish the existence of prior C -::1 
discrimination. Although this argument seems belated at 
this point in the proceedings, we need not consider the ques-
tion since we conclude below that the layoff provision was not 
a legally appropriate means of achieving even a valid 
purpose. 5 
C 1 6 JUSTICE MARSHALL contends that "the majority has too quickly as-
sumed the absence of a legitimate factual predicate for affirmative action in 
the Jackson schools," post, at--. In support of that assertion, he en-
gages in an unprecedented reliance on non-record documents that respond-
ent has "lodged" with this Court. This selective citation to factual materi-
als not considered by the District Court or the Court of Appeals below is 
unusual enough by itself. Even relying on these non-record materials, 
JUSTICE MARSHALL's argument is reduced to assertions without citations 
for key points; see, e. g., post at 4 ("without some modification of the se-
niority layoff system, genuine faculty integration could not -take place"). 
The Court's disagreement with JuSTICE MARSHALL, however, is more fun-
damental than any disagreement over the heretofore unquestioned rule 
that this Court decides cases based on the record before it. JUSTICE MAR-
SHALL does not define what he means by "legitimate factual predicate," nor 
does he demonstrate the relationship of these non-record materials to his 
undefined predicate. If, for example, his dissent assumes that general so-
cietal discrimination is a sufficient factual predicate, then there is no need 
to refer to respondents' lodgings as to its own employment history. No-
one disputes that there has been race discrimination in this country. If 
that fact alone can justify race-conscious action by the State, despite the 
Equal Protection Clause, then the dissent need not rely on non-record ma-
terials to show a "legitimate factual predicate." If, on the other hand, 
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IV 
The Court of Appeals examined the means chosen to ac-
complish the Board's race-conscious purposes under a test of 
"reasonableness." That standard has no support in the deci-
sions of this Court. As demonstrated in Part II above, our 
decisions always have employed a more stringent standard-
however articulated-to test the validity of the means chosen 
by a state to accomplish its race-conscious purposes. See, 
e. g., Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 480 (opinion of BURGER, C. J.) 
("We recognize the need for careful judicial evaluation to as-
sure that any ... program that employs racial or ethnic cri-
teria to accomplish the objective of remedying the present ef-
fects of past discrimination is narrowly tailored to the 
achievement of that goal") 6; Bakke, 438 U. S., at 362 (opin-
JUSTICE MARSHALL is assuming that the necessary factual predicate is 
prior discrimination by the Board, there is no escaping the need for a fac-
tual determination below-a determination that does not exist. 
The real dispute, then, is not over the state of the record. It is dis-
agreement as to what constitutes a "legitimate factual predicate." If the 
necessary factual predicate is prior discrimination--that is, that race-
based state action is taken to remedy prior discrimination by the govern-
mental unit involved-then the very nature of appellate review requires 
that a factfinder determine whether the employer was justified in institut-
ing a remedial plan. Nor can the respondent unilaterally insulate itself 
from this key constitutional question by conceding that is has discriminated 
in the past, now that it is in its interest to make such a concession. Con-
trary to the dissent's assertion, the requirement of such a determination by 
the trial court is not some arbitrary barrier set up by today's opinion. 
Rather, it is a necessary result of the requirement that race-based state 
action be remedial. 
At any rate, much of the material relied on by JUSTICE MARSHALL has 
been the subject of the previous lawsuit in Jackson II, where the court 
concluded that it ''had not been established that the Board had discrimi-
nated against minorities in its hiring practices." /d., at--. Moreover, 
as noted supra, at 2, in Jackson I the Board expressly denied that it had 
engaged in employment discrimination. 
8 The term "narrowly tailored," so frequently used in our cases, has ac-
quired a secondary meaning. More specifically, as commentators have in-
dicated, the term may be used to require consideration whether lawful al-
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ion of BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., 
requiring a "strict and searching" judicial inquiry even at the 
intennediate level of scrutiny.) Whatever the purpose as-
serted to justify a racial preference, the means chosen must 
be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that pur-
pose. Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 480 (opinion of BURGER, 
C. J.). 7 "Racial classifications are simply too pernicious to 
pennit any but the most exact connection between justifica-
tion and classification." I d., at 537 (STEVENS, J., 
dissenting). 
We have recognized, however, that in order to remedy the 
effects of prior discrimination, it may be necessary to take 
race into account. As part of this Nation's dedication to 
eradicating racial discrimination, innocent persons may be 
ternative and less restrictive means could have been used. Or, as 
Professor Ely has noted, the classification at issue must "fit" with greater 
precision than any alternative means. Ely, The Constitutionality of Re-
verse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 727, n. 26 (1974) 
(hereinafter Ely). "[Courts] should give particularly intense scrutiny to 
whether a nonracial approach or a more narrowly tailored racial classifica-
tion could promote the substantial interest about as well and at tolerable 
administrative expense." Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Ra-
cial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 578-579 
(1975) (hereinafter Greenawalt). 
7 Several commentators have emphasized, no matter what the weight of 
the asserted governmental purpose, that the means chosen to accomplish 
the purpose should be narrowly tailored. In arguing for a form of interme-
diate scrutiny, Professor Greenawalt contends that, ''while benign racial 
classifications call for some weighing of the importance of ends they call for 
even more intense scrutiny of means, especially of the administrability of 
less onerous alternative classifications." Greenawalt 565. Professor Ely 
has suggested that "special scrutiny in the suspect classification context 
has in fact consisted not in weighing ends but rather in insisting that the 
classification in issue fit a constitutional permissible state goal with greater 
precision than any available alternative." Ely 727, n. 26. Professor Gun-
ther argues that judicial scrutiny of legislative means is more appropriate 
than judicial weighing of the importance of the legislative purpose. Gun-
ther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A 
Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 20-21 (1972). 
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called upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy. 
''When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to 
cure the effects of prior discrimination, such a 'sharing of the 
burden' by innocent parties is not impermissible." !d., at 
484, quoting Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 
U. S. 747 (1976). 8 In Fullilove, the challenged statute re-
8 Of course, when a state implements a race-based plan that requires 
such a sharing of the burden, it cannot justify the discriminatory effect on 
• some individuals because other individuals had approved the plan. Any 
"waiver" of the right not to be dealt with by the government on the basis of 
one's race must be made by those affected. Yet JUSTICE MARSHALL re-
peatedly contends that the fact that Article XII was approved by a major-
ity vote of the Union somehow validates this plan. He sees this case not in 
terms of individual constitutional rights, but as an allocation of burdens 
"between two racial groups." Post, at 13. Thus, Article XII becomes a 
political compromise that "avoided placing the entire burden of layoffs on 
either the white teachers as a group or the minority teachers as a group." 
Post, at 4. But the petitioners before us today are not "the white teachers 
as a group." They are Wendy Wygant and other individuals who claim 
that they were fired from their jobs because of their race. That claim can-
not be waived by petitioners' more senior colleagues. In view of the way 
union seniority works, it is not surprising that while a straight freeze on 
minority layoffs was overwhelmingly rejected, a "compromise" eventually 
was reached that placed the entire burden of the compromise on the most 
junior union members. The more senior union members simply had noth-
ing to lose from such a compromise. See post, at 5 ("To petitioners, at the 
bottom of the seniority scale among white teachers, fell the lot of bearing 
the white group's proportionate share of layoffs that became necessary in 
1982.") The fact that such a painless accomodation was approved by the 
more senior union members six times since 1972 is irrelevant. The Con-
stitution does not allocate constitutional rights to be distributed like bloc 
grants within discrete racial groups; and until it does, petitioners' more se-
nior union colleagues cannot vote away petitioners' rights. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL also attempts to portray the layoff plan as one that 
has no real invidious effect, stating that "within the confines of constant 
minority proportions, it preserves the hierarchy of seniority in the selec-
tion of individuals for layoff." Post, at 14. That phrase merely expresses 
the tautology that layoffs are based on seniority except as to those nonmi-
nority teachers who are displaced by minority teachers with less seniority. 
This is really nothing more than group-based analysis: "each group would 
shoulder a portion of [the layoff] burden equal to its portion of the faculty." 
. ~, \ . ,• 
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quired at least 10 percent of federal public works funds to be 
used in contracts with minority-owned business enterprises. 
This requirement was found to be within the remedial powers 
of Congress in part because the "actual burden shouldered by 
nonminority firms is relatively light." 448 U. S., at 484. 9 
Significantly, none of the cases discussed above involved I 
layoffs. 10 Here, by contrast, the means chosen to achieve the 
Board's asserted purposes is that of laying off nonminority 
teachers with greater seniority in order to retain minority 
teachers with less seniority. We have previously expressed 
concern over the burden that a preferential layoffs scheme 
imposes on innocent parties. See Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 
U. S. 561, 574-576, 578-579 (1984); see also Weber, n. 9, 
supra this page, at 208 ("The plan does not require the dis-
charge of white workers and their replacement with new 
black hirees"). In cases involving valid hiring goals, the 
burden to be borne by innocent individuals is diffused to a 
considerable extent among society generally. Though hiring 
goals may burden some innocent individuals, they simply do 
not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs impose. De-
nial of a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive as 
loss of an existing job. 
Post, at 4. The constitutional problem remains: the decision that petition- L 
ers would be laid off was based on their race. r 
• Similarly, the Court approved the hiring program in Steelworkers v., 
Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 208 (1979), in part because the plan did not "unnec-
essarily trammel the interests of the white employees." Since Weber in-
volved a private company, its reasoning concerning the validity of the hir-
ing plan at issue there is not directly relevant to this case, which involves a 
state-imposed plan. No equal protection claim was presented in Weber. C ~ 
10 There are cases involving alteration of strict seniority layoffs, see, 
e. g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330 (1953); Aeronautical In-
dustrial District Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U. S. 521 (1949), but they do 
not involve the critical element here-layoffs based on race. The Con-
stitution does not require layoffs to be based on strict seniority. But it 
does require the state to meet a heavy burden of justification when it im-
plements a layoff plan based on race. 
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Many of our cases involve union seniority plans with em-
ployees who are typically heavily dependent on wages for 
their day-to-day living. Even a temporary layoff may have 
adverse financial as well as psychological effects. A worker 
may invest many productive years in one job and one city 
with the expectation of earning the stability and security of 
seniority. "At that point, the rights and expectations sur-
rounding seniority make up what is probably the most valu-
able capital asset that the worker 'owns,' worth even more 
than the current equity in his home." Fallon & Weiler, Con-
flicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 58. 
Layoffs disrupt these settled expectations in a way that gen-
eral hiring goals do not. 
While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclos-
ing only one of several opportunities, 11 layoffs impose the en-
tire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individ-
uals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives. 
That burden is too intrusive. We therefore hold that, as a 
means of accomplishing purposes that otherwise may be le-
gitimate, the Board's layoff plan is not sufficiently narrowly 
tailored. 12 Other, less intrusive means of accomplishing sim-
ilar purposes-such as the adoption of hiring goals-are 
available. For these reasons, the Board's selection of layoffs 
"The "school admission" cases, that involve the same basic concepts as 
cases involving hiring goals, illustrate this principle. For example, in 
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (1974), while petitioner's complaint 
alleged that he had been denied admission to the University of Washington 
Law School because of his race, he also had been accepted at the Oregon, 
Idaho, Gonzaga, and Willamette Law Schools. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 
Wash. 2d 11, 30, n. 11, 507 P. 2d 1169, 1181, n. 11 (1973). The injury to 
Defunis was not of the same kind or degree as the injury that he would 
have suffered had he been removed from law school in his third year. 
Even this analogy may not rise to the level of harm suffered by a union 
member who is laid off. 
12 We have recognized, however, that in order to provide make-whole 
relief to the actual, identified victims of individual discrimination, a court 
may in an appropriate case award competitive seniority. See Franks v. 
Bowman Transportaion Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976). 
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as the means to accomplish even a valid purpose cannot sat-
isfy the demands of the Equal Protection Clause. '3 
v 
We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
18 The Board's definition of minority to include blacks, Orientals, Ameri-
can Indians , and persons of Spanish descent, n. 2, supra, further illus-
trates the undifferentiated nature of the plan. There is no explanation of 
why the Board chose to favor these particular minorities or how in fact 
members of some of the categories can be identified. Moreover, respond-
ents have never suggested-much less formally found-that they have en-
gaged in prior, purposeful discrimination against members of each of these 
minority groups. 
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WENDY WYGANT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JACKSON 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, ETC., ET AL. 
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APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
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JUSTICE POWELL announced the judgment of the Court 
and delivered an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, and 
JusTICE REHNQUIST joined, and which JusTICE O'CONNOR 
joined in parts I, II, III-A, III-B, and V of the opinion. 
This case presents the question whether a school board, 
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, may extend 
preferential protection against layoffs to some of its employ-
ees because of their race or national origin. 
I 
In 1972 the Jackson Board of Education, because of racial 
tension in the community that extended to its schools, consid-
ered adding a layoff provision to the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement (CBA) between the Board and the Jackson Edu-
cation Association (the Union) that would protect employees 
who were members of certain minorities against layoffs. 1 
The Board and the Union eventually approved a new provi-
sion, Article XII of the CBA, covering layoffs. It stated: 
' Prior to bargaining on this subject, the Minority Affairs Office of the 
Jackson Public Schools sent a questionnaire to all teachers, soliciting their 
views as to a layoff policy. The questionnaire proposed two alternatives: 
continuation of the existing straight seniority system, or a freeze of minor-
ity layoffs to ensure retention of minority teachers in exact proportion to 
the minority student population. Ninety-six percent of the teachers who 
responded to the questionnaire expressed a preference for the straight 
seniority system. · 
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"In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the 
number of teachers through layoff from employment by 
the Board, teachers with the most seniority in the dis-
trict shall be retained, except that at no time will there 
be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off 
than the current percentage of minority personnel em-
ployed at the time of the layoff. In no event will the 
number given notice of possible layoff be greater than 
the number of positions to be eliminated. Each teacher 
so affected will be called back in reverse order for posi-
tions for which he is certificated maintaining the above 
minority balance." App. 13.2 
When layoffs became necessary in 1974, it was evident that 
adherence to the CBA would result in the layoff of tenured 
nonminority teachers while minority teachers on probation-
ary status were retained. Rather than complying with Arti-
cle XII, the Board retained the tenured teachers and laid off 
probationary minority teachers, thus failing to maintain the 
percentage of minority personnel that existed at the time of 
the layoff. The Union, together with two minority teachers 
who had been laid off, brought suit in federal court, id., at 30, 
(Jackson Education Assn. v. Board of Education, (Jackson 
/) (mem. op.)), claiming that the Board's failure to adhere to 
the layoff provision violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. They also urged the District Court to take 
pendent jurisdiction over state law contract claims. In its 
answer the Board denied any prior employment discrimina-
tion and argued that the layoff provision conflicted with the 
Michigan Teacher Tenure Act. App. 33. Following trial, 
the District Court sua sponte concluded that it lacked juris-
diction over the case, in part because there was insufficient 
evidence to support the plaintiffs' claim that the Board had 
2 Article VII of the CBA defined "minority group personnel" as "those 
employees who are Black, American Indian, Oriental, or of Spanish 
descendancy." App. 15. 
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engaged in discriminatory hiring practices prior to 1972, id., 
at 35-37, and in part because the plaintiffs had not fulfilled 
the jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII claim by filing 
discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission. After dismissing the federal claims, the 
District Court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over 
the state law contract claims. 
Rather than taking an appeal, the plaintiffs instituted 
a suit in state court, Jackson Education Assn. v. Board of 
Education, No. 77-011484CZ (Jackson County Circuit 
Court, 1979) (Jackson II), raising in essence the same claims 
that had been raised in Jackson I. In entering judgment for 
the plaintiffs, the state court found that the Board had 
breached its contract with the plaintiffs, and that Article XII 
did not violate the Michigan Teacher Tenure Act. In reject-
ing the Board's argument that the layoff provision violated 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the state court found that it 
"ha[d] not been established that the board had discriminated 
against minorities in its hiring practices. The minority 
representation on the faculty was the result of societal racial 
discrimination." App. 43. The state court also found that 
"[t]here is no history of overt past discrimination by the par-
ties to this contract." I d., at 49. Nevertheless, the court 
held that Article XII was permissible, despite its discrimina-
tory effect on nonminority teachers, as an attempt to remedy 
the effects of societal discrimination. 
After Jackson II, the Board adhered to Article XII. As a 
result, during the 1976-1977 and 1981-1982 school years, 
nonminority teachers were laid off, while minority teachers 
with less seniority were retained. The displaced nonminor-
ity teachers, petitioners here, brought suit in Federal Dis-
trict Court, alleging violations of the Equal Protection 
Clause, Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and other federal and 
state statutes. On cross motions for summary judgment, 
the District Court dismissed all of petitioners' claims. With 
84-134(}.-0PINION 
4 WYGANT v. JACKSON BOARD OF EDUCATION 
respect to the equal protection claim, 3 the District Court held 
that the racial preferences granted by the Board need not be 
grounded on a finding of prior discrimination. Instead, the 
court decided that the racial preferences were permissible 
under the Equal Protection Clause as an attempt to remedy 
societal discrimination by providing "role models" for minor-
ity schoolchildren, and upheld the constitutionality of the 
layoff provision. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, 
largely adopting the reasoning and language of the District 
Court. 746 F. 2d 1152 (1984). We granted certiorari, 471 
U. S. -- (1985), to resolve the important issue of the con-
stitutionality of race-based layoffs by public employers. We 
now reverse. 
II 
Petitioners' central claim is that they were laid off because 
of their race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Decisions by faculties and admin-
istrators of public schools based on race or ethnic origin are 
reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 This Court 
has "consistently repudiated '[d]istinctions between citizens 
solely because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to a free 
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of 
equality,"' Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967) quoting 
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943). 
"Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently sus-
pect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination." 
Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 
291 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J., joined by WHITE, J.) 
The Court has recognized that the level of scrutiny does I 
not change merely because the challenged classification oper-
3 Petitioners have sought review in this Court only of their claim based 
on the Equal Protection Clause. 
• School district collective bargaining agreements constitute state action 
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Abood v. Detroit Board 
of Ed., 431 U. S. 209, 218, and n. 12 (1977). 
84-1340-0PINION 
WYGANT v. JACKSON BOARD OF EDUCATION 5 
ates against a group that historically has not been subject to 
governmental discrimination. Mississippi University for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 724 n.9 (1982); Bakke, 438 
U. S., at 291-299; see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 22 
(1948); see also A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 133 
(1975). In this case, Article XII of the CBA operates 
against whites and in favor of certain minorities, and there-
fore constitutes a classification based on race. "Any 
preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily 
receive a most searching examination to make sure that it 
does not conflict with constitutional guarentees." Fullilove 
v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 491 (1980) (opinion of BURGER, 
C. J.). There are two prongs to this examination. First, 
any racial classification "must be justified by a compelling 
governmental interest." Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S. 429, 
432 (1984); see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967); cf. 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 375 (1971) (alienage). 
Second, the means chosen by the State to effectuate its 
purpose must be "narrowly tailored to the achievement of 
that goal." Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 480. We must decide 
whether the layoff provision is supported by a compelling 
state purpose and whether the means chosen to accomplish 
that purpose are narrowly tailored. 
III 
A 
The Court of Appeals, relying on the reasoning and lan-
guage of the District Court's opinion, held that the Board's 
interest in providing minority role models for its minority 
students, as an attempt to alleviate the effects of societal 
discrimination, was sufficiently important to justify the racial 
classification embodied in the layoff provision. 7 46 F. 2d, at 
1156-1157. The court discerned a need for more minority 
faculty role models by finding that the percentage of minority 
teachers was less than the percentage of minority students. 
!d., at 1156. 
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This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone 
is sufficient to justify a racial classification. Rather, the 
Court has insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination 
by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited 
use of racial classifications in order to remedy such dis-
crimination. This Court's reasoning in Hazelwood School 
District v. United States, 433 U. S. 299 (1977), illustrates 
that the relevant analysis in cases involving proof of 
discrimination by statistical disparity focuses on those dispar-
ities that demonstrate such prior governmental discrimina-
tion. In Hazelwood the Court concluded that, absent em-
ployment discrimination by the school board, 
" 'nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a 
work force more or less representative of the racial and eth-
nic composition of the population in the community from 
which the employees are hired."' !d., at 307, quoting Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 340, n. 20 (1977). See 
also Wygant, supra, 746 F. 2d, at 1160 (Wellford, J., concur-
ring) ("Had the plaintiffs in this case presented data as to the 
percentage of qualified minority teachers in the relevant 
labor market to show that defendant Board's hiring of black 
teachers over a number of years had equalled that figure, I 
believe this court may well have been required to re-
verse .... ") Based on that reasoning, the Court in ) 
Hazelwood held that the proper comparison for determining 
the existence of actual discrimination by the school board was 
"between the racial composition of [the school's] teaching 
staff and the racial composition of the qualified public school 
teacher population in the relevant labor market." 433 U. S., 
at 308. Hazelwood demonstrates this Court's focus on prior 
discrimination as the justification for, and the limitation on, a 
State's adoption of race-based remedies. See also Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 
(1971). 
Unlike the analysis in Hazelwood, the role model theory 
employed by the District Court has no logical stopping point. 
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The role model theory allows the Board to engage in discrimi-
natory hiring and layoff practices long past the point required 
by any legitimate remedial purpose. Indeed, by tying the 
required percentage of minority teachers to the percentage of 
minority students, it requires just the sort of year-to-year 
calibration the Court stated was unnecessary in Swann, 402 
U. S., at 31-32: 
"At some point these school authorities and others like 
them should have achieved full compliance with this 
Court's decision in Brown I. . . . Neither school au-
thorities nor district courts are constitutionally required 
to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial compo-
sition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to 
desegregate has been accomplished and racial dis-
crimination through official action is eliminated from the 
system." 
See also id., at 24. 
Moreover, because the role model theory does not neces-
sarily bear a relationship to the harm caused by prior dis-
criminatory hiring practices, it actually could be used to 
escape the obligation to remedy such practices by justifying 
the small percentage of black teachers by reference to the 
small percentage of black students. See United States v. 
Hazelwood School District, 392 F. Supp. 1276, 1286-1287 
(ED Mo. 1975), rev'd, 534 F. 2d 805 (CAS 1976), rev'd and 
remanded, 433 U. S. 299 (1977). Carried to its logical 
extreme, the idea that black students are better off with 
black teachers could lead to the very system the Court re-
jected in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) 
(Brown 1). 
Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a 
basis for imposing a racially classified remedy. The role 
model theory announced by the District Court and the resul-
tant holding typify this indefiniteness. There are numerous 
explanations for a disparity between the percentage of minor-
ity students and the percentage of minority faculty, many 
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of them completely unrelated to discrimination of any kind. 
In fact, there is no apparent connection between the two 
groups. Nevertheless, the District Court combined irrele-
vant comparisons between these two groups with an indis-
putable statement that there has been societal discrimina-
tion, and upheld state action predicated upon racial 
classifications. No one doubts that there has been serious 
racial discrimination in this country. But as the basis for 
· imposing discriminatory legal remedies that work against in-
nocent people, societal discriminat~on is ~nsuffici~mt and over I 
expansive. In the absence of particularized findmgs, a court 
could uphold remedies that are ageless in their reach into the 
past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future. 
B 
Respondents also now argue that their purpose in adopting 
the layoff provision was to remedy prior discrimination 
against minorities by the Jackson School District in hiring 
teachers. Public schools, like other public employers, oper-
ate under two interrelated constitutional duties. They are 
under a clear command from this Court, starting with Brown 
v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 (1955), to eliminate 
every vestige of racial segregation and discrimination in the 
schools. Pursuant to that goal, race-conscious remedial ac-
tion may be necessary. North Carolina State Board of Edu-
cation v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43, 46 (1971). On the other 
hand, public employers, including public schools, also must 
act in accordance with a "core purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment" which is to "do away with all governmentally 
imposed distinctions based on race." Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 
U. S., at 432. These related constitutional duties. are not 
always harmonious; reconciling them requires public employ-
ers to act with extraordinary care. In particular, a public 
employer like the Board must ensure that, before it embarks 
on an affirmative action program, it has convincing evidence 
that remedial action is warranted. That is, it must have 
., . 
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sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that there has 
been prior discrimination. 
Evidentiary support for the conclusion that remedial action 
is warranted becomes crucial when the remedial program is 
challenged in court by nonminority employees. In this case, 
for example, petitioners contended at trial that the remedial 
program-Article XII-had the purpose and effect of insti-
tuting a racial classification that was not justified by a reme-
dial purpose. 546 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (ED Mich. 1982). In 
such a case, the trial court must make a factual determination 
that the employer had a strong basis in evidence for its con-
clusion that remedial action was necessary. The ultimate 
burden remains with the employees to demonstrate the un-
constitutionality of an affirmative action program. But un-
less such a determination is made, an appellate court review-
ing a challenge to remedial action by nonminority employees 
cannot determine whether the race-based action is justified 
as a remedy for prior discrimination. 
Despite the fact that Article XII has spawned years of liti-
gation 'and three separate lawsuits, no such determination 
ever has been made. Although its litigation position was dif-
ferent, the Board in Jackson I and Jackson II denied the ex-
istence of prior discriminatory hiring practices. App. 33. 
This precise issue was litigated in both those suits. Both 
courts concluded that any statistical disparities were the 
result of general societal discrimination, not of prior dis-
crimination by the Board. The Board now contends that, 
given another opportunity, it could establish the existence of 
prior discrimination. Although this argument seems belated 
at this point in the proceedings, we need not consider the 
question since we conclude below that the layoff provision 
was not a legally appropriate means of achieving even a 
compelling purpose. 5 I 
5 JUSTICE MARSHALL contends that "the majority has too quickly 
assumed the absence of a legitimate factual predicate for affirmative action 
in the Jackson schools," post, at - . In support of that assertion, he 
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IV 
The Court of Appeals examined the means chosen to ac-
complish the Board's race-conscious purposes under a test of 
engages in an unprecedented reliance on non-record documents that 
respondent has "lodged" with this Court. This selective citation to factual 
materials not considered by the District Court or the Court of Appeals 
below is unusual enough by itself. My disagreement with JUSTICE MAR- C '1 
SHALL, however, is more fundamental than any disagreement over the 
heretofore unquestioned rule that this Court decides cases based on the 
record before it. JUSTICE MARSHALL does not define what he means by 
"legitimate factual predicate," nor does he demonstrate the relationship of 
these non-record materials to his undefined predicate. If, for example, his 
dissent assumes that general societal discrimination is a sufficient factual 
predicate, then there is no need to refer to respondents' lodgings as to its 
own employment history. No-one disputes that there has been race dis-
crimination in this country. If that fact alone can justify race-conscious 
action by the State, despite the Equal Protection Clause, then the dissent 
need not rely on non-record materials · to show a "legitimate factual predi-
cate." If, on the other hand, JUSTICE MARSHALL is assuming that the 
necessary factual predicate is prior discrimination by the Board, there is no 
escaping the need for a factual determination below-a determination that 
does not exist. 
The real dispute, then, is not over the state of the record. It is 
disagreement as to what constitutes a "legitimate factual predicate." If 
the necessary factual predicate is prior discrimination-that is, that race-
based state action is taken to remedy prior discrimination by the govern-
mental unit involved-then the very nature of appellate review requires 
that a factfinder determine whether the employer was justified in institut-
ing a remedial plan. Nor can the respondent unilaterally insulate itself 
from this key constitutional question by conceding that is has discriminated 
in the past, now that it is in its interest to make such a concession. Con-
trary to the dissent's assertion, the requirement of such a determination by 
the trial court is not some arbitrary barrier set up by today's opinion. 
Rather, it is a necessary result of the requirement that race-based state 
action be remedial. 
At any rate, much of the material relied on by JUSTICE MARSHALL has 
been the subject of the previous lawsuit in Jackson II, where the court 
concluded that it "had not been established that the Board had discrimi-
nated against minorities in its hiring practices." Id., at--. Moreover, 
as noted supra, at 2, in Jackson I the Board expressly denied that it had 
engaged in employment discrimination. 
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"reasonableness." That standard has no support in the deci-
sions of this Court. As demonstrated in Part II above, our 
decisions always have employed a more stringent standard-
however articulated-to test the validity of the means chosen 
by a state to accomplish its race-conscious purposes. See, I 
e. g., Palmore, 466 U. S., at 432 ("to pass constitutional 
muster, [racial classifications] must be necessary ... to the 
accomplishment of their legitimate purpose") (quoting 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 196 (1964); Fullilove, 
448 U. S., at 480 (opinion of BURGER, C. J.) ("We recognize 
the need for careful judicial evaluation to assure that any . . . 
program that employs racial or ethnic criteria to accomplish 
the objective of remedying the present effects of past dis-
crimination is narrowly tailored to the achievement of that 
goal"). 6 Under strict scrutiny the means chosen to accom- C ~ 
plish the State's asserted purpose must be specifically and l 
narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose. Fullilove, 448 
U.S., at 480 (opinion of BURGER, C. J.). 7 "Racial classifica-
6 The term "narrowly tailored," so frequently used in our cases, has 
acquired a secondary meaning. More specifically, as commentators have 
indicated, the term may be used to require consideration whether lawful 
alternative and less restrictive means could have been used. Or, as Pro-
fessor Ely has noted, the classification at issue must "fit" with greater pre-
cision than any alternative means. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse 
Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 727, n. 26 (1974) (hereinaf-
ter Ely). "[Courts] should give particularly intense scrutiny to whether a 
nonracial approach or a more narrowly tailored racial classification could 
promote the substantial interest about as well and at tolerable adminis-
trative expense." Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Pref-
erence in Law School Admissions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 578-579 (1975) 
(hereinafter Greenawalt). 
7 Several commentators have emphasized, no matter what the weight of 
the asserted governmental purpose, that the means chosen to accomplish 
the purpose should be narrowly tailored. In arguing for a form of interme-
diate scrutiny, Professor Greenawalt contends that, "while benign racial 
classifications call for some weighing of the importance of ends they call for 
even more intense scrutiny of means, especially of the administrability of 
less onerous alternative classifications." Greenawalt 565. Professor Ely 
has suggested that "special scrutiny in the suspect classification context 
84-1340-0PINION 
12 WYGANT v. JACKSON BOARD OF EDUCATION 
tions are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most 
exact connection between justification and classification." 
Id., at 537 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). 
We have recognized, however, that in order to remedy the 
effects of prior discrimination, it may be necessary to take 
race into account. As part of this Nation's dedication to 
eradicating racial discrimination, innocent persons may be 
called upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy. 
"When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to 
cure the effects of prior discrimination, such a 'sharrks funds 
to be used in contracts with minority-owned business enter-
prises. This requirement was found to be within the reme-
dial powers of Congress in part because the "actual burden 
shouldered by nonminority firms is relatively light. 'ing of the 
burden' by innocent parties is not impermissible." Id., at 
484, quoting Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 
U. S. 747 (1976).8 In Fullilove, the challenged statute 
has in fact consisted not in weighing ends but rather in insisting that the 
classification in issue fit a constitutional permissible state goal with greater 
precision than any available alternative." Ely 727, n. 26. Professor Gun-
ther argues that judicial scrutiny of legislative means is more appropriate 
than judicial weighing of the importance of the legislative purpose. Gun-
ther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A 
Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 20-21 (1972). 
8 Of course, when a state implements a race-based plan that requires 
such a sharing of the burden, it cannot justify the discriminatory effect on 
some individuals because other individuals had approved the plan. Any 
"waiver" of the right not to be dealt with by the government on the basis 
of one's race must be made by those affected. Yet JUSTICE MARSHALL 
repeatedly contends that the fact that Article XII was approved by a ma-
jority vote of the Union somehow validates this plan. He sees this case 
not in terms of individual constitutional rights, but as an allocation of bur-
dens "between two racial groups." Post, at 13. Thus, Article XII be-
comes a political compromise that "avoided placing the entire burden of 
layoffs on either the white teachers as a group or the minority teachers as a 
group." Post, at 4. But the petitioners before us today are not "the 
white teachers as a group." They are Wendy Wygant and .other individ-
uals who claim that they were fired from their jobs because of their race. 
That claim cannot be waived by petitioners' more senior colleagues. In 
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required at least 10 percent of federal public wo' 448 U. S., 
at 484. 9 
Significantly, none of the cases discussed above involved 
layoffs. 10 Here, by contrast, the means chosen to achieve the 
view of the way union seniority works, it is not surprising that while a 
straight freeze on minority layoffs was overwhelmingly rejected, a "com-
promise" eventually was reached that placed the entire burden of the com-
promise on the most junior union members. The more senior union mem-
bers simply had nothing to lose from such a compromise. See post, at 5 
("To petitioners, at the bottom of the seniority scale among white teachers, 
fell the lot of bearing the white group's proportionate share of layoffs that 
became necessary in 1982. ") The fact that such a painless accomodation 
was approved by the more senior union members six times since 1972 is 
irrelevant. The Constitution does not allocate constitutional rights to be 
distributed like bloc grants within discrete racial groups; and until it does, 
petitioners' more senior union colleagues cannot vote away petitioners' 
rights. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL also attempts to portray the layoff plan as one that 
has no real invidious effect, stating that "within the confines of constant 
minority proportions, it preserves the hierarchy of seniority in the selec-
tion of individuals for layoff." Post, at 14. That phrase merely expresses 
the tautology that layoffs are based on seniority except as to those nonmi-
nority teachers who are displaced by minority teachers with less seniority. 
This is really nothing more than group-based analysis: "each group would 
shoulder a portion of [the layoff] burden equal to its portion of the faculty." 
Post, at 4. The constitutional problem remains: the decision that petition-
ers would be laid off was based on their race. 
9 Similarly, the Court approved the hiring program in Steelworkers v. 
Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 208 (1979), in part because the plan did not "unnec-
essarily trammel the interests of the white employees." Since Weber 
involved a private company, its reasoning concerning the validity of the 
hiring plan at issue there is not directly relevant to this case, which in-
volves a state-imposed plan. No equal protection claim was presented in 
Weber. 
'
0 There are cases involving alteration of strict seniority layoffs, see, 
e. g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330 (1953); Aeronautical 
Industrial District Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U. S. 521 (1949), but they 
do not involve the critical element here-layoffs based on race. The Con-
stitution does not require layoffs to be based on strict seniority. But it 
does require the state to meet a heavy burden of justification when it 
implements a layoff plan based on race. 
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Board's asserted purposes is that of laying off nonminority 
teachers with greater seniority in order to retain minority 
teachers with less seniority. We have previously expressed 
concern over the burden that a preferential layoffs scheme 
imposes on innocent parties. See Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 
U. S. 561,· 574-576, 578-579 (1984); see also Weber, n. 9, 
supra this page, at 208 ("The plan does not require the dis-
charge of white workers and their replacement with new 
black hirees"). In cases involving valid hiring goals, the 
burden to be borne by innocent individuals is diffused to a 
considerable extent among society generally. Though hiring 
goals may burden some innocent individuals, they simply 
do not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs impose. 
Denial of a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive 
as loss of an existing job. 
Many of our cases involve union seniority plans with em-
ployees who are typically heavily dependent on wages for 
their day-to-day living. Even a temporary layoff may have 
adverse financial as well as psychological effects. A worker 
may invest many productive years in one job and one city 
with the expectation of earning the stability and security of 
seniority. "At that point, the rights and expectations sur-
rounding seniority make up what is probably the most valu-
able capital asset that the worker 'owns,' worth even more 
than the current equity in his home." Fallon & Weiler, Con-
flicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 58. 
Layoffs disrupt these settled expectations in a way that 
general hiring goals do not. 
While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclos-
ing only one of several opportunities, 11 layoffs impose the 
11 The "school admission" cases, that involve the same basic concepts as 
cases involving hiring goals, illustrate this principle. For example, in 
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (1974), while petitioner's complaint 
alleged that he had been denied admission to the University of Washington 
Law School because of his race, he also had been accepted at the Oregon, 
Idaho, Gonzaga, and Willamette Law Schools. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 
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entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular indi-
viduals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives. 
That burden is too intrusive. We therefore hold that, as a 
means of accomplishing purposes that otherwise may be 
legitimate, the Board's layoff plan is not sufficiently narrowly 
tailored.'2 Other, less intrusive means of accomplishing 
similar purposes-such as the adoption of hiring goals-are 
available. For these reasons, the Board's selection of layoffs 
as the means to accomplish even a valid purpose cannot 
satisfy the demands of the Equal Protection Clause. 13 
v 
We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
Wash. 2d 11, 30, n. 11, 507 P. 2d 1169, 1181, n. 11 (1973). The injury to 
Defunis was not of the same kind or degree as the injury that he would 
have suffered had he been removed from law school in his third year. 
Even this analogy may not rise to the level of harm suffered by a union 
member who is laid off. 
12 We have recognized, however, that in order to provide make-whole 
relief to the actual, identified victims of individual discrimination, a court 
may in an appropriate case award competitive seniority. See Franks v. 
Bowman Transportaion Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976). 
13 The Board's definition of minority to include blacks, Orientals, 
American Indians, and persons of Spanish descent, n. 2, supra, further 
illustrates the undifferentiated nature of the plan. There is no explanation 
of why the Board chose to favor these particular minorities or how in fact 
members of some of the categories can be identified. Moreover, respond-
ents have never suggested-much less formally found-that they have 
engaged in prior, purposeful discrimination against members of each of 
these minority groups. 
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WENDY WYGANT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JACKSON 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, ETC., ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[May 19, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL announced the judgment of the Court 
and delivered an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE and 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST joined, and which JUSTICE O'CONNOR 
joined in parts I, II, III-A, III-B, and V. 
This case presents the question whether a school board, 
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause,. may extend 
preferential protection against layoffs to some of its employ-
ees because of their race or national origin. 
I 
In 1972 the Jackson Board of Education, because of racial 
tension in the community that extended to its schools, consid-
ered adding a layoff provision to the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement (CBA) between the Board and the Jackson Edu-
cation Association (the Union) that would protect employees 
who were members of certain minority groups against lay-
offs. 1 The Board and the Union eventually approved a new 
'Prior to bargaining on this subject, the Minority Affairs Office of the 
Jackson Public Schools sent a questionnaire to all teachers, soliciting their 
views as to a layoff policy. The questionnaire proposed two alternatives: 
continuation of the existing straight seniority system, or a freeze of minor-
ity layoffs to ensure retention of minority teachers in exact proportion to 
the minority student population. Ninety-six percent of the teachers who 
responded to the questionnaire expressed a preference for the straight 
seniority system. 
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provision, Article XII of the CBA, covering layoffs. It 
stated: 
"In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the 
number of teachers through layoff from employment by 
the Board, teachers with the most seniority in the 
district shall be retained, except that at no time will 
there be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid 
off than the current percentage of minority personnel 
employed at the time of the layoff. In no event will the 
number given notice of possible layoff be greater than 
the number of positions to be eliminated. Each teacher 
so affected will be called back in reverse order for 
positions for which he is certificated maintaining the 
above minority balance." App. 13.2 
When layoffs became necessary in 1974, it was evident that 
adherence to the CBA would result in the layoff of tenured 
nonminority teachers while minority teachers on probation-
ary status were retained. Rather than complying with 
Article XII, the Board retained the tenured teachers and laid 
off probationary minority teachers, thus failing to maintain 
the percentage of minority personnel that existed at the time 
of the layoff. The Union, together with two minority teach-
ers who had been laid off, brought suit in federal court, id., at 
30, (Jackson Education Assn. v. Board of Education, (Jack-
son I) (mem. op.)), claiming that the Board's failure to adhere 
to the layoff provision violated the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. They also urged the District Court to 
take pendent jurisdiction over state law contract claims. In 
its answer the Board denied any prior employment dis-
crimination and argued that the layoff provision conflicted 
with the Michigan Teacher Tenure Act. App. 33. Follow-
2 Article VII of the CBA defined "minority group personnel" as "those 
employees who are Black, American Indian, Oriental, or of Spanish 
descendancy." App. 15. 
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ing trial, the District Court sua sponte concluded that it 
lacked jurisdiction over the case, in part because there was 
insufficient evidence to support the plaintiffs' claim that the 
Board had engaged in discriminatory hiring practices prior to 
1972, id., at 35-37, and in part because the plaintiffs had not 
fulfilled the jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII claim by 
filing discrimination charges with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission. After dismissing the federal 
claims, the District Court declined to exercise pendent juris-
diction over the state law contract claims. 
Rather than taking an appeal, the plaintiffs instituted 
a suit in state court, Jackson Education Assn. v. Board 
of Education, No. 77-011484CZ (Jackson County Circuit 
Court, 1979) (Jackson II), raising in essence the same claims 
that had been raised in Jackson I. In entering judgment for 
the plaintiffs, the state court found that the Board had 
breached its contract with the plaintiffs, and that Article XII 
did not violate the Michigan Teacher Tenure Act. In reject-
ing the Board's argument that the layoff provision violated 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the state court found that it 
"ha[d] not been established that the board had discriminated 
against minorities in its hiring practices. The minority 
representation on the faculty was the result of societal racial 
discrimination." App. 43. The state court also found that 
"[t]here is no history of overt past discrimination by the 
parties to this contract." ld., at 49. Nevertheless, the 
court held that Article XII was permissible, despite its dis-
criminatory effect on nonminority teachers, as an attempt to 
remedy the effects of societal discrimination. 
After Jackson II, the Board adhered to Article XII. As a 
result, during the 1976-1977 and 1981-1982 school years, 
nonminority teachers were laid off, while minority teachers 
with less seniority were retained. The displaced nonminor-
ity teachers, petitioners here, brought suit in Federal Dis-
trict Court, alleging violations of the Equal Protection 
Clause, Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and other federal and 
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state statutes. On cross motions for summary judgment, 
the District Court dismissed all of petitioners' claims. With 
respect to the equal protection claim, 3 the District Court held 
that the racial preferences granted by the Board need not be 
grounded on a finding of prior discrimination. Instead, the 
court decided that the racial preferences were permissible 
under the Equal Protection Clause as an attempt to remedy 
societal discrimination by providing "role models" for minor-
ity schoolchildren, and upheld the constitutionality of the 
layoff provision. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, 
largely adopting the reasoning and language of the District 
Court. 746 F. 2d 1152 (1984). We granted certiorari, 471 
U. S. -- (1985), to resolve the important issue of the 
constitutionality of race-based layoffs by public employers. 
We now reverse. 
II 
Petitioners' central claim is that they were laid off because 
of their race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Decisions by faculties and admin-
istrators of public schools based on race or ethnic origin are 
reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 This Court 
has "consistently repudiated '[d]istinctions between citizens 
solely because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to a free 
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of 
equality,'" Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967) quoting 
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943). 
"Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently sus-
pect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination." 
Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 
291 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J., joined by WHITE, J.) 
3 Petitioners have sought review in this Court only of their claim based 
on the Equal Protection Clause. 
• School district collective bargaining agreements constitute state action 
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Abood v. Detroit Board 
of Ed., 431 U. S. 209, 218, and n. 12 (1977). 
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The Court has recognized that the level of scrutiny does 
not change merely because the challenged classification oper-
ates against a group that historically has not been subject to 
governmental discrimination. Mississippi University for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 724 n.9 (1982); Bakke, 
438 U. S., at 291-299; see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 
22 (1948); see also A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 
133 (1975). In this case, Article XII of the CBA operates 
against whites and in favor of certain minorities, and 
therefore constitutes a classification based on race. "Any 
preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily 
receive a most searching examination to make sure that it 
does not conflict with constitutional guarentees." Fullilove 
v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 491 (1980) (opinion of BURGER, 
C. J.). There are two prongs to this examination. First, 
any racial classification "must be justified by a compelling 
governmental interest." Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S. 429, 
432 (1984); see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967); cf. 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 375 (1971) (alienage). 
Second, the means chosen by the State to effectuate its 
purpose must be "narrowly tailored to the achievement of 
that goal." Fullilove, 448 U. S., at 480. We must decide 
whether the layoff provision is supported by. a compelling 
state purpose and whether the means chosen to accomplish 
that purpose are narrowly tailored. 
III 
A 
The Court of Appeals, relying on the reasoning and lan-
guage of the District Court's opinion, held that the Board's 
interest in providing minority role models for its minority 
students, as an attempt to alleviate the effects of societal 
discrimination, was sufficiently important to justify the racial 
classification embodied in the layoff provision. 746 F. 2d, at 
1156-1157. The court discerned a need for more minority 
faculty role models by finding that the percentage of minority 
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teachers was less than the percentage of minority students. 
ld., at 1156. 
This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone 
is sufficient to justify a racial classification. Rather, the 
Court has insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination 
by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited 
use of racial classifications in order to remedy such dis-
crimination. This Court's reasoning in Hazelwood School 
District v. United States, 433 U. S. 299 (1977), illustrates 
that the relevant analysis in cases involving proof of 
discrimination by statistical disparity focuses on those 
disparities that demonstrate such prior governmental dis-
crimination. In Hazelwood the Court concluded that, absent 
employment discrimination by the school board, "'nondis-
criminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force 
more or less representative of the racial and ethnic compo-
sition of the population in the community from which the 
employees are hired."' Id., at 307, quoting Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U. S. 324, 340, n. 20 (1977). See also 
Wygant, supra, 746 F. 2d, at 1160 (Wellford, J., concurring) 
("Had the plaintiffs in this case presented data as to the 
percentage of qualified minority teachers in the relevant 
labor market to show that defendant Board's hiring of black 
teachers over a number of years had equalled that figure, I 
believe this court may well have been required to re-
verse .. . . ") Based on that reasoning, the Court in Hazel-
wood held that the proper comparison for determining the ex-
istence of actual discrimination by the school board was 
"between the racial composition of [the school's] teaching 
staff and the racial composition of the qualified public school 
teacher population in the relevant labor market." 433 U. S., 
at 308. Hazelwood demonstrates this Court's focus on prior 
discrimination as the justification for, and the limitation on, a 
State's adoption of race-based remedies. See also Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 
(1971). 
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Unlike the analysis in Hazelwood, the role model theory 
employed by the District Court has no logical stopping point. 
The role model theory allows the Board to engage in discrimi-
natory hiring and layoff practices long past the point required 
by any legitimate remedial purpose. Indeed, by tying the 
required percentage of minority teachers to the percentage of 
minority students, it requires just the sort of year-to-year 
calibration the Court stated was unnecessary in Swann, 402 
U. S., at 31-32: 
"At some point these school authorities and others like 
them should have achieved full compliance with this 
Court's decision in Brown I. . . . Neither school au-
thorities nor district courts are constitutionally required 
to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial compo-
sition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to 
desegregate has been accomplished and racial dis-
crimination through official action is eliminated from the 
system." 
See also id., at 24. 
Moreover, because the role model theory does not neces-
sarily bear a relationship to the harm caused by prior dis-
criminatory hiring practices, it actually could be used to 
escape the obligation to remedy such practices by justifying 
the small percentage of black teachers by reference to the 
small percentage of black students. See United States v. 
Hazelwood School District, 392 F. Supp. 1276, 1286-1287 
(ED Mo. 1975), rev'd, 534 F. 2d 805 (CA8 1976), rev'd and 
remanded, 433 U. S. 299 (1977). Carried to its logical 
extreme, the idea that black students are better off with 
black teachers could lead to the very system the Court 
rejected in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 
(1954) (Brown 1). 
Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a 
basis for imposing a racially classified remedy. The role 
model theory announced by the District Court and the resul-
tant holding typify this indefiniteness. There are numerous 
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explanations for a disparity between the percentage of minor-
ity students and the percentage of minority faculty, many 
of them completely unrelated to discrimination of any kind. 
In fact, there is no apparent connection between the two 
groups. Nevertheless, the District Court combined irrele-
vant comparisons between these two groups with an indis-
putable statement that there has been societal discrimina-
tion, and upheld state action predicated upon racial 
classifications. No one doubts that there has been serious 
racial discrimination in this country. But as the basis for 
imposing discriminatory legal remedies that work against in-
nocent people, societal discrimination is insufficient and over 
expansive. In the absence of particularized findings, a court 
could uphold remedies that are ageless in their reach into the 
past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future. 
B 
Respondents also now argue that their purpose in adopting 
the layoff provision was to remedy prior discrimination 
against minorities by the Jackson School District in hiring 
teachers. Public schools, like other public employers, oper-
ate under two interrelated constitutional duties. They are 
under a clear command from this Court, starting with Brown 
v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 (1955); to eliminate 
every vestige of racial segregation and discrimination in the 
schools. Pursuant to that goal, race-conscious remedial ac-
tion may be necessary. North Carolina State Board of Edu-
cation v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43, 46 (1971). On the other 
hand, public employers, including public schools, also must 
act in accordance with a "core purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment" which is to "do away with all governmentally 
imposed distinctions based on race." Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 
U. S., at 432. These related constitutional duties are not 
always harmonious; reconciling them requires public employ-
ers to act with extraordinary care. In particular, a public 
employer like the Board must ensure that, before it embarks 
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on an affirmative action program, it has convincing evidence 
that remedial action is warranted. That is, it must have 
sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that there has 
been prior discrimination. 
Evidentiary support for the conclusion that remedial action 
is warranted becomes crucial when the remedial program is 
challenged in court by nonminority employees. In this case, 
for example, petitioners contended at trial that the remedial 
program-Article XU-had the purpose and effect of insti-
tuting a racial classification that was not justified by a reme-
dial purpose. 546 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (ED Mich. 1982). In 
such a case, the trial court must make a factual determination 
that the employer had a strong basis in evidence for its con-
clusion that remedial action was necessary. The ultimate 
burden remains with the employees to demonstrate the un-
constitutionality of an affirmative action program. But un-
less such a determination is made, an appellate court review-
ing a challenge to remedial action by nonminority employees 
cannot determine whether the race-based action is justified 
as a remedy for prior discrimination. 
Despite the fact that Article XII has spawned years of liti-
gation and three separate lawsuits, no such determination 
ever has been made. Although its litigation position was dif-
ferent, the Board in Jackson I and Jackson II denied the ex-
istence of prior discriminatory hiring practices. App. 33. 
This precise issue was litigated in both those suits. Both 
courts concluded that any statistical disparities were the 
result of general societal discrimination, not of prior dis-
crimination by the Board. The Board now contends that, 
given another opportunity, it could establish the existence of 
prior discrimination. Although this argument seems belated 
at this point in the proceedings, we need not consider the 
question since we conclude below that the layoff provision 
was not a legally appropriate means of achieving even a 
• · 
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compelling purpose. 5 
IV 
The Court of Appeals examined the means chosen to ac-
complish the Board's race-conscious purposes under a test of 
6JUSTICE MARSHALL contends that "the majority has too quickly 
assumed the absence of a legitimate factual predicate for affirmative action 
in the Jackson schools," post, at--. In support of that assertion, he 
engages in an unprecedented reliance on non-record documents that 
respondent has "lodged" with this Court. This selective citation to factual 
materials not considered by the District Court or the Court of Appeals 
below is unusual enough by itself. My disagreement with JUSTICE 
MARSHALL, however, is more fundamental than any disagreement over the 
heretofore unquestioned rule that this Court decides cases based on the 
record before it. JUSTICE MARSHALL does not define what he means by 
"legitimate factual predicate," nor does he demonstrate the relationship of 
these non-record materials to his undefined predicate. If, for example, his 
dissent assumes that general societal discrimination is a sufficient factual 
predicate, then there is no need to refer to respondents' lodgings as to 
its own employment history. No-one disputes that there has been race 
discrimination in this country. If that fact alone can justify race-conscious 
action by the State, despite the Equal Protection Clause, then the dissent 
need not rely on non-record materials to show a "legitimate factual predi-
cate." If, on the other hand, JUSTICE MARSHALL is assuming that the 
necessary factual predicate is prior discrimination by the Board, there is no 
escaping the need for a factual determination below-a determination that 
does not exist. 
The real dispute, then, is not over the state of the record. It is 
disagreement as to what constitutes a "legitimate factual predicate." If 
the necessary factual predicate is prior discrimination-that is, that race-
based state action is taken to remedy prior discrimination by the govern-
mental unit involved-then the very nature of appellate review requires 
that a factfinder determine whether the employer was justified in institut-
ing a remedial plan. Nor can the respondent unilaterally insulate itself 
from this key constitutional question by conceding that is has discriminated 
in the past, now that it is in its interest to make such a concession. Con-
trary to the dissent's assertion, the requirement of such a determination by 
the trial court is not some arbitrary barrier set up by today's opinion. 
Rather, it is a necessary result of the requirement that race-based state 
action be remedial. 
At any rate, much of the material relied on by JUSTICE MARSHALL has 
been the subject of the previous lawsuit in Jackson II, where the court 
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"reasonableness." That standard has no support in the deci-
sions of this Court. As demonstrated in Part II above, our 
decisions always have employed a more stringent standard-
however articulated-to test the validity of the means chosen 
by a state to accomplish its race-conscious purposes. See, 
e. g., Palmore, 466 U. S., at 432 ("to pass constitutional 
muster, [racial classifications] must be necessary ... to the 
accomplishment of their legitimate purpose") (quoting 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 196 (1964); Fullilove, 
448 U. S., at 480 (opinion of BURGER, C. J.) ("We recognize 
the need for careful judicial evaluation to assure that any ... 
program that employs racial or ethnic criteria to accomplish 
the objective of remedying the present effects of past dis-
crimination is narrowly tailored to the achievement of that 
goal"). 6 Under strict scrutiny the means chosen to accom-
plish the State's asserted purpose must be specifically and 
narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose. Fullilove, 448 
U.S., at 480 (opinion of BURGER, C. J.). 7 "Racial classifica-
concluded that it "had not been established that the Board had discrimi-
nated against minorities in its hiring practices." /d., at--. Moreover, 
as noted supra, at 2, in Jackson I the Board expressly denied that it had 
engaged in employment discrimination. 
6 The term "narrowly tailored," so frequently used in our cases, has 
acquired a secondary meaning. More specifically, as commentators have 
indicated, the term may be used to require consideration whether lawful 
alternative and less restrictive means could have been used. Or, as Pro-
fessor Ely has noted, the classification at issue must "fit" with greater pre-
cision than any alternative means. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse 
Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 727, n. 26 (1974) (hereinaf-
ter Ely). "[Courts] should give particularly intense scrutiny to whether a 
nonracial ;lpproach or a more narrowly tailored racial classification could 
promote the substantial interest about as well and at tolerable adminis-
trative expense." Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Pref-
erence in Law School Admissions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 578-579 (1975) 
(hereinafter Greenawalt). 
7 Several commentators have emphasized, no matter what the weight of 
the asserted governmental purpose, that the 'TIUlans chosen to accomplish 
the purpose should be narrowly tailored. In arguing for a form of interme-
diate scrutiny, Professor Greenawalt contends that, ''while benign racial 
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tions are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most 
exact connection between justification and classification." 
Id., at 537 (STEVENS, J. , dissenting). 
We have recognized, however, that in order to remedy the 
effects of prior discrimination, it may be necessary to take 
race into account. As part of this Nation's dedication to 
eradicating racial discrimination, innocent persons may be 
called upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy. 
"When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to 
cure the effects of prior discrimination, such a 'sharing of the 
burden' by innocent parties is not impermissible." Id., at 
484, quoting Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 
U. S. 747 (1976).8 In Fullilove, the challenged statute 
classifications call for some weighing of the importance of ends they call for 
even more intense scrutiny of means, especially of the administrability of 
less onerous alternative classifications." Greenawalt 565. Professor Ely 
has suggested that "special scrutiny in the suspect classification context 
has in fact consisted not in weighing ends but rather in insisting that the 
classification in issue fit a constitutional permissible state goal with greater 
precision than any available alternative." Ely 727, n. 26. Professor Gun-
ther argues that judicial scrutiny of legislative means is more appropriate 
than judicial weighing of the importance of the legislative purpose. Gun-
ther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A 
Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1; 20-21 (1972). 
8 Of course, when a state implements a race-based plan that requires 
such a sharing of the burden, it cannot justify the discriminatory effect on 
some individuals because other individuals had approved the plan. Any 
"waiver" of the right not to be dealt with by the government on the basis 
of one's race must be made by those affected. Yet JUSTICE MARSHALL 
repeatedly contends that the fact that Article XII was approved by a ma-
jority vote of the Union somehow validates this plan. He sees this case 
not in tenns of individual constitutional rights, but as an allocation of bur-
dens "between two racial groups." Post , at 13. Thus, Article XII be-
comes a political compromise that "avoided placing the entire burden of 
layoffs on either the white teachers as a group or the minority teachers as a 
group." Post, at 4. But the petitioners before us today are not "the 
white teachers as a group." They are Wendy Wygant and other individ-
uals who claim that they were fired from their jobs because of their race. 
That claim cannot be waived by petitioners' more senior colleagues. In 
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required at least 10 percent of federal public works funds to 
be used in contracts with minority-owned business enter-
prises. This requirement was found to be within the reme-
dial powers of Congress in part because the "actual burden 
shouldered by nonminority firms is relatively light." 448 
U. S., at 484. 9 
Significantly, none of the cases discussed above involved 
layoffs. 10 Here, by contrast, the means chosen to achieve the 
view of the way union seniority works, it is not surprising that while a 
"straight freeze on minority layoffs was overwhelmingly rejected, a "com-
promise" eventually was reached that placed the entire burden of the com-
promise on the most junior union members. The more senior union mem-
bers simply had nothing to lose from such a compromise. See post, at 5 
("To petitioners, at the bottom of the seniority scale among white teachers, 
fell the lot of bearing the white group's proportionate share of layoffs that 
became necessary in 1982. ") The fact that such a painless accomodation 
was approved by the more senior union members six times since 1972 is 
irrelevant. The Constitution does not allocate constitutional rights to be 
distributed like bloc grants within discrete racial groups; and until it does, 
petitioners' more senior union colleagues cannot vote away petitioners' 
rights. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL also attempts to portray the layoff plan as one that 
has no real invidious effect, stating that ''within the confines of constant 
minority proportions, it preserves the hierarchy of seniot:ity in the selec-
tion of individuals for layoff." Post, at 14. That phrase merely expresses 
the tautology that layoffs are based on seniority except as to those nonmi-
nority teachers who are displaced by minority teachers with less seniority. 
This is really nothing more than group-based analysis: "each group would 
shoulder a portion of [the layoff] burden equal to its portion of the faculty." 
Post, at 4. The constitutional problem remains: the decision that petition-
ers would be laid off was based on their race. 
'Similarly, the Court approved the hiring program in Steelworkers v. 
Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 208 (1979), in part because the plan did not "unnec-
essarily trammel the interests of the white employees." Since Weber 
involved a private company, its reasoning concerning the validity of the 
hiring plan at issue there is not directly relevant to this case, which 
involves a state-imposed plan. No equal protection claim was presented in 
Weber. 
10 There are cases involving alteration of strict seniority layoffs, see, 
e. g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330 (1953); Aeronautical 
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Board's asserted purposes is that of laying off nonminority 
teachers with greater seniority in order to retain minority 
teachers with less seniority. We have previously expressed 
concern over the burden that a preferential layoffs scheme 
imposes on innocent parties. See Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 
U. S. 561, 574-576, 578-579 (1984); see also Weber, n. 9, 
supra this page, at 208 ("The plan does not require the dis-
charge of white workers and their replacement with new 
black hirees"). In cases involving valid hiring goals, the 
burden to be borne by innocent individuals is diffused to a 
considerable extent among society generally. Though hiring 
goals may burden some innocent individuals, they simply 
do not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs impose. 
Denial of a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive 
as loss of an existing job. 
Many of our cases involve union seniority plans with em-
ployees who are typically heavily dependent on wages for 
their day-to-day living. Even a temporary layoff may have 
adverse financial as well as psychological effects. A worker 
may invest many productive years in one job and one city 
with the expectation of earning the stability and security of 
seniority. "At that point, the rights and expectations sur-
rounding seniority make up what is probably the most valu-
able capital asset that the worker 'owns,' worth even more 
than the current equity in his home." Fallon & Weiler, Con-
flicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 58. 
Layoffs disrupt these settled expectations in a way that 
general hiring goals do not. 
While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclos-
ing only one of several opportunities, 11 layoffs impose the 
Industrial District Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U. S. 521 (1949), but they 
do not involve the critical element here-layoffs based on race. The 
Constitution does not require layoffs to be based on strict seniority. But it 
does require the state to meet a heavy burden of justification when it 
implements a layoff plan based on race. 
11 The "school admission" cases, which involve the same basic concepts as 
cases involving hiring goals, illustrate this principle. For example, in 
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (1974), while petitioner's complaint 
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entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular indi-
viduals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives. 
That burden is too intrusive. We therefore hold that, as a 
means of accomplishing purposes that otherwise may be 
legitimate, the Board's layoff plan is not sufficiently narrowly 
tailored. 12 Other, less intrusive means of accomplishing 
similar purposes-such as the adoption of hiring goals-are 
available. For these reasons, the Board's selection of layoffs 
as the means to accomplish even a valid purpose cannot 
satisfy the demands of the Equal Protection Clause. 13 
v 
We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
alleged that he had been denied admission to the University of Washington 
Law School because of his race, he also had been accepted at the Oregon, · 
Idaho, Gonzaga, and Willamette Law Schools. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 
Wash. 2d 11, 30, n. 11, 507 P. 2d 1169, 1181, n. 11 (1973). The injury to 
Defunis was not of the same kind or degree as the injury that he would 
have suffered had he been removed from law school in his third year. 
Even this analogy may not rise to the level of harm suffered by a union 
member who is laid off. 
12 We have recognized, however, that in order to provide make-whole 
relief to the actual, identified victims of individual discrimination, a court 
may in an appropriate case award competitive seniority. See Franks v. 
Bowman Transportaion Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976). 
11 The Board's definition of minority to include blacks, Orientals, 
American Indians, and persons of Spanish descent, n. 2, supra, further 
illustrates the undifferentiated nature of the plan. There is no explanation 
of why the Board chose to favor these particular minorities or how in fact 
members of some of the categories can be identified. Moreover, respond-
ents have never suggested-much less formally found-that they have 
engaged in prior, purposeful discrimination against members of each of 
these minority groups. 
